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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"Your deeper ideals always depend upon 
viewing life in the light of larger 
unities than now appear, upon viewing 
yourself as a co-worker with the uni-
verse for the attainment of what no 
present human game of action can now 
reveal." WJ p.38. 
. - ··- -· .. 
"·~·- ----·-----·- -----
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: I 
G~ 
'•,• 
PART ONE INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem. 
~e problem which this stud7 seeks to investigate is the 
philosophy of religion or Josiah Royce. It is to be first of all 
a historical and factual study, aiming to discover what Royce's 
philosophical views concerning religion were. These data are 
scattered throughout a great number of unconnected sources covering 
a period of over thirty-five years. The assembling of this material 
is the first and most fundamental task~ The second aim, not remote 
from the first, is to arrange these facts in an organic way. Royce 
is systematic in his philosophical procedure, and yet his utterances 
on religion are nowhere complete. Each problem is enmeshed in a 
network of other problems of less direct religious bearing, and each 
network is treated more or less apart. It is necessary to discover 
the implicit connections between these different statements and or-
ganize them into a whole that shall stand as a true and consecutive 
presentation of Royce's philosophy of religion. Part Two is given 
to this exposition and the order followed is a dialectical movement 
characteristic of Royce's search for the experience and meaning of 
the Real. 
The third aim of our study is critical. It believes that 
no one undersyqnds until he appreciates, and therefore seeks to see 
what Royce sees and value what he values. Furthermore it finds 
Royce misunderstood by many critics and seeks to correct such misin-
3. 
terpretations. On the other hand, there is much criticism that is 
just, and beyond this there is additional critical ground to cover. 
There are subtle difficulties whose logical outcome needs to be 
followed through to the end. In short, our aim is to evaluate 
· historically, constructively and critically the Roycean philosophy 
as an interpretation of religion. 
This is not an altogether untouched field of investiga-
tion. Josiah Royce, during the span of his productive life-time, 
attracted no little comment. The critical reviews of his chief 
works in contemporary philosophical periodicals are of ~irst im-
portance in this connection. References to these will appear in 
the notes and bibliographies. The reviews by John Dewey, J. E. 
Creighton, J. E. McTaggart, R. B. Perry, A. K. Rogers, w. R. Sorley, 
F. Thilly, w. E. Hocking, L. P. Jacks and w. A. Brown are the most 
valuable. Critical articles other than book reviews have also 
appeared in these periodicals, of which J. W. Buckham1 snThe Con-
(1) 
tribution of Professor Royce to Christian Thought" is the most 
to the point. 
(2) 
E. s. Carr's article on11Roycets Philosophy of 
Religion" is too polemical to be serviceable. G. Marcel's 
I (3) 
serial article "La Metaphysique de Josiah Royce 11 is the most 
comprehensive. 
For biographical material as well as criticism a chap-
ter on Royce in Santayana's Character and Opinion in the United (4) - --
States is good. A. K. Rogers treatment of Royce in English 
( 5) 
and American Philosophy since 1800 is clarifying. J. Loewen-
(6) 
berg's editorial introduction to Royce's Fugitive Essays is 
commendable in the highest sense. J. H. Philp's Ph.D. thesis 
on ·The Principle of Individuality in the Philosophy of Josiah (7) - - - - - ..;;..___.;,;..;; 
Royce is inadequate as a fair treatment of that problem but is 
suggestive in its criticism. 
: ·~•·' .. (~; · ' 
.· 
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4. 
M. J. Aronson has recently published La Philosophie Morale de Josiah 
(8} --
Royce, an essay which treats Royce in the background of a historical 
survey of social idealism in the United States. 
rather than critical. 
It is expository 
Without doubt the most valuable material gathered together 
in one volume are the Papers in Honor or Josiah Royce ~ ~ Sixtieth 
(9) 
Birthday, published by the Philosophical Review. This volume of 
two hundred nine~y-four pages contains twenty articles on Royce, a 
brief autobiography by Josiah Royce and a bibliography by Banjamin 
Rand. This bibliography is so exhaustive up to that date that our 
General Bibliography will not:undertake to duplicate it, but only to 
supplement it. The list of contributors to this volume is a roll of 
America's leading philosophers and the range of subjects discussed 
is quite inclusive. It is hard to say which of these have not con-
tributed to our study of Royce. But it is not difficult to assign 
the place of first importance to M. w. Calkins article on The Founda-
(10) 
~ ~ Royce 1 s Philosophy for Christian Theism. Though only 
eleven pages in length, its thorough research and discerning insight 
rank it with Loewenberg 1 s introduction to Fugitive Essays as one of 
the two most important investigations bearing upon our subject. 
2. Josiah Royce. 
Josiah Royce was born November 20, 1855 at Grass Valley, 
a mining town in the Sierra Nevada range, California. In this pio-
neer town, which he recalls as five or six years older than himself, 
the boy and his world grew up together until the family moved to San 
Francisco. 
. ----- --- -------------···---·----
- ~~-, ----- -· 
5. 
In the year 18b6 he entered Grammar School in that city a 
(11) 
"redheaded, freckled, countrified" boy, among a thousand other 
boys. In 1871 he entered the University of California, where he 
studied under such teachers as Joseph Le Conte and Edward Rowland 
Sill. He was graduated in 1875. After this he studied in Germany, 
and from there returned to Johns Hopkins University completing his 
Ph.D. studies in 1778. 
During the next four years he was engaged in teaching 
English at the University of California~ His approach to literature 
was that of a lover and a scholar. His love of literature shines 
throughout his ~ntire work, his scholar's passion for profounder 
truth appears in these early years. From this period came most of 
(12) 
the writings published posthumously under the title Fugitive Essays, 
showing a thoughtful philosophy of literature. In this period also 
we find·him not content to teach English in the usual way, but intent 
upon laying for it a foundation of logic. Thus he wrote a Primer (13) 
£! L0 gical Analysis .~ ~ ~ £! Composition Students. 
In 1882 he was called to Harvard University where he taught 
until his death, S~ptember 14~ 1916. During these years he published 
sixteen volumes and more than eighty articles on philosophical and 
allied subjects. His productive labors have been prodigious. The 
bibliography which Benjamin Rand compiled in Royce's sixtieth year 
lists a total of one hundred fourteen works, contributions and arti-
(14) 
cles. 
But Royce's business was the work of a teacher. His writ-
ings come not from the cloister of a recluse. "Woe unto the man", 
(15) 
says Royce, "who can do nothing but be thoughtful." A »emarkable 
thing about Professor Royce was his ability not to·be hurried, - to 
investigate patiently, to reason carefully, to think profourldly, to 
stop and listen as long as any one wished to criticize. And yet it 
is not surprizing in view of his love for the human values. This no 
doubt was one of the secrets of his success as a teacher. In the 
6. 
class room, and in the Seminar where the atmosphere was freer, he was 
at his best. A member of eight Royce Seminars considers his power to 
answer questions one of his best traits as a teacher. "When students 
ask him questions he does not discourage them by having the answer on 
the tip of the tongue. He often had to think before answering- most 
ral!9 and precious trait in a teacher1 - and sometimes he talres a question 
under advisement and hands down his decision at a later meeting. That 
encourages us ••• For he saw all around the question and often answered 
(16) 
what it meant as well as what it said." 
In a literal sense Royce's work was his life. He requested 
that no biography should be published, choosing for himself as he once 
(17) 
said of Shelley that his "character we must seek in his works." His 
work was the pursuit of truth wherever it might reasonably be found and 
loyalty to the highest values of the communal life of which he was an 
eager part. 
3. A Growing Philosophy. 
Josiah Royce was not one to strain after originality. "It 
is as vain to be a mere seeker of novelities as it is to be a mere con-
(18) 
servative." "For it is as fickle to disagree with everybody as it 
(19) is to agree with everybody." He sought no royal road to philosophy 
but traveled e.xhyli'stively its historical paths. His first aim was to 
·'t 
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gain for himself the values of the past, with fresh understanding and 
interpretation. "Faithfulness to history is the beginning of creative 
(20) 
wisdom." There was no lack of ·new arguments or reinterpretations 
but he comes as one seeking not to destroy but to fulfil. 
So we find in Royce a growing philosophy. To be sure 
there are remarkably clear anticipations in his early v~itings of 
(21) 
the later system. Very few earl~ ideas are ever discarded, but 
equally few ideas fail to grow. His philosophy developed not by 
uprooting and replanting but by the enrichment and fulfilment of ri-
pening maturity. Logically rounded out as his system was, it bears 
no evidence of ever becoming finally complete in the mind of its 
author. An open mind abhors unalterable conclusions as nature does 
a vacuum. The last volume published before his death records growth 
"during the last two years" and confesses a "longing to see how the 
nheory of 'interpretation' ••• would bear the test of an application 
(22) 
to new problems". 
The last series of lecture~ which Professor Royce deliv-
ered as Philosophy ~ in Harvard College likewise reveals growth. Of 
special interest here is a kind of mental autobiography which he un-
folds to hi s students. On January 11, 1916,he devoted the entire 
lecture period to re-tracing the early influences, problems and 
reasonings which led to the forging of his system. With the kind 
permission of Professor w. E. Hocking who holds the manuscript of 
this unpublished series of lectures, we will here introduce , 
( .• 
. \" ) Royce's own account of his early philosophical growth • 
.. 
11 I began the study of philosophy before I ever read 
any German idealism,· which was quite unknown to me until 
I had become acquainted with Mill ••• I became through 
Mill 1 s influence a decidedly skeptical crJtical empiri-
cist, with this result. We all desire to_, ~uided by 
womething reasonable, we intend to discover what we ought 
to think and the standards by which thought should be 
guided. You can never find these in the Scottish way 
through intuition of first or fundamental truths. 
'' 
'' 
------~ --
. ------.. :-
e. 
If you do, you are always subject to the criticism: Do you 
believe these doctrines about the nature of things because 
you are tempted to? Then they are mere persuasions, they 
are faiths. or do you found them on particular experiences? 
Then they have no necessity about them. Therefore 'nec-
essary' or 'fundamental' truths must fail as the basis of 
thinking. Herbert Spencer's effort to restate the necessary 
truths on the basis of his evolutionary theory never satis-
fied me. 
"It was in such a mood that I turned to German phil-
osophy, to Kant and to Fichte especially, and by way of 
an episode, to Schopenhauer. These were the three German 
philosophers who influenced me. This was the time from 
1875 when I first began to study in Germany to the time 
when I came to Harvard to teach seven years later. The 
years 1875 to 1883 determined my philosophical thinking. 
Kant seemed to me for a while to have a very definite 
solution to my problem, but I found it very difficult to 
understand. In the Spirit of Modern Philosophy I have 
set forth my efforts to get ax what Kant had in mind. The 
nao-Kantian movement was prominent at Leipsic where I 
studied. There I heard some of the liveliest of the neo-
Kantians set forth their ideas of the problems. I also 
heard Wundt. 
"Kant more and more tended to abandon the Dirg an sich, 
but insisted that experience conforms to certain generar--
forms which the nature of the knowing intelligence defines, 
so that the intelligence predetermines in its general form 
what sorts of objects it can regard as real objects, and 
therefore the sort of world that we must regard as the real 
world, though objective. Over against Mill's empiricism 
this doctrine had a certain intennal absoluteness about it. 
Mill left you to the data of sense, to the endlessly shift-
ing variety of the fortunes of experience. This realm of 
experience as interpreted by science tends to take on the 
form of law... The forms of intelligence are impressed 
upon that which we regard as nature. But that which we re-
gard as nature is a kind of shadow, a phenomenon of a real-
ity that we can never find. The metaphysical problem is 
insoluble according to Kant ••• 
, .P __ ''ft 
"I was influenced somewhat by the impressive personal-
ity of Lotze whom I heard at GBttingen. He always presented 
his metaphysic in a tentative way. He was accustomed to say, 
not This is the solution, but It would appear to us thus. 
He wa:sa tnoroughly gen:Sle soui; tfiiiid in his ma:niier:--The 
lesson I drew from Lotze was that man's convictions were not 
his. innate ideas but his postulates. Fichte•s philosophy 
had that feature; a man's philosophy was an expression of 
the kind of man he was. 
''when I came to Harvard in 1882 to teach I brought this: 
We are in a position of postulates, voluntary attitudes, will 
attitudes towards the world and our purpose as philosophers 
is to reflect on these and to bring them into some kind of 
-"--------~-~------------ ---------------------- ----.... ----· ---------~=----=~----·-------------- ~----=-· ___,_,:==z::~~ 
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union and also to attach them to experience. On so much 
our philosophy depends. But the difficulty is that ~ur 
general opinions, the categories of your understanding, 
are useful to you only so far as they give you views which 
you state in universal propositions. You want your postu-
lates to tell you something universally true: but so far as 
you deal with particulars, your difficulty is to attach your 
postulates to your empirical data. The philosopher must be 
guided by postulates which he doesn't atempt to verify, but 
only asserts, or which he verifies by verifications which 
are matters of the moment. A truth ethical or spiritual is 
never contained in a moment. A general truth is never 
illustrated by experience, and must be defined in terms of 
a postulate. We want to be guided by experience, but never 
can be guided by experience except at this and that moment; 
and hence we never get in experience a survey of the whole, 
the synoptic view which gives you necessary laws. We are af 
the mercy of what happens at the present. What we want is 
the insight to assert something about the nature of the 
world. We are always left with postulates on our hands 
which are statements about what we are not now verifying 
in experience, and yet we want to verify them. 
"I f'elt what an inadequate preparation this was for 
teaching philosoph¥. I could say to men, You actually 1~ 
on postulates, on voluntary attitudes, treatin&rthe world 
as if it were thus and thus; you act in a mo~ courageous 
assertion. You always want verification but experience 
teaches you only what is present at the moment. The diff-
iculty would always occur if I tell them Be bold, be brave, 
take life at a risk, (that) I apparently lei't-:ai'em 'EO ca·prlce; 
I au tii"''FF'ze<! anything, any absurdity. On the other hand~ if 
I said Look at the facts of experience, I had nothing to 
show them-Dut~present:-;. 
"I gradually came in sight of the contradictions which 
I now set forth in connection with the study of the problem 
of truth and error. They came to me in the form of a some-
what insistent self-criticism which appeared when I tried to 
state this very doctrine in a definite form. What I know 
about the world is that something or other is present in 
present experience and somewhat or other is postulated. 
Kant supposed that the postulates could be defined as perma-
nent categories. Try to conceive your world in those terms 
and what have you? . The assertion that there is a present 
moment in experience. The present moment is the datum, 
the rest postulate. The future is postulated: volunt~rrstic­
ally one views the future as if it were to be. Voluntar-
istically one views the past as if it had been. Space is 
viewed as if extended indefinitely. If one asks what makes 
these postulates, one says that one does so as a voluntary 
being who simply has to act. But why in this way? No 
ground appears. Such was my attitude. I had no guarantee 
beyond this postulating character. This was the central 
problem for me when I began to teach philosophy here. 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
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11 If you say the only datum which guides us is the pres-
ent moment, what do you mean by the present moment? As soon 
as you try to tell what is your present experience, it has 
slipped away. There is no present moment, there is a postula-
ted present moment. There is what you would have seen if you 
had been able to hold it. •o moment stay, thou art so fair'. 
(Faust). The radical empiricist is always lost when he tries 
to find the present moment, it turns into postulate. One gets 
nothing but this endless postulating with the insistence that 
one means to be guided by data if they can be found, but finds 
only postulates. 
"This led me to the decided reversal of point of view 
which followed. My postulates may be mere attitudes toward 
the real. If that is the case, then error is at least poss-
ible. But wh~t would be an error? What would it be to err 
about the past or fUture? What is it to make a blunder in 
science? This led me to the doctrine of the nature of err-
or as involving interpretation. I said to myself, this 
view which I set forth about the nature and conditions of 
error is true or false. Whether it is true or false, we 
have a teleological situation which brings the thought of 
the moment into contact with a(tvpe of consciousness which 
is not the merely human type." 2"3) 
From this point Royce's mental biography may be traced in his 
published works. The problem of experience, postulate and knowledge 
of reality continues throughout, developing into the theory of truth 
as fulfilment of purpose, realit,y as fulfilment of idea, self as fUl-
fflment of a plan of action, the community as fUlfilment of interpre-
tation and loyalty. In general the direction is from abstraction to 
concretion. His joy in difficult logical speculation does not dimin-
ish, but his love for the human and social values increases. The 
later works are the fruit of the earlier branche~. 
4. Seekins ~ Eternal. 
The field of this investigation is Royce's philosophy of 
religion. Limitation of subject here is not easy, for religion es-
capes imprisonment. To Rgyce religious interest was as large as life. 
It is hard to say what part of his writings is without religious 
I 
~ j 
i I 
·11 
'l 
I 
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. bearing. A mere glance at titles shows religious questions involved _in 
half of his published volumes, while a study of contents reveals dis-
cussions of religion in most of the others. If any, his logical and 
~~~ psychological writings would seem to escape religious bearing. But as 
~ 
... l 
i '-~"' f ~ 
the data of religion are in consciousness, and as Royce continually 
employ~ his mathematical logic to establish the Absolute, even these 
can hardly be excluded. 
Therefore, we shall have to accept the entire breadth of 
Royce's productive labors as ground for our investigation. The limit-
ation of the subject will appear not in the material but in the point 
of view. That is to saw, Royce's philosophy will be examined from its 
religious point of view. His system of thought will be reviewed and 
tested as to its religious value and comprehension. As the investiga-
tion proceeds, it will become evident that his entire life study was a 
religious quest. Royce's hunger for order, meaning and completeness 
was a life-long search for the Eternal. 
Nothing is more characteristic of Josiah Royce than the words, 
(~) 
11 Still we are seeking the Eternal". In the preface of his first 
published work he says, "The religious problems have been chosen for the 
present study because they first drove the author to philosophy, and be-
cause they, of all human interesbJ deserve our best efforts and our ut-
(:25) 
most loyalty". In his last great work he expresses the same inter-
est toward the close of his life. "Whatever the truth of religion may 
be, the office, the task, the needs of religion are the 
(26) 
most important 
oD the needs, the tasks, the offices of hwnanity". In private 
conversation at one time he gave symbolic religious significance to 
his magna opera by saying, "The World and the Individual is my doctrine 
--- --- --- ----------
of the Father and the Son, and the Problem of Christianity is my doc-
(27) 
trine of the Holy Spirit". 
t 
I' 
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In view of the wide variation in use of the term religious, 
it may be well at this point to inquire what religion means to Royce. 
There are three elements, which to him constitute any religion. "A 
religion must teach some moral code, must in some ~ay inspire a strong 
feeling of devotion to that code, and in so doing must show something 
in the nature of things that answers to the code or that serves to re-
(28) 
inforce the feeling". His emphasis appears in this other defin-
ition: "Religion is not then the power to work miracles but it is the 
wisdom to find in all things, however obscure or fragmentary, the ex-
(29) 
pressions however mysterious of the Divine Love". 
The statement which seems most characteristic of him is 
that religion "is the interpretation both of the eternal and of the 
(30) 
spirit of loyalty". The Eternal stands central like a mountain 
above the plain. We may approach from one side by interpretation, 
from the other by the spirit of loyalty. These are the approaches of 
intellectual quest and moral devotion, or as suggested in the preced-
ing section of knowledge and postulate. Or following literally the 
sequence of the definition, religion, according to Royce, may be des-
cribed as the interpretation of reality in its eternal and human as-
pects. The human side of reality best gains religious meaning in the 
spirit of loyalty, and the beyond-human side of reality holds relig-
ious value to Royce not by pure or passive experience, but by virtue 
of interpretation. "A particular event in the world may have a 
religious significance, but that significance will depend on the re-
lation of this event to eternal truth. And the eternal truth is what 
(31) 
we want to know." 
------------------------------.um------------···~ .............. •s•nmmw.777.-'W'Z'•nr•m~t•w~sz~m•'nU"'M1 .. T ~ . . -------------~--~--- ;.r ... 
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l 
It is ever the absolute religion that Royce is seeking in 
and beyond limited symbols, experience and faiths. Here is his 
creed of absolute religion: "First, the rational unity and goodness 
,r,. ( .. f of the world-life; next its true but invisible nearness to us despite 
our ignorance; further its fulness of meaning despite our barrenness 
of present experience; and yet more its interest in our personal des-
tiny as moral beings; and finally the certainty that through our act-
ual human loyal~, we come like Moses face to face with the true will 
(32) 
of the world as a man speaks to his friend. 11 
This is Royce's philosophy of life as it is also his relig-
ion. Approaching life from the human side he declares: "I believe in 
the beloved community, and the spirit which makes it beloved, and in 
the communion of all who are, in will anC:deed, its members. I see 
no such community as yet, but none the lecl my rule of life is: Act 
(33) 
so as to hasten its coming". Approaching life beyond human he •.. 
(34) 
confesses: "I believe in the et~rnal, I am in qu~st of the eternal" • 
.. 
5. Synopsis. 
We have seen from the precedin.g section that the direction 
of Royce's philosophic ~~est is outward bound. 
-He begins with the 
material closest at hand and pushes his way out to the farthest reaches 
of thought. He is ever .. e~gaged with "the true relations between our 
( 35) 
finite ideas an.9. the ultimate nature of' things" o Nowhere is he con-
tent to stop short of absolute truth or reality. All roads lead to 
the Eternal City. 
; 
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Part Two undertakes to follow these roads. Finite exper-
iences of reality are presented as starting points for Royce's system. 
[~ ~· The first five of these are limited human experiences, incomplete in 
their own significance. Royce's method is to take these incomplete 
experiences and follow them through to their logical conclusion. Each 
one proves unsatisfactory in itself, and each in turn presses on to a 
something more. The sequence of these experiences is not accidental. 
There is a dialectical progress, or logical and psychological develo~-
ment from each one to the following. 
The key to this arrangement is our conviction that Royce's 
entire philosophy is a progression from finite experience to the 
Universal-Community. In viewing his life toward the end he says, 
"When I review this whole process, I strongly feel that my deepest 
motives and problems have centered about the Idea of the Community, 
(36) 
although this idea has only come gradually to my clear consciousness". 
(37) 
W.i:th this problem centrally located the various streams 
of Royce's thought flow together into a coherent whole~ Chapter Vt 
seeks to gather this system together. Part Thr.ee will bring the 
.. 
system before its critics, inquiring into its capability of meeting 
certain rather serious objections. The contributions which Professor 
Royce mal{es to the philosophy of religion together with his omissio~1s 
and difficulties raise important resultant problems for our consider-
ation. A statement of the conclusions growing out of this investiga-
tion and a summary of our fundamental propositions appears in Part 
Four. 
II 
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PART TWO 
FINITE EXPERIENCE OF REALITY 
------ ---------- -- -------
"I can rind my place in the world 
only by discovering where I stand in 
the whole system of experience." 
PL :p.367. 
"For in the victorious warfare with 
finitade consists the perrection of the 
spirit." WI vol.i, p.382. 
--~.\ 
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PART TWO ~-~·* 
--
FINITE EXPERIENCE ~ REALITY 
CHAPTER I 
THE FINITE PRESENT 
The first question of any undertaking is where to begin. 
Josiah Royce begins with the finite present. However infinite 
the goal of our search, we can only reach it, if at all, from our 
finite location. The truth of religion like the truth of reality 
(1) 
can be known to us only in our human experience. "This truth 
that we seek is not in the heavens, nor in the depths; it is nigh 
us, even in our hearts. Only inattention can be hiding it from 
(2) 
us. Let us look closer." 
Therefore, the data of any philosophy of religion are 
(3) 
finite facts. Royce expresses deep interest in the world of fact 
(4) 
and holds the philosophic problem to be the meaning of brute facts. 
( 5) 
A fact is"that which I ought to recognize". In general there are 
four types of facts that determine or limit my activity. There are 
(6) 
physical facts, fellow-beings, past events and future events. Upon 
stating these types it is at once evident that they cover a wmde 
. .. ;o . 
range of possibilities. How do we come to recognize facts as dis-
tant as past and future·, other things and other peoples? 
The obvious answer is: we know the facts that are present 
to immediate experience. Some facts may require investigation but 
the self-evident facts would seem to be the immediately present 
facts. This will of course limit the facts no little. Past and 
• 
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future can hardly be present, distant objects and men can not at 
once all be present. However some thing and time must be present 
to experience so we may begin here. For the sake of definiteness 
and immediacy, let us dlsregard the absent possibilities and local-
ize our attention. The present moment is the datum, let us study 
the immediately given. 
1. Present Experience. 
Whatever else may constitute the reality of life, we can-
not disregard present experience. We forever meet and are met by 
the world of present experience. This is a something real no liv-
ing creature oon escape. Identically the same experience will not 
be present to all or to any, but to each it will be the most intim-
ately real and true. This in fact is what it means to be a finite 
being, namely, to have a finite experience. We are to see life 
through finite eyes, to have such knowledge of true reality as 
comes through the doorway of the present experience. It is char-
acteristic of the finite point of view not to look dow.n upon life 
as a whole, but to gaze at life through successive fleeting glimpses. 
When we come then to investigate the facts, we must real-
ize and accept our finite siltua tion. All human understanding 
stands in the stream of human experience. As Royce puts it, "All (!7) 
knowledge is of matters of experience". External reality is 
not oUr immediate material for investigation even in science, for 
we only know our own experience of it. "Apart from- that is 
divorce from ~ experience there is no knowledge,. The whole 
problem of knowledge, whether of Nature, of man or of God, may be 
{8) 
condensed into one question: What does our experience indicate?" 
The immediate field far our study is this present experience. 
:j 
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By present experience is literally meant that which is now present 
(9) 
to consciousness. If we are to be strictly empirical and deal with 
the data of immediately presented facts we are limited to the world 
of the present. Past, future and otherwhere excluded, let us focus 
our attention narrowly upon the here and now. What is the content 
of present consciousness in its simplest terms? 
Sensitiveness seems to be one of the most elemental fac-
tors of consciousness. Sensations of motion and direction, of 
color, temperature, odor, pleasure and pain are poured into the 
stream of consciousness by the physical organism. 11 All conscious-
ness when it occurs and Whatever else it implies or contains is a 
manifestation of present sensitiveness, that is of the fact that 
(10) 
the organism is disturbed by external or internal stimulations." 
(ll) 
These sensory stimuli influence the most absorbed meditation as 
(12) 
well as religious experience. As a part of the phenomena of 
sensitiveness Royce also includes mental imagery (visual, aud~tory, 
verbal-motor, etc.,) and feelings (agreeable-disagreeable,restless-
(13) 
quiescent). 
Activity is another factor of all experience. This takes 
the form of an incessant restlessness arising from instincts, de-
(14) 
sires, impulses, and efficacious effort. There is a kind of 
activity required in receiving the sensations, images and feelings 
noted above. The basis of this receptivity is the activity of 
Gi.. attention. "The sense-impression is itself not yet lmowledge. A 
sense-impression to whiCh we give no attention slips through con-
sciousness as a man's hand through water. Nothing grasps and 
retains it. No effect is produced. It is unknown. You cannot 
----- ---~--~-~--~-------------------------
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even tell what it is. For to know what such an unnoticed impression (15) 
·is,_ would be to pay attention to it." Attentive activity fur-
thermore selects and intensifies impressions,thereby making conscious-
ness more definite and less complex or confused. Along with this 
goes the activity of recognition which gives a familiarity tone to 
fact. This will appear again in our discussion a little further on. 
Multiplicity is another feature of experience. The narrow-
est span of attention is more than a single mental state. By con-
scious focusing I can attend to a mathematical point, but there is 
always a fringe of consciousness spreading in wi~ng circles about 
it. The present in space or time is ever a complex. Within this 
I 
complex there is never simple unity, but always variety, diversity, 
of content. It may be chaotic or ordered but it. is multiplicity 
somehow related. "The one conscious state of the moment is always (16) 
a unity consisting of a multiplicity." 
relation. 
This introduces another feature of the present, namely, 
The presence of a single simple state would logically 
require a contrast. The here can only be located by separation from 
the ~-here, the £2! can only be defined by its position over 
against the not-now, the ~by contradistinction from the ~-min~. 
Royce is therefore not looking for a single simple mental state. 
To him the basis of conscious experience is a contrast-effect. One 
is no more aware of this than ~' of ego than alter for the sim-
plest mental state is a complex of contrast. The relation may em-
phasize likeness instead of difference for each involves the other· , 
contrast-depending upon similarity and vice versa in a relationship (17) -
''that simply cannot be sundered". This relation is given in 
20. 
the complex multiplicity of the present experience, but attention 
to relations inevitably leads beyond the present. 
There is another element which Royce finds :ftmdamental to 
all conscious experience. This is the sense of oughtness. In· an 
earlier paragraph of this chapt~r, a fact was defined as "that which 
I ought to recognize". This is the attitude in which consciousness 
faces objective reality. The OUght differs from response to stim-
uli in being prior to stimuli as a more primitive impulse. It is 
the kind of impulse which feels the stubbornness of facts and sub-
mits to them. The acknowledgement of facts is an expression of the 
will impulse, the activity defined above as recognition, the activ-
(18) 
ity which Schweitzer would call •world and life-affirmation'. 
But it is more than recognition or affirmation, it is the recogni-
tion that the real ought to be affirmed. It is a kind of will-to-
honesty that is at the bottom of all knowledge or valid experience. 
It is the instinctive desire to live among facts rather than fancies. 
"That all our acknowledgement of facts is a conscious submission to 
(19) 
an Ought," is the primary principle of experience to Royce. He 
holds "that the first determining principle, namely the Ought, re-
quireS us to acknowledge at _.each moment as real certain particular 
(20) 
facts." 
These then are the data of present experience: sensitive-
ness, activity, multiplicity, relation and oughtness, but the 
r· ~) greatest of these is the ought. 
------------------~--------------------~~~~-~ f ~:-· 
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2. ~ Meaning of the Present. 
It may be contested that this exploration of present ex-
perience is unsatisfactory. Some may consider it incomplete while 
others may think it too complete for the immediately given. No 
one would agree with either criticism more readily than Josiah 
Royce. Nowhere does he attempt exhaustively to define the data 
of immediate experience. He suggests a factor here and another 
there, which I have tried to gather together as shown above. Royce 
would admit each of these, but certainly he would not accept such 
account as final. In fact his explorations of the present led him 
eventually to the borders of the universe of space, time and meaning. 
The difficulty in defining the present is the difficulty 
of finding the borderline. 
"This moment is of course, as the present moment, to 
be cut off from past and future. Very well, then how 
large a moment is it, and how long? IS it quite instan-
taneous, wholly without duration? No, for I must surely 
be supposed immediately to know, in this moment a passing 
of time. My psychological present is a 'specious pres-
ent•. It looks backward and forward. It lasts a 
little, and then insensibly glides over into the next 
moment ••• But alasl the present, as thus defined is only 
the more left undefined. This gliding 'specious present' 
when does it cease to be present(21lhen does it become past? Where are the boundaries? 
The spatial present is as difficult to bound as the tem-
poral present. A mathematical point may be hypothetically defined, 
but even then it does not stand alone in consciousness •. No ma. tter 
how sharp the focus of attention there is always a fringe. When 
without moving his eyes, one tries to enumerate all within his 
range of vision it brings to light a much larger field of present 
experience than before realized. Likewise the meaning present at 
any conscious moment fails in uniform clearness. For "my conscious-
•• j 
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ness, even now, has its background as well as its foreground, its 
obscurity as well as its clearness ••• And nobody amongst us human 
beings, as we now are, can verify precisely the whole of what it is 
(22) 
that the present moment furnishes to his experience." 
Thus when we undertake to engage the meaning of the present, 
we have difficulty in surrounding it. Each of the data of experience 
presented above is dependent for its meaning on something beyond the 
present. Sensitiveness is necessarily sensitiveness to something and 
the stimuli that arouse the present eense';impression come from beyond. 
Activity of impulse, attention or recognition is response to something, 
so a complex situation. Multiplicity is exactly this quality of 
complexity which reaches out to embrace a variety. Relation leads 
irresistibly from this to ~~ from~ to there, from present to 
past or future. Oughtness is in its simplest form objective refer-
ence to some fact, while its element of recognition and acknowledge-
ment carries it into ever widening circles for its meaning. "And 
thus the present moment has about it all the mystery that everywhere 
dbuds finite facts. I am conscious just now, but I am not wholly 
(23) 
conscious of my consciousness." 
Present experience, when it tries to stand alone, falls into 
utter rout and confusion. There is a more serious difficulty here 
than boundary dispute, for if you should succeed in settling that, 
your limited present would still be meaningless. If you seek to 
find truth or reality in the isolated present the outcome is either 
illusioA or disillusion. Neither knowledge nor conduct can survive 
such amputation. The simplest act of knowledge consists of three 
parts: (1) a datum, or fact of momentary experience, {2) a positUm, 
that which is acknowledged or admitted as real in the past, 
23. 
(3) an anticipation, or expectation of future experience. The pres-
ent alone falls short of lmowledge, for "all conceivable truth is 
contained within the limits of the past, future and possible exper-
(24) 
ience of conscious being." Conduct likewise re cp.ires a wider 
I 
f~eld of operation than the range of the present. 
"The present moment is given. To act with reference to 
it alone, is not conduct at all. Conduct is first found 
when in the present we act with reference to at least one 
future moment, forming our expectation of what this moment 
may be through an act of acknowledgement of what some past 
moment was. And conduct increases in complexity and defin-
iteness according as we act with reference to a more ex-
tended time, posit a greater p~gt time as real, expect a 
greater future time to come."\ } 
Here then lies the great difficulty of our finite situa-
tion. Our knowledge in whatever field of search is dependent upon 
the deliverances of present experience. But present experience upon 
investigation of its character per !! breaks down into chaotic and 
empty meaninglessness. The present alone is datum, but the present 
datum alone is meaningless. This Royce considers one of the deepest 
problems of the life of human reason. 
"I can lmow only what can get presented to me. But on 
the other hand, most of what gets presented to me always 
escapes my knowledge. I know not the merely presented, 
as such, but only that which in the presented facts I can 
hold, apperceive, contrast with other contents, and define 
as to the real meaning of this object which I am to know. 
But alas, the moment flits. What I now know turns into 
what I just now knew, even while I reflect upon it. The 
direct gets lost in the indirect, the instant in the im-
perfectly known series of states; and my best approach to 
finite knowledge appears only as a sort of substituting 
of expectations and of me~ories for the desired presenta-
tions. If then, on the one hand, I can know only my 
own ideas, states, thoughts, presentations, our present 
unhappy resultf seems to be that, as a fact, I cannot 
fully know even these. For, once more, I can know only 
what I can examine with steadily fixated attention; but 
while I fixate· my attention upon tha)inner object, it 
changes even while I observe it."( 2 6 
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This is the finite paradox. To know what one experiences 
would require more experience than what at present is given. nin 
fact then, our presented experience is indeed our only guide; but 
it always guides us by pointing beyond ,itself to that without which 
(27) 
it becomes contradictory." We are dependent for knowledge upon 
experience which is not itself independent. The foundation of 
knowledge appears thus to be itself \rlthout foundation. Our atten-
tion seems limited to a present experience that is too narrow to 
give us ·intelligible grasp of truth. "our finitude means then an 
actual inattention, - a lack of successful interest at this conscious 
(28) 
instant, in more than a very few of the details of the universe." 
The meaning of the present escapes the experience of the 
present. It appears that finite beings are cut off from direct 
knowledge of either the outer world or the inner self. Even the 
finite fact whose presence was to be the datum of our investigation, 
seems to be ljoreign to us. For a fact is "never a mere datum of 
(29) 
anybody's present experiencenj It ma¥ be acknowledged but 
... 
acknowledgement is not the complete act of knowledge. 
3. Finite Search for God. 
--
Our investigation to this point has only intensified 
our sense of inadequacy to investigate. We began with a study of 
finite facts, but in that study discovered this very finiteness to 
stand between us and other facts we would like to know. The one 
fact that is inevitable is our finite limitation. Let us then 
explore the religious significance of this one fact open to us. 
'I 
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We are finite. If there is anything we may be sure of it 
is our own incompleteness. our immediate experience is narrowed 
down to the present, and the present we have seen is too narrow to 
comprehend. No sooner do we rush upon it than it vanished. Our 
narrowness is our defeat, depriving our life of knowledge, unity, 
continuity and meaning. The present moment flees, and in fleeing 
leaves us fragments. "We then know our finitude, and we are inward-
(30) 
ly disquieted thereby." 
Herein lies the root of all religion. Because of our lack 
we hunger. To be human is to be conscious of need and from human 
need springs the religious impulse. To be aware of our finite 
condition is to hunger for something more and better. The sense of 
fragmentary living yearns for the complete life, the sense of trans-
itoriness longs for a permanence that binds together the fleeting 
(31) 
glimpses of life. Because of human failure we long for salva-
tion. This to Royce is the common source of all religious seeking. 
The end or object of religious paths may differ widely, but they 
all begin in this longing for salvation. The sense of need urges 
on to the glimpse of an ideal better~ 
"we are indeed, and so far, just as the Buddhists said, · 
naturally the creatures of transient feelings, of passing 
caprices, of various and wilful longings. But just be-
cause of this fact, we can get an insight, as intimate as 
it is fragmentary, into one absolutely valuable ideal ••• 
It is the ideal that the reign of caprice ought to be 
ended, that the wounds of the spirit ought to be healed. 
In the midst of all our caprices, yes, because of our 
caprices, we learn the value of one great spiritual 
ideal, the ideal of spiritual unity and self-possession. 
And both Q~)ideal and our need come to consciousness 
at once.n\ 
il 
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These moments of insight are usually tragic because the~ 
are founded upon contrast. They are momentary because we do not 
always rise to fUll consciousness of our finitude. But in times of 
death, or failure when we have· defeated ourselves, or when we are 
confronted with our own unfaithfulness to loved one or master, may 
come the tragic moment of insight. Then we feel deeply the contrast 
between· ourse·l ves as we are and life as it ought to be. By. such con-
trast with the ideal of complete life, these moments of insight show 
us our need. "What need do they. show? I answer, the need to possess 
what by mere nature we never come to possess, namely, the power to 
•see life steadily and see it whole•, and then to live triumphantly 
(33) 
in the light of this vision." "And so to live would be salva-
tion. The word salvation is fitting, because the need is· so great 
(34) 
and because the transformation would be so profound." 
It hardly need bo said that the true religious life must 
be a present experience. Conventional religion may be merely a 
merely a hope. 
v memory, nascent religion. In truly living religion one is in the 
1\ 
very act of tasting and seeing that salvation is good. It is a 
present deliverance that is desired and neither memory nor promise 
will fill the present need. For an absent Deliverer still solves 
··' 
no immediate problem. 11We need to find the presence that can give 
this unity and self-possession to the soul. This presence is what 
(35) 
all the higher religions seek.n 
But in order to save us this presence will need to be 
more than human. We have too much of the finite already; it is this 
which makes our incessant problem, that leaves us to the helpless 
confusion of chaotic fragmentary living. The distinctive character-
istic of the religious impulse is its resolution to move out beyond 
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the human. Therefore in order to meet our finite need, in order 
to fulfil our sufficient ideal, the religious Deliverer must be 
superhuman. 
"For we are, indeed, helpless either to hold before 
us this our personal vision of the triumphant life and 
of the unity of the spiriti or to turn the vision into 
the practical reality, unless we come into touch and 
keep in touch with an order of spiritual existence 
which is in a perfectly genuine sense superhuman,and in 
the same sense super~~~~al, and which certainly is not 
our natural selves."\ J 
But by our confession of this religious requirement, 
i.e., immediate experience of a superhuman Deliverer, we are led 
at once into what Royce terms the religious paradox. How can a 
human being have experience of what is beyond human? This ia a 
more serious form of the finite paradox noted in the section above. 
In that discussion it appeared that a paradox is revealed in every 
effort to know. 11Without intense and intimate personal feeling, 
you never learn any valuable truths whatever about life, about 
its ideals, or about its problems, but pn the other hand, what you 
know only through your feelings is like the foam of the sea, un-
(37) 
stable - like the passing hour doomed to pass away." From this 
finite predicament religion offered to lead u~0a superhuman De-
liverer. But upon trying to reach this superhuman Deliverer we 
are caught again in a paradox yet more hopeless. The way of re-
ligion leads beyond the realm of the human. But how can one who 
failed to know the human ever hope to leap out of the human into 
a higher realm? 
11 The religious paradox is that the needy and ignorant 
natural man must somehow obtain the spiritual power to 
get into a genuine touch with a real life that is above 
his own level. If he is to be saved, something that 
is divine must come to be born in the humble manger of 
his po.or natural life. How is this apparition of the 
divine in the(g~an, of the supernatural in the natural 
cone ei vable?" t5 J 
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From the paradox of all knowledge the religious seeker 
is thrown into the paradox of beyond-human knowledge. What is the 
relation of human experience with its impressions 1 ideas and activ-{39) 
ities to the total ultimate reality? Toward the understanding 
and meeting of this problem in varying forms the next five chapters 
will be devoted. 
.l .L--=================~~~~--------------.............................. .. ~ 
religion. 
CHAPTER II 
DOUBT 
The right to criticize is essential to any philosophy 
In the thinking of Josiah Royce, criticism was more 
of 
than a right, it was a duty. If the unexamined life is not worth 
living, surely the unexamined truth is not worth following. To 
imagine that the seeker might arrive at the philosophic truth 
without passing through the water~ of doubt was to him inconceiv-
able. "Philosophic truth, as such, comes to us first under the 
form of doubt; and we never can be very near it in our search un-
less, for a longer or shorter time, we have come to despair of it 
. ( 1) 
altogether." Doubt is ever the beginning of the learning 
process. 
The danger of excessive reverence is as fatal to religion 
as that of cynical indifference. Royce deprecates the dumb reverence 
that wastes capital letters on all pronouns referring to religious 
objects but fears to do the honor of getting clear ideas about 
(2) 
them.·' If one is advised to cling to his faith, it must be asked 
~ faith, which of several hundreds of creeds shall be trusted 
uncritically? It is evident that whatever inherited creed we may 
bring with us is only an accident of faith, the narrowness of which 
is further evinced by intolerance and conflict. "We claim, then, 
the right to criticize as fearlessly, as thoroughly, and as skept-
ically as may be, the foundations of conduct and faith. For what 
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we criticize are at the outset, our own notions, which we want to 
have conform to the truth, if so be that there is any truth. As 
for doubt on religious questions, that is for a truth seeker not 
(3) 
~ only a privilege but a duty." ~- -
our religious quest began with a critical examination of 
the finite situation. It was observed that whatever knowledge the 
finite individual may have of the divine, m~st reach him through 
finite experience. This study of finite experience convinced us 
that it must be present to be immediate, while to be merely present 
is to be meaningless. The outcome of that criticism was doubt as 
to the ability of the individual to know either the divine or the 
human world. This chapter will carry the criticism of lmowledge and 
life to a farther point. 
1. Error and Evil. 
our criticism of human knowledge has revealed its serious 
limitations. What common sense calls reality, critical investigation 
found to be only the fickle reports of sense impression. Vfuat is 
called God is a religious hypothesis of something beyond. What passes 
for truth is but the fragmentary view of the individual subject. To 
be real, permanent, divine, or true means to be present in perfect 
proportion to an absolute point of view. But as no absolute point of 
view is the property of finite experience our finite situation is 
inevitably subject to error. 
The logical conclusion of error is skepticism. If my 
quest for reality and judgment of fact is subject to error, why not 
admit it? If my knowledge is error then I am only deceiving myself; 
why keep up the delusion? To continue assuming the validity of my 
I. ,, 
erroneous view of life is dishonesty. At least one may be honest if 
not wise. Let us renounce this vain seeking for knowledge of a world 
not destined to be ours. Let us turn from the unknowable remote to 
~ the immediate experience. We know enough to know that we do not know. 
-~) 
We know life, for it pulsates within us. Away then with vain specu-
lations, let us live for the life within. 
But even so we cannot part with our critical method. We 
may renounce vain speculation but not the act by which we renounce it. 
Our critical method may cut the ground from under our feet, it may 
cut into its very self, so long as it does not lose its cutting edge 
and become uncritical. For to surrender criticism would be to give 
up our whole e~mination, the task of philosophy as well as of skept-
icism. "Unreflective, self-satisfied skepticism always means mental 
death; but in self-critical skepticism, observant of itself as of 
(4) 
everything else moves the very life blood of philosophy." If then 
our skepticism leads us to renounce knowledge of the outer world, we 
still have on our hands the critical problem of the life within. 
If our present experience does not give us knowledge, does 
it bring satisfaction? From criticism of knowledge we. turn to crit-
icize the worth of life itself. In so doing we shall begin by re-
( 5) 
calling the content of present experience discovered in the chapter 
above. We found,to begin with,a stream of sensory experiences in 
conscious life. In this stream pleasure and pain sensations are 
prominent. Let us take our sensory life at its best and disregard-
ing pain for the moment, assume that all our sensations are pleasant. 
If all sensations of present experience were pleasant and all feel-
ings agreeable would life be worth while? 
L~-----------------
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A little examination shows that the sense-gratification 
of each moment belongs merely to that moment. The elusive character 
of momentary experience has already been established in the first 
chapter. Whatever is of the moment escapes the grasp of conscious-
ness, and disappears even while it is in the act of coming. To be 
sure there is always another moment to take its place but if no one 
of these comes to clear self-consciousness, what value have they? 
"Our sense-enjoyment can be spoken of as valuable only when we know 
. {6) 
afterwards that we personally have enjoyed." Otherwise such sensa-
tiona are merely like the weird unrealities of the drunken man which 
. . 
appear remote, hazy and foolish to sober afterthought. The pleasant-
ness of a past moment is nothing to me now. It hardly belongs to 
me at all and certainly is insignificant to a memory that does not 
preserve it. Such transient experience would hardly be looked for-
ward to with eagerness in the future either, for it is born only to 
die with the moment. 
But we do have memory of agreeable experiences that belong 
to our past. What is the present worth of such memory? It is sim-
ply the recognition of a pleasant past that is no longer present. 
By the very act of remembering the past pleasure I am aware that I 
do not have it now. The contrast only heightens the dissatisfaction 
of the present. Even to know that I ~ay have this pleasure again 
does not deliver present satisfaction. For the expection like the 
memory of pleasure is always comparison and contrast with the pres-
ent which has it not. In either case the pleasure of the present 
is denied and the upshot of it all is failure to have the absent 
~r-. 
•• 
pleasure. One "recognizes the pleasure as his own only in so far 
(7) 
forth·as he feels the present lack of it, feels want or pain." So 
bhe most promising pleasure is sought only in pain. 
The worth of life therefore does not appear in the sensation 
of pleasure. It must then belong to the striving for some other good. 
Life is activity, we have seen, just as truly as sensitivity. What-
ever the goal may be the satisfaction of life appears to belong to the 
striving. To be active in any direction is to exercise the normal 
function of a living organism. This will-to-live is the root and sub-
stance of organic life. What hope may we find of its satisfaction? 
Here is something deeper than knowledge; if our capacity to know 
does not satisfy, may not our capacity to act? After reducing the 
finite present to its lowest terms (in the chapter above) we still 
have left to us a longing. What is the answer to it? 
This active or longing principle of life is a more or less 
conscious desire for the not now present. How can we attain satis-
faction? Only by fulfilment of the desire. Satisfaction comes by 
gaining whatever object will put that desire to rest. But in putting 
life's desire, longing, activity, will,to rest there is no want to be 
gratified and life thus defeats itself. To be free from desire is to 
cease to live, but to live and desire is to suffer lack. Therefore 
to live is desiring to desire - willing to suffer always some lack. 
How can life then ever find satisfaction? The condition of life is 
1::,'1 ( 8) 
.,,. restless, longing striving ~ ~ _ : . ~., .. :::; for that which defeats itself. 
This leads us' from skepticism to pessimism. So far as 
our limited vision can see, all is caprice. On the basis of this 
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experience we seem justified in making at least one judgment --
caprice is the universal fact. We are not forgetting our skeptical 
denial of knowledge of the external world, but by inner needs we are 
aware of outer futility. Our needs we know, and their failure in 
life to find satisfaction we know, therefore it seems reasonable to 
conclude life is irrational. At every turn we seem to be confronted 
with brute chance, accident, chaos, mocking contradiction. 
Of course this may be only.my finite viewpoint, but even 
so it is essentially tragic to me. And after all it is exactly the 
~inite that we are condemning. Finite experience, by every test thus 
far employed, seems everywhere evil. The good is transient. The 
evil endures. Whatever I do or am is worthless. Nothing is sig-
nificant. All is irrational and ridiculous. To this sorry state our 
honest search for truth has led us. 
The question may be raised here: Is Royce sincere in his 
skepticism and pessimism? Does he merely sympathize with others who 
doubt or does he feel the sting of doubt and the despair of futility 
in his own experience? The mental autobiography in the Introduction 
confesses, 11 I became ••• a decidedly skeptical critical empiricist" and 
in referrin~ to his early students "I apparently left them to caprice." 
His appreciation of Schopenhauer seems to have been based upon per-
sonal conviction as well as admiration of a great scholar. He 
writes in ~h~ Spiri~ of Modern Philosophy "In fact, finite life is 
tragic, very nearly as much so as Schopenhauer represented, and 
tragic for the very reason that Schopenhauer ~hd all the: 
counsellors of resignation are never weary of expressing in so far, 
(9) 
namely, as it is at once deep and restless." Then a little farther 
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on he says, 11 If you will let me speak of my private experience, I 
myself have often found it deeply comforting, in the most bitter 
moments, to have discounted, so to speak all the tragedies of exper-
,..-· ",i ience, all my own weakness and caprice and foolishness and ill for-
-.,\ 'i t,i 
tune, by one such absolute formula for evil as Schopenhauer's doctrine 
(10) 
gives me." 
To Royce the finite experience was undeniably tragic. He 
was led by his investigations to baieve "that there must be some sort 
of evil present wherever there is a finite will. It is not joyous 
to be finite, in so far as one is finite. One longs always to know 
more, and to possess more,;' and one lives in all sorts of paradoxical 
(11) 
relations to other finite life. 11 Many idealistic thinkers shirk 
the problem or fact of evil. But Royce ever faces evil squarely, 
feeling its sting as well'as recognizing its presence. His solution 
of evil will be reviewed in later chapters of this study, but the 
reality of evil was undeniable to him. "Evil is not a dream, but a 
(12) 
bitter truth." 
Of all evils the one to sting him most seems to have been 
finite ignorance, error, accident and all caprice that makes life 
foolish, undignified and petty. For these rob even sober tragedy of 
its honor, and defy the noblest search for purpose in suffering. 
Even the sinner may show a kind of nobility in cheerfully accepting 
his punishment in stern contempt of his own sorrow and the bitterness 
of his moral defeat. But the stupidity of our human nature lets 
down nobility into the empty, tragedy of mere farce. To him 
"the worst tragedy of the world is the tragedy of the 
brute chance to which everything spiritual seems to be 
subject·among us -- the tragedy of diabolical irration-
ality ••• one1s own foolishness, one's ignorance, the 
cruel accidents of disease, the fatal misunderstandings 
that part friends and lovers, the chance mistakes that 
--------------------------------------•••_. ......................... -z•s•zs .. t?TZTI······· 
wreck nations: - these are the things we lament most 
bitterly, not becau~e they are painful but because 
they are farcical."\~3) 
36. 
And to see this farcical aspect of the universe is "for the first {14) 
time to come to a sense of the true gloom of life." 
2. The Neglected Ideal. 
To this point has our honest pursuit of doubt led us. But 
this is not the end. It may appear that a little doubting like a 
little learning is a dangerous thing, but more thorough doubting is 
its ovm corrective. Criticism of knowledge may lead to skepticism 
and criticism of life to pessimism, but they need not remain forever 
there. Further criticism of such positions offers its own logical 
way beyond them. 
The basis of skepticism and pessimism is a consciousness 
of inadequacy, an awareness of falling short. But the awareness of 
falling short does not stop thus abruptly. One might fall short 
unconsciously but the consciousness of falling short involves at 
once the ideal fallen short of. Uncribical finitude might not real-
ize anything missing, but it has been the one contention of our 
skeptical and pessimistic inquiry that it is critical. And so far 
as it is critical it is conscious of what is lacking. Skepticism 
has declared the truth to be lacking and knowledge of the truth un-
obtainable. Pessimism has declared the good to be lacking and the 
significance of life unattainable. Thus the ideal of a true know-
ledge and a good life are already present. 
This is the inevitable outcome of all consistent self-
criticism when carried to_ its logical conclusion. It is the reward 
of fearless investigation~epen only to those who are willing to take 
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the risk of doubting. When the doubting process is once begun it 
proceeds by recognition of present insufficiencies. But every in-
sufficiency is a coming short of a sufficiency and only before the 
ideal does the unideal stand condemned. This is the value of all 
doubting and criticizing that it operates in the interest of the 
ideal. And every thrust cuts away the satisfied present by uncover-
ing the neglected ideal. Therefore when the unworthy finite becomes 
conscious of its finitude it is already stretching beyond it in see-
ing and yearning after ideal completeness. 
Or to put it another way, our self-criticism has now dis-
covered its own span of judgment. From the start of this critical 
inquiry we have been making critical judgments. Every criticism is 
a judgment and we have been judging our finite position as to its 
error, evil, etc. We have declared our knowledge to be dependent 
upon present experience, but in the very act of so judging it, we 
have transcended present experience. For a judgment is always a 
span relating facts or separated parts, and thereby is already trans-
cendent to them. 
Analysis of the act of judgment reveals clearly what has at 
different times in the foregoing discussion suggested itself implicit-
. (15) 
ly, namely tha~ present experience is too narrow. But whereas 
before we felt confined to that experience, we now see that in the 
very judgment of confinement we were already transcending it. That 
is, we never have been remaining within the limits of the finite 
present even-when we thought we were locked up in it. For as Royce 
says, "All thinking in its very nature as mental activity, is necess-
arily a transcending of direct experience ••• He who should desire to 
·---
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limit himself strictly to sense experience in all his thought, would 
(16) 
indeed have a very simple task; for he would never then think at all." 
To ponder upon the question of present experience is by 
.r:--
.1 that very act of thinking to transcend it. We do not think along and 
"'-' ~I 
then come to a wall that must somehow be scaled, we scale the wall at 
the first leap of thought. "The tendency to transcend experience is, 
(17) 
therefore, in itself not merely justifiable but indispensable." 
This does not mean we are to turn our backs upon experience and have 
nothing more to do with it, for knowledge is still dependent upon ex-
perience. "To transcend experience you must first be in possession 
(18) 
of experience. tt But if knowledge partakes of experience it is 
. (19} 
only knowledge by becoming more than experience." 
It may still be argued that immediate experience is the 
only direct form of knowledge. But our analysis has shown that to 
be knowledge at all it must have more than a direct form. 
lies the essential postulate at the basis of all thought. 
Here then 
Knowledge 
recognizes that it cannot be directly given, but must rather take the 
form of judgment or interpretation. How the present experience is 
transcended we do not -know • But it is transcended in every mental 
activity, so we can do no less than accept it, even though this 
acceptance be on faith. Knowledge then is based upon postulate as 
well as experience, the postulate that we actually are transcending 
the present experience. 
This is the foundation upon Which all intelligence, all 
sane mentalcperation is built. The present moment requires the postu-
late of past and future moments to mean anything at all. The present 
condition requires the postulate of contrast with absent conditions 
to receive judgment of fact, with better or worse conditions to receive 
j: 
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judgment of value. Conscious activity requires the postulate of an 
end in order to be more than unconscious urge or blind impulse. 
Every elemental content of present experience, sensitiveness, activity, 
multiplicity, relation and oughtness requires a postulate of objective 
reference (namely, stimulus, end, variety, contrast, ideal) in order 
to be adequately defined. Suph postulating is more than faith, it 
is the foundation of all self-conscious existence. 
Then why shrink from this form of voluntary activ-
ity that alone makes experience intelligible? It is only this ftmda-
mental attitude of will that can free us from the dilemma of the fin-
ite paradox •. The preceding analysis has shown not only the hopeless-
ness of finite experience, it has also shown the essential act of will 
employed in all finite knowledge. 11 A postulate is a mental way of 
. (20) 
behavior." And this kind of behavior is at the foundation of 
every intelligent act of consciousness. "Postulates, however, are 
not blind faith. Postulates are voluntary assumptions of a risk, 
for the sake of a higher end. Passive faith dares not face doubt. 
The postulate faces doubt... Blind faith is emotion, and often 
cowardly emotion. The postulate is deliberate and courageous vol-
(21) 
i tion." It is this form of mental behavior that offers the 
basis for organizing life. 
(22) 
"The wise shall live by postulates." 
3. The Organization of Experience. 
RoJ~e differs from many other religious thinkers by his 
friendliness toward doubt. Truth for him cannot be reached by 
dodgfting or dreading or discountenancing doubt but by embracing it. 
Doubt is not an enemy but an ally in the philosophic ·quest. He 
welcomes doubt eagerly, "by accepting, experiencing and absorbing 
,.-...., 
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the doubt until, as an element in our thought, it becomes an element 
. {23) . . 
in an higher truth." In the discussion or this chapter-we have 
rollowed doubt on until rinally it has led us out of our dirriculty. 
This point has been reached by recognizing the active place or the 
will in the knowing process. 
What is the e~rect or this activity upon skepticism and 
pessimism? Skepticism grows out of the disappointed will-to-know. 
It is now clear that this act of will has been present in all our 
thinking. It has been present in response, attention, recognition, 
~rasp or variety, consciousness or relations and obligation to the 
ideal. Skepticism, therefore, is disposed of by consciously accept-
ing this voluntary activity that has been present all along and em-
playing it more thoroughly. Thus I render conscious allegiance to 
the ideal or reasonableness by extending the span of attention. I 
place my trust in the reasonableness of my uudgments by widening the 
horizon of my vision to include the utmost thinkable reaches or time 
and space. Reasonableness is a"vision ror the true relations and 
{24) 
for the total values of things". Willingness to risk this broad-
er vision gives the freedom or past, future and the external world 
to our thought. When we say, "Be reasonable", we mean: 11 Take a 
wider outlook; see things not one at a time, but many at once; be 
broad, consider more than one side; bring your ideas together, in a 
{24) 
word, get insight." It is a mistake to set reason in opposition 
~) to experience, for the normal human achievement is reasonable exper-
ience. It is the will to see life orderly ani complete that makes 
chaotic experience coherent. To Royce it is "perfectly fair to de-
fine reason as the power to get articulate insight -- insight into 
wholes rather than rragments. It will also be rair to define the 
' ,, 
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reasoning process as the process or getting connected experience on 
(25) 
a large scale. 11 
As skepticism is founded upon the will-to-know so pessimism 
is founded upon the unrealized will-to-goodness. The way out of 
pessimism is not to deny the presence of evil, but to face it with 
the courageous resolve that the evil shall serve the good. 
becomes possible when one takes the leap of reasonableness. 
This 
For in 
so doing the vision of life wins the perspective to see wholes as 
well as parts. Then it becomes evident that the meaning of lire 
cannot fairly be measured by the fragments. That is to say, the math-
ematical sum of momentary pains and pleasures is no adequate estimate 
of life. No judgment can be valid which simply operates in present 
experience • This we have seen above. Least of all can a worth-
judgment have validity unless it achieves more than a summation of 
successive separate sense-impressions. Any fair judgment of the 
worth of human life will need to see the significance of the entire 
. (26) 
life process as a whole. 
In what way shall this whole of life be more than the sum 
of its parts? By reference::to the goal which life as a whole is 
facing toward. When the fragments of life are simply added together 
the result is an aggregate of jumbled parts. It is only when the 
direction or purpose of life, the end of all the otherwise futile 
(~ striving, is seen that the whole comes to its meaning. "The only 
useful speculations on the worth of life are those that regard life 
with reference to some accepted goal; itself a state of consciousness 
(27) 
in some animate being." The worth of life is then dependent 
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upon the consciously accepted goal of life, and consciously to accept 
a goal is to will a fixed purpose. Therefore the whole issue of 
pessimism is relative to the will of the individual whose life is in 
question. If tha,t will fails to find its purpose then all striving 
becomes empty futility, and life denies itself. But if the will 
sees its goal with clear enthusiasm, then all striving becomes self-
real! zation. 
Furthermore Royce maintains that even when the purpose of 
life is not clearly beheld, pessimism may yet be overcome by the act 
of will which declares that whatever the purpose, it shall be good. 
Even though the goodness may not be clearly seen, it may be postu-
lated or actively dared. For "a worth-judgment about human life is 
the result of an act of mind, somewhat resembling an ordinary prac-
tical volition. ~~~good, ~~is ~' these oppos-
ing judgments·are two opposing attitudes of will. The ultimate 
decision in the matter is not to result from a mathematical estimate, 
. (28) 
but'from moral insight." 
This wholeness of life is no accident. The unity of con-
scious life is never anything less than an achievement. We noted 
that experience comes to us in multiple form; we might have added 
chaotic form. In the barest succession of present experiences life 
was certainly chaotic, and as far as data have power to organize 
themselves it might continue forever chaos. "For the unity of 
.• things is never for us mortals anything that we fini given in our 
( (29) 
· / experiences." 
(30) 
Unorganized experience is not only useless but in the 
true sense it is not mental life at all. For the "intellectual life 
is precisely the organization of experience~'(31) Mental life then, 
!'] 
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is nore than the succession of experiences, it is that active organ-
ization of exparience which alone makes conduct or knowledge possible. 
Toward this organization we have found a certain voluntary principle 
. 
essential. A purpose to act toward an accepted goal, an obligation 
toward a cherished ideal, an urganization of experience about some 
plan - these are characteristics of the mental life. They are, fur-
thermore, the characteristics of selfhood. 
Nowhere in the immediate facts of experience has the self 
been found as a datum. The reason for this is not far to seek; it 
(32) 
is simply because "the self never is a mere datum." "The true 
(33) 
self of any individual man is not a datum but an ideal". The 
(34) 
self is too complex a factor to find at the beginning of our search, 
it can never be a datum for it is that which takes up and organizes 
(35) 
the data. To lmow the self is an indirect process and requires 
the postulate essential to all knowledge, transcendence of the present 
- ( 36) 
data. Therefore to know the self is an infinitely rich and man-
ifold experience; "the knowledge of the self is a knowledge of the 
coherence that underlies and overarches all its diverse purposes, 
(37) 
always acting anew yet still always itself together with its past." 
In the organization of_experience around purpose, plan, 
ideal we thus come upon the self. 11 The self I define as life lived 
(38) 
in accordance with a plan." "A man's Ego, therefore, exists 
as one Ego, only in so far as he has a plan in life, a coherent 
tJ 1 and conscious ideal, and in so far as his experience means for him 
(39) 
approach to this ideal." The self is not outside of experience 
but is in fact the spiritual unity of experience. For "the real 
Self is the totality of our empirical consciousness when viewed as 
.-9 
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having unity of meaning, and ~ exemplifying, ~ i~ its totality ~-
- (40) 
filing !!! ~·" This idea Royce goes on to explain is for us an 
ideal, which is never embodied at any one empirical moment, but as 
that which gives meaning to life. It is only when life is viewed 
( 41). 
as a struggle toward an ideal that it acquires either unity o~ meaning. 
Of this struggle more will be said in the next chapter. 
It remains for the present chapter merely to estimate what is 
an essential religion for our world of postulates. The result of our 
doubting inquiry has been to reduce religious faith to its minimum 
content. The minimum religion of our postulating life is "that univer-
(42) 
sal goodness is somehow at the heart of things". As the minimum 
faith of science, without Which no investigation can proceed a step 
is the postulate of order and uniformity in the universe, so the 
fundamental faith of all moral and religir,us activity is the postu-
late of universal goodness. To relinquish either of these postulates 
is to surrender our world to hopeless chaos. To accept either post-
ulate is to find a foundation for coherent activity toward some goal, 
scientific, 
Amoral or religious. The religious value of moral activity will be 
the subject of investigation for the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
MORAL ACTIVITY 
It has become evident that our hesitation is our failure. 
Doubt is not to be feared, but pursued. Whoever dallies and loiters 
by the way dwells with despair, but he who bravely runs the course 
finds some goal. Working is the antidote for fUtile doubting, as {1) 
doubting is for careless working. It is 11 in our perpetual hes-
itation or unsteadiness in the choice of ideals, we most frequently 
(2) 
find the deepest ground for pessimistic despair". Life is activ-
ity and can only find its meaning in action. The problem of life 
then will find its solution not by stationary analysis but by active 
resolve. Our fault lies in a paralysis of the will. "Here is the 
(3) 
great failure, that we cannot make up our minds to undemke anything." 
1. Ideals in Action. 
Life then is to be lived. Ideals are more than lofty 
peaks of contemplation. They are commands to action. Tl:e purpose 
of an ideal is to be realized, and whoever accepts the ideal is 
under obligation to accomplish its reality. To continue criticiz-
ing or even constructively planning and preparing indefinitely is 
in fact denying the purpose of life. 
last for which the first was endured • 
Let us therefore come to the 
This call to action is a characteristic note with Royce, 
as it is with Kant and more recently with Bergson and the pragma-
tists. It is the natural outcome of a philosophy of postulates, 
such as we have come bo by the development of the last chapter. 
•. I\. ' 
If the circle of light is limited, at least we can act upon such 
light as we have. The closing postulate of that chapter left us 
with the religious faith t~at somehow goodness is at the heart of 
things. Therefore our religious duty would seem to call us to act 
in the cause of goodness. 
Mqral activity is as much religion as we now appear to 
have. Where does it lead us? Into action, and as we have just 
seen, action is the cause of goodness. But hew shall we serve the 
cause of goodness unless we know what is the good? We may act with 
good intentions only to find them resulting in evil. Every activity 
cannot surely serve the cause of goodness. It will be necessary 
to discover and define the good in order to strive toward it. 
A glance at history shows this search for the true good 
as the underlying human motive. It brings at once meaning and 
confusion, for the search for the goods of life is the task that 
has both united and divided men. Each man has fought for the good 
as he saw it, but as men have differed in seeing and holding goods, 
they have fought each other in seeking the good. History there-
fore appears as a warfare of and for goods, ideal and material. 
Warfare for material goods has resulted from agreement as to the 
goods, the spiritual conflicts of history have resulted from dis-
agreement as to the goods of life. 
A brief review of the warfare of moral ideals will show 
the confusion among men over the true good. The Cyrenaica defined 
the good as individual pleasure, the Cynics as individual sacrifice, 
the Epicureans as social pleasure, the Stoics as social sacrifice. 
This conflict between self-realization and self-sacrifice continued 
47. 
in contrasting forms among the Greek and the Jewish, the Christian 
and the Buddhist attitudes toward life. In addition there is the 
question as to whether the self is the end of moral activity after 
all. Many hold that altruism is the true good, and that moral ac-
tivity is measured in terms of unselfish devotion to others. Then 
arises the question as to whether these others are to be served as 
individuals or as a social group. If other individuals are chosen 
then there is the qQestion as to their good; is it their happiness 
or their perfection and is their happiness or perfection won by ad-
justment to environment or by adjusting environment to them? Or 
if society is chosen, there follows the question of what is good 
. . 
for the society, power or love. Niet~he and Machiavelli believed 
the good to be power while Jesus and Moh Tih believed it tobe love. 
Plato on the other hand chose neither: but for his ideal of the 
social good chose justice. 
In any case tt is not simply a matter of choosing. It 
is rather a question of how to choose so as to know it is the good 
which is being chosen. Philosophers have advised choice by such 
contradictory methods as instinct, desire, emotion, intuition, 
moral sense, reason, and if by reason some say in consideration of 
the formal intent, others of the practical consequences, while 
still others advise a uniting of 
ods. If the formal is accepted 
that miscarries and works evil? 
the formal and teleological math-
then what of the go~ntention 
If the teleological then how 
decide which consequences are practical? If both how gather in 
all the evidence in time to act at all? 
C.~ 
"Each end, if chosen, has its own way of marshalling 
acts as good or bad. But one end cannot establish it-
self theoretically over against another ••• Each says 
'In me is the truth about right and wrong. I am the 
Way'. But for one another they have not arguments, but 
anathemas. 1~ey give no proof, only assertion and con-
demnation." ( ) 
By such a warfare of ideals we are "reduced to ethical 
48. 
skepticism. It was our decision to act in the cause of goodness, 
but upon seeking to define the good we are met by a confusion of 
ideals, each claiming to be the good. Good men hav~ chosen each 
of these and waged in turn the battle against the rest, but none 
have convinced the others, and who can claim the victory of the 
field? No matter how sure I may be that I am right, others are 
just as sure that they are right. These man-made ideals seem sub-
ject to private taste. Each ideal-creator spins his world from his 
own eccentricities. So "you have no basis left for your ideals but 
individual caprice, and every idealist will be his own measure of 
. { 5) 
all things, and an elastic measure at that". 
Which one of us after all sees enough to grasp the whole 
of goodness? Again our finitude baffles our quest. First we 
thought to know, now we have sought to act, but in each case the 
truth and the .goal escape us. We are confined to the helpless 
fragment. 
2. Struggle with Evil. 
But if this be our lot, why not make the best of it? If 
we are confined to individual caprice, perhaps we may still give a 
good account of that individuality. If we are reduced to man as 
the measure of all things, then it is surely our duty to make the 
49. 
measure as manly as we can. 11You cannot touch heaven. You remain 
but a man. But at all events you can do a man's work, however hard 
(6) 
that work is." At least we can struggle with such evil as we 
find at our door. I may not see the same evil that you do, but we 
ought to agree that evil exists. We may not oil the same things 
evil, but even if my evil be your good, still it is my duty to tackle 
my evil. 
Therefore action is open to each of us, even though we may 
agree neither upon end nor means. Let him who is without evil 
scorn to act, but to every man who has any personal experience of 
evil comes a task. If he cannot be sure about being his brother's 
keeper, at least he is his own. He may cast out the beam in his 
own eye, he may exert himself to set his own house in order, he may 
begin his reformation at home. Surely no neighbor would object to 
this. Ethical individualism is possible even in a world of caprice. 
Struggle with the nearest evil is open to the man who cannot define 
the ultimate good. 
. A world of conflict could hardly be a moral vacuum. 
Whatever goodness is attained is no gift from the lap of the gods 
but the outcome of a hard-won contest. This is the nature of every 
good within time, an achievement which is in some sense a triumphant 
contrast, a victory over evil. "In the choice against evil is the 
very life of goodness, which would be a pale stupid abstraction (7) 
otherwise. 11 Conflict does not defeat the good we seek, it is 
the condition of it. 
r~ •' ., . ' .. rm 
ala tS 
' 
The cause of goodness therefore to which we declared 
allegiance and to which we resolved to devote our action is not 
utterly beyond our finite grasp. If we cannot see the whole of 
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goodness, tf we cannot sight the distant goal, we can will the good 
by every inner choice against,evil. We may not guess the relation 
of our part to the whole, but at least we may taste and see that 
goodness is good. "This child of inner strife is the good, and the 
(8) 
only moral good, we know." 
Such experience of goodness is no abstract theory of 
remote possibilities. It is based upon the present finite fact 
of evil. As long as there is evil at hand, goodness is possible. 
The experience of goodness in this way does not need to wait until 
the last evil is routed and the world made every whit clean. 11 Good-
- (9) 
ness is this organism of struggling elements. 11 It is dependent 
only upon the will and the power to struggle with existent evil. 
Conflict may continue within and without, but as long as the will 
struggles on triumphantly goodness will endure. 
"For us holiness means, not the abolition of worldiness, 
not innocence, not turning away from the world, ·but the 
victory that overcometh the world, the struggle, the 
courage, the vigor, the endurance, the hot fight with 
sin, the facing of the demon, the power to have him 
there in us and to hold him by the throat, the living 
and ghastly presence of the enemy, and the triumphant 
wrestling with him and keeping him forever a panting 
furious immortal thrall and bQndman. That is all the 
holiness we can hope for.u(lOJ 
3. Morality and Religion. 
Goodness, it has been suggested, depends upon the will 
and the power to struggle with evil. But what of the will without 
tlble power? Suppose a man struggles on and on with never the 
power to overcome. What if the evil overcomes the struggling will? 
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Is moral defeat goodness? "Evil besets us, pain oppresses us, 
chagrin or calamity overwhelms.us. We cry out bitterly, 'Prove 
to me that such a life is good. Experience doesn't show it to be 
(11) 
good." 
There is a certain sense in which "the wrestling is the 
(12) 
blessing". But this lfussing of wrestling becomes most appar-
ent when the victory has been won and the victor looks back over 
the glorious field of conquest. The defeated wrestler does not 
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remember the battle with the same keen delight. In fact the very 
effort which the struggle cost is the more deeply regretted because 
it was wasted, so much life thrown away. The costlier the defeat, 
the poorer is the reward of the ~eated. 
If the battle were merely a physical struggle then the 
will might even yet remain above the defeat, heroically unconquered 
still. But in moral defeat it is the will that is involved, and 
the will that crumbles. There is little nobility or even moral 
dignity in a will that has broken, no matter how hard the struggle. 
The will which suffers moral defeat is to be pitied not praised. 
There must certainly be more evil than good in the struggle that 
leads to failure. 
Therefore if the wrestler has not the power to wrest the 
victory, the goodness sought again escapes us. That there are mor-
al defeats is undeniable; and from this it would follow that there 
areiRufficient powers to win the struggles of the moral life. 
Furthermore the powers that we have seem to thwart each other. We 
are as often betrayed by inner conflict of moral powers as by the 
external opponent. Or by successive acts, our powers often undo 
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previous acts, so that they contradict and cancel our moral efforts. 
"Hence we spend much of our lives in finding out, after the fact, 
that what we chose to do at one moment of our lives has hopelessly 
(13) 
thwarted what we in tended to do at some other moment." 
To this experience of powerlessness there is added to the 
moral wrestler the sense of aloneness. It is ever a contest of one 
individual will against the numberless powers of darkness. The evils 
of life seem to outnumber the power of this one human endeavor. 
There are times when the individual seems to be fighting the world. 
(14) 
This "lonely heroism" has its emotions of sadness, but these 
might be borne with. The decisive thing about the aloneness is its 
contribution to moral defeat. For the lonely wrestler against evil 
is standing against overwhelming odds, and because left to himself, 
·he is apt to become his own worst enemy. "'Self-will then, left to 
(15) 
itself, means self-defeat. That is the lesson of life." 
This might suggest the need of the individual for society. 
A great deal of emphasis is placed, in these times, upon social sin 
and social salvation. Every individual is born into a social group, 
comes to self-consciousness through the social group, is naturally 
gregarious, learns to live by imitation, avoids difficulties by con-
forming to social conventionality. If we share certain evils and 
defeats, that would suggest that we may also share certain good and 
victories. If we cannot single-handed put evil to flight perhaps 
social cooperation will win the day. That we cannot bear to be too 
much alone, that we are mo~ or less helpless in isolation would seem 
. ( 16) 
to indicate our human need for each other. 
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This need can hardly be denied, but the problem of getting 
together is not so easily solved. The social fact is that cooperation 
is a rare art, that conflict is the line of least resistance. If we 
love we also fight our kind, if we need human company we also resent 
social relations, if we sometimes pity and long to help, we as often 
find men rivals and try to crush them. The relationships within 
society are as often the cause of our moral defeat as of moral re-
enforcement. ttThere is then no one social tendency that, as it 
comes to us in the course of our ordinary social experience, gives 
us sufficient guidance to tell us how to escape self-defeat. For 
my love and pity war with my social greed and with my rivalries. 
(17) 
I am so far left to my chaos." Society in its natural state 
leaves us still lonely and by its conflict the more handicapped in 
our struggle for goodness. 
Let us review the course of our moral search. We began 
with the resolve to act in the cause of goodness. But upon seeking 
to know the good we found endless confusion and conflict among human 
ideals of the good. We were reduced to ethical skepticism in which 
we had to admit our finite inability to know the ultimate goal of 
moral action. Then it occurred to us that each man has an immediate-
ly personal moral task in struggling with his own evil. As ethical 
individualists we can fight the wrong as we each see it, and in every 
man's victory over his evil experience goodness. But every man does 
not win the victory over evil; the good is lost through weakness and 
self-contradiction. Seeing that goopness cannot be assured by iso-
lated wrestling, we turned to sociai experience for help. But again 
we are disappointed in finding conflict and mutual thwarting of 
goodness here. Our moral quest has only led us to the despair of 
(18) 
ethical pessimism. 
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As skepticism doubts the knowledge pessimism doubts the 
value of the moral ideal. Perhaps after all stern duty is the human 
delusion, and strenuous moral activity futile. It may be the more 
violent the activity, the more taut becomes the tangle. Many a 
wrestler has come to believe that activity is not only useless, but 
worse than useless. Suppose it is the self-willed and willful 
activity which is the very cause of our hopeless confusion and de-
feat. Need rather than duty may be the key to our salvation. 
Once more we have been throvm by our human lack upon the 
religious hope. In the limitations of the finite present we con-
fessed our need of religion. Now in the entanglements of moral 
activity we are again brought to confess a need for religion. There 
seems to be nowhere else to turn and even though we were formerly 
unable to substantiate the religious claim to salvation we again 
attempt to understand it. The conditions for religion, as Royce sees 
it, are twofold: (1) 11 That there is some one highest end of exist-
ence, some goal of life, some chief good; and (2) That by nature, 
man is in great danger of completely failing to attain this good, (19) 
so that he needs to be saved from this danger." The chief 
good has been our fundamental postulate, the ~le object of our 
moral quest. That we are in serious danger of m:tssing this good 
entirely, both by failure to know and failure~attain is exactly 
the outcome of our present investigation. Therefore the develop-
ment of this chapter has met precisely the two conditions for re-
ligion. In spite of his joy in moral activity Royce is honestly 
convinced that it alone is not enough to solve the problem of 
human living. 11 To me" says Royce, "the religious need seems an 
(20) 
insistent and clear need." 
11We need to give life sense 1 to know and to control 
our selves1 to end the natural chaos 1 to bring order 
and light into our deeds, to make the warfare of natural 
passion subordinate to the peace and power of the spirit. 
This is our need. To live thus is our ideal. And be-
cause this need is pressing and this ideat21~ far off from the natural man1 we need salvation." 
This religious salvation, as noted in Chapter I 1 will need 
to be achieved by a power not our own 1 i.e. 1 by the presence of a 
superhuman Deliverer. At that time we were blocked by the religious 
paradox, by the consciousness of our human inability to reach the 
divine levels necessary to salvation. This chapter has demonstrated 
the futility of our own moral activity to reach universal goodness 
and thus has in a way heightened the paradox. But in so doing it 
has led us to seize this very paradox as the way out of our diffi-
culty. If we are unable in our ovm human strength to reach the 
good or the divine, then let us cease striving. For the claim of 
the deeper religious insight is that our own weakness is divine 
opportunity. If we will but cease this futile striving, if we will 
transfer trust in self-activity to trust in the divine-activity, we 
may then open the way for the operation of divine grace. When w& 
come to realize "the fact that the divine is nob of our making and 
that its ways are not our ways~n~hat its good is something beyond 
(22) 
our power to create or attain of ourselves" then we are ready 
to see "that grace alone saves and that without such grace, works 
(23) 
are but vanity." ''Whoever has once felt, under any circum-
stances1 his helplessness to do right knows what such religious 
(24) 
experience of the need of grace means." 
.•. \ 
We have seen the place of the will in all knowledge and 
conduct. In recognizing the voluntary basis of life, we found 
choice fUndamental to every human condition. However, it bec~ame 
evident later that self-will left to itself means self-defeat. By 
the very exercise of his free choice, the individual may event-
ually will his own defeat. 
11 The career, for instance, of that man who failed ttl 
love or in business or in politics is wrecked. His rep-
utation is lost. Well, it was his will, as a social be-
ing, to aim at just such a career and to value just that 
sort of reputation. Hs:l he chosen to be a hermit, or a 
saint or a Stoic, what would just such a career and such 
a reputation have been to him? How could he have lost 
unless he sought? And his failure what was it due to? 
No doubt some choice of his own quite as much as to his 
rival's skill. He wanted freedom to carry on his own 
speculations. He got that freedom and lost his fortune. 
He wanted to be free to choose whom and how to love. He 
had his way and defeated his O\Tn aim. He chose to 
follow his amlbitions. They have led him where he is .n ~5 ) 
Therefore the way of escape would logically appear to 
be the surrender of this trouble-seeking will. By the insight now 
arrived at, our highest act of will should be to give up our self-
will. 11 0ur wills B.a are ours to make them thine." In such sub-
mission of the human to the divine will, religion claims to find 
salvation. The most extreme form of this religious aubmission 
is mystical surrender. To the examination of this type of 
experience we shall next turn • 
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CHAPTER IV 
MYSTICAL SURRENDER 
Doubt and conflict have led us here. It began in 
dissatisfaction with the finite present. It turned to doubting 
and from thence to recognition of the primacy of will in all life. 
Activity became the promise of larger life and we entered eagerly 
into the realm of moral action. But the warfare of moral ideals, 
the conflict within and without seemed to thwart and cancel any 
progress, and we found our state the more tragic because of our 
activity. Having found no light in this direction, it may be 
wise to give up vain striving on this path and turn elsewhere. A 
totally different way of life is offered in mystical surrender. 
cism. 
Such, it may be noted, is the natural approach to mysti-
(1) 
The philosophical mystics often began as naive realists, 
and then discovering the contradictions in such a position they 
doubted, and doubted thoroughly. A study of the great mystics 
shows them to have been 11men·whose piety has been won after long 
conflict, whose thoughts have been dissected by a very keen inner 
skepticism, whose single minded devotion to an abstraction has re-
sulted from a vast experience of the painfu~ complications of life, 
and whose utter empiricism is the outcome of a severe discipline, 
(2) 
whereby they have learned to distrust ideas." To the ranks of 
the mystic have also come the baffled and disappointed, the defeated 
ones beaten in life's struggle with evil. The mystical mood 11 finds 
you despairing, and it teaches you to despise even your despair, 
. {3) 
and to rejoice even in your failure." 
' 
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In Chapter II we saw that the striving of the will can be 
satisfied by putting the will to rest. But at that time cessation 
of will seemed too great a price to pay for satisfaction. The active 
will seemed the more desirable, so we made our choice. But in Chap-
ter III the difficulties of our active position have increased until 
now we are ready to try the other alternative and let go the will 
for peace. Doubt may lead either to activity or passivity. We 
have followed the will, but its activity availing nothing we shall 
now try negation of will, and explore the way of the mystic. 
1. Pure experience. 
In quest of reality, we began with present experience. The 
reason for this was the assumption that we can lanow directly only 
what is present as immediate experience. It is now time for us to 
return and reaffirm that assumption. From that point in the earlier 
investigation we found our lanowledge so rapidly expanding that it re-
fused to be bound by present limitations altogether. Perhaps our 
expansion was more. rapid than wise. Let us start again from this 
point and make sure of every critical step, in a careful effort to 
avoid the difficulties of the former expansion. 
The difficulty seems to have crept in at the very start in 
defining the content of present experience. For at that time we 
permitted elements as immediate data which made pure experience at 
once impossible. Oughtness naturally brought in the unrealized 
idea, relation demanded contrasting others, multiplicity made sim-
plicity forever out of the question, while activity inducted this 
eternal re,~tlessness which has created all of our subsequent diff-
iculties and brought us to our present state. Once grant the right 
I 
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of these to dwell in the immediate experience of the present moment 
and there is no limit to the extent in which they will develop. It 
is these seeds of discord which sprang up into the hopeless contra-
dictions we have witnessed. 
Let us admit, then, the error of our former generosity, 
and recognize that the experience of the first chapter was too com-
plex. Such complexity led and always will lead to contradictions. 
Those contradictions reduced us to intellectual skepticism, which we 
escaped only to stumble into ethical skepticism. Let us exhaust 
ourselves no longer in futile effort to escape the inevitable. If 
finite ideas and finite knowledge of the good are fleeting, contra-
dftctory and hopeless, then the end of this road suggests another. 
We may make our skepticism the basis for renunciation. We may re-
nounce finite ideas as futile and the desire for finite knowledge 
as vain. From these we turn to the mystical way of pure experience. 
Surrender of knowledge shall be our first mystical aim. 
Finite ideas being illusory the mystic gives up all vain ambitions 
To him the reaJ/is distinguishable -as· ,, the for worldly knowledge • 
. ( 4) 
innnediate. All mediations and indirect forms of knowledge are 
unrealities and finite presumptions. As human ideas of reality 
are false they must be negated in the pursuit of some more direct 
method of reaching it. The mystic is the only pure empiricist. 11 For 
only the mystic looks for Pure Experience whoaly apart from ideas ••• 
{ 5) 
He is the only thoroughgoing Empiricist • 11 
11 0rdinary empiricism only half loves the facts of ex-
perience, as facts; for it no sooner gets them than it gets 
outside them, makes endless hypotheses about them,restless-
ly tries to explain them by ideal constructions, and if 
f 
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realistic, forsakes them altogether to talk of independ-
dent beings. The mystic loves the simple fact, just as 
far as it is simple and ~ediated, the absolute datum, 
with no questions to be a~~~d. That alone for him, is 
worthy of the name real." l ') 
Mysticism begins with ordinary present experience as does 
Chapter I, but is not content to leave it in its given state, as 
human beings usually know it. The mystic begins where other empir-
icists leave off and seeks to refine or purify this raw experience. 
Vfuat the average man calls. pure color, pure sound, pure emotion, 
is not pure at all but very complex, is already twisted, distorted 
and reconstructed in the act of being known perceptually. For as 
(7) 
we have seen a certain·~·!· activity is involved in the very receiv-
ing of impressions. Attention and recognition alter experience in 
the apperception process. Such experiences are partly immediate to 
be sure, but only imperfectly so, and because of .this human imper-
fection the real is never wholly immediate. 
Therefore, it is our task to develop the art of purifying 
raw experience until it is wholly passive and perfectly immediate. 
Such purifying art is not the ready gift or ability of the natural 
man. It must be carefully acquired by long training. This train-
ing is the negative path of the mystics by which they are taught 
gradually to cut off disturbing factors, to concentrate in medita-
tion and devotion upon Being in p~er form. The way of mysticism 
is ever a way of discipline, a surrender of cravings of the flesh 
and the too restless activity of the mind. If this way proves 
~ccessful the purely immediate is abstracted, withdrawn and iso-
lated from entangling mediations and Reality may be met in pure 
experience. 
~I. 
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And yet the word "met" is misleading. It comes from the 
world of dualisms, of this over against other, and denies the presen~e 
of the fact already within. The mystical discovery is not a reaching 
out but a returning home, a coming to himself after prodigal wander-
ings. The discipline is truly renunclation, a turning from the world 
of externa~ things, restless strivings and grasping ideas to the 
still depth of the innermost experience. 
"Look deeper," the mystic says, "but not deeper into 
i~lusory ideas. Look deeper into the interior of exper-
ience itself. There, if you only look deeper than· all 
ordinary and partial immediacy, deaper than colors and 
sounds and deeper than mortal love, then when once 
rightly prepared, you shall find a fact, an immediate 
and ineffable fact, such that it wholly satisfieS every 
longing, answere every inquiry, and fulfils the aim of 
every thought. And this it will do:· for you just be-
cause it will be at l~st the pure immediate, with no 
beyond to be sought. t(P) 
This looking within is quite different from the process 
usually known among psychologists as introspection. For what 
introspection finds is the object of the investigating self. The 
I by exploring self-consciousness comes upon the ~· The me which 
is known is the material self and as viewed by the I seems quite 
other. Now the mystic is not seeking for the known self for that 
is nothing more than the human being whose life is so unsatisfactory. 
What the mystic seelrs within is the knower, and the knower is to be 
found not by knowledge (for then it would be the object) but by 
immediate experience as the subject. This knowing subject is the 
creative source within me, it is the great mystery. But as Knower 
it seems to partake of the universal pr~nciple of knowing, it comes 
from beyond and is note xhausted within. Therefore by immediate ex-
perience of the inner Knower one has come upon ultimate Reality. 
9 
The identity of the world of reality with the internal 
Knower, Professor Royce believes, is the key to Hindu mysticism. 
Whatever the individual recognizes in the world about him becomes 
divine, because in the knowing principle is the Reality of which 
everyone partakes. Whatever object he sees to be real, That art 
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thou; "therefore asserting of him as knower, whatever one asserts 
of the Being that he knows ••• It is a world identical with the 
knower. It is a vision of his soul. Its life is his life. It 
is in so far as he creates it. Whatever he is as knower, that is 
(9) 
his world." 
Here is offered a solution for the religious paradox noted 
in a previous discussion. This paradox developed from the seeming 
inability of the human knower to know the divine. But this Gordian 
knot mysticism cuts at one bold stroke by declaring that the knower 
is already the divine. There is only the Knower. All else is 
illusion. By ceasing the striving of human knowledge and disciplin-
ing himself to have only pure experience, the mystic finds his ex-
periencing subject to be a part of the only real Being. In realizing 
. ( 10) 
that the subject simply is, experience becomes metaphysical. 
2. Simple Unity. 
The a:lm of pure; experience is simple unity. This is the 
end of the finite search and it is here reached by discovering that 
,, Reality is no longer other, but immediately prese.nt. The object 
which thus fulfils the finite search by eliminating otherness must 
of necessity be in itself One. For variety calls forth an other 
as contrasted with the simple unit, and purely immediate Reality 
' 
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can there~ore remain so in no other way except by being the only One. 
Variety must be illusory, because it inevitably leads us into contra-
dictions as well as bec~use it is based upon the pretension o~ in-
dependent beings which our insight has ~ound to be impossible. Every 
~act not wholly immediate we have seen to be unreal. For a ~act 
not satis~ying sends you elsewhere in in~inite regress until you are 
(11) 
~inally obliged to admit it only a will-o-the~wisp. 
The Knower alone is real. All else independent o~ the 
One is unreal. I~ I, there~ore am one with the Knower who alone 
is real what else need I to know or seek? This Oneness is the ~ul-
filment o~ all finite striving. What more is there to strive ~or? 
There is no other object real or desirable. For 11 the true Self does 
not strive. It has no idea o~ any other. It has no positive will. 
Object and Subject are in it no longer even di~~erent ••• Di~~erences 
. (12) 
are illusory. The Self merely is." 
So the next mystical step is naturally the surrender of 
will. It was the striving of desire, the activity o~ the will, as 
(13) 
noted above which finally defeated the finite life. Restless 
desires are forever de~eating satis~action while even the best of 
activity thwarts itself. Therefore the Buddhists seek extinction 
o~ desire, the pessimists seek the cessation of the will-to-live, {14) 
and the philosophers seek to live in submission to reality. The 
religious outcome of this pessimistic view of life is mysticism • 
The mystic resolves upon peace at any price, and as he has already 
found the pain of desiring and the conflict of activity he usually 
is not unwilling to pay the price. The price of mystical peace is 
the cutting o~~ of desire and the ~orsaking of finite activity ~or 
pas:si ve unity. 
,., · ... 
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Toward simple unity, therefore, we are persuaded to turn. 
So far we have advanced by surrendering finite knowledge and finite 
will. But yet another step is necessary in order to reach the de-
sired unity. Consciousness can never be a simple unity, for "all 
consciousness involves partially dissatisfied ideas.of a Beyond and 
( 15) 
includeS desires that seek another than what is now wholly present." 
The final step required to reach simple unity will thus be the 
surrender of consciousness. All conscious life implies the dual-
ism of sub"O.ect and object. To reach the simple unity of the subject, 
we shall have to discipline ourselves to reduce consciousness to a 
zero. 
From such a step many would shrink as from suicide, for 
this would seem to be a deliberate anlhil~tion of the self. But to 
the well-trained passive mystic this appears as the fulfilment of 
the self. -It may be objected that this is an extreme form of 
mysticism, and so it is. But it is the logical end of the course 
we have begun. Let us glance back over the way we have come. 
We began with the observation that all efforts to deal 
with the real indirectly, by mediating, complex methods lead to 
error and delusion. The mystical path started in the desire to 
(16) 
substitute 11 an extremely rich acquaintance with the real" for 
these other unsatisfactory methods. The raw experience we under-
took to refine to pure experience, in order that "the raw material 
.of meaning" might become "the restful goal of all meaning - as be-
(17) 
yonP. ideas, even because .it is simpler than they are". . Ideation-
al knowledge was thus given up for an experience of unity in which 
the subject reduced to its primitive simplicity seemed to mingle 
with the Being independent of which nothing can be real. This 
9 
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Being strives not because it completely is; there is no other object. 
As long as we strive there is some object unattained, so the longing 
will is given up for a unity that the present holds. (a~t~~-~~~~ 
~-~~~~~-~a&P&-~&-&~~~~e~~-~~~~~~a;-&e-~ae-~eag~g-w~~~-~& 
But as long as there 
is consciousness, the subject-object dualism is involved, and absol-
ute Unity alwa~s denied. There£ore i£ our search is sincere and we 
actually do seek absaute unity, we must stop our thinking and accept 
it in absolute immediacy. The unity of absolute immediacy is the 
si~ple unity of unconsciousness. To be one with pure Being then 
is to surrender all predicates of being and become the simple unity 
(18) 
of the Is. 
Absolute immediacy then is the simple unity that removes 
all acts of seeing, hearing, thinking, etc., by achieving a minimum 
of consciousness. "Absolute Immediacy, per£ect peace, fulfilment 
of meaning by a simple and final presence, - when do we finite 
beings come nearest to that? On the borderlands of unconsciousness, 
(19) 
when we are closest to dreamless slumber. 11 The unity of life can 
only be per£ectly simple when it is per£ectly dark. This is the 
simplicity of mystery. The process of reaching it is a negative 
retreat from conscious error. ~His position is that since, in us 
mortals, consciousness means ignorance and since the less we observe 
our ignorance, the nearer we are to unconsciousness, therefore at 
(20} 
the limit to be possessed of absolute knowledge is to be unconscious. 
The finite zero is the absolute infinite. 
' 
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3. The Outcome ££ Mysticism. 
The closing sentence of the above section sounds like a 
reductio ad absurdum. It would seem that the~itical spirit in 
which we began our undertaking has been betrayed at the hands of 
mysticism. But this mystical position claims a philosophy, and as 
absurd as some conclusions may sound, there is no denying it has a 
rigid logicl Royce finds it "essentially a self-conscious and re-
flective doctrine" which "explicitly states its ownfufects, and 
{21) 
points beyond its own abstractions. The mystic in contrast to 
the realist "is in a much larger measure his own critic. 
{22} He is 
essentially dialectical." 
It is not difficult to see that the mystics use dialec-
tical skill in criticizing others. The±~ criticism brings the dig-
nity of human reason and the usefulness of the human will to the 
ground in a masterly.way~ Their demolishment of the independent 
beings of realism is thorough. But when they turn to reality for 
themselves they throw reason to the winds and hold on to pure ex-
perience. Reason to the mystic would thus seem to be an instrument 
of destruction, never turned to constructive arts. He uses the 
weapon of other thirucers to rout them on 'their own field, but having 
once done so flings it hastily aside. To him in his.mystical quest 
reason is only one of the impedimenta of the march. 
But even so it could hardly be shown that the mystic re-
fuees to turn his criticism on himself. He does criticize with 
glee his own finite error and futility. He does see his own in-
consistencies and paradoxes. He seizes them and makes them the 
chief cornerstone that other builders rejected. Philosophical 
J ~ I'! ~ 
1
1.1 
1 
•. j 
11' J 
il 
!J 
l 
1 
• 
67. 
mysticism "always expounds its own paradoxes, and actually glories 
(23) 
in them." Even the mystic does not pray continually without 
ceasing • When he prays or loses himself in devotion to Pure Being 
he leaves his critical faculties behind, no doubt, for he chooses to 
limit conscious activity to its lowest possible threshold. But 
when the prayer is over and he comes out of his darkened closet into 
the clear light of full consciousness, he again puts on his critical 
faculties. Then he sees his paradoxes and uses the reason he had 
the moment before abandoned to defend the uncritical way he chose. 
When the mystic faces reality his aim is to lay himself bare of 
thoughts when he faces the illusions of his fellow-creatures he arms 
"(24) 
himself with his sharpest thoughts. 
What is the mystic's reward? His reward is peace, escape 
from conflict and contradiction. This is the pearl of great price 
to the mystic, but he has to go and sell all he has, even his very 
self-consciousness itself to win his peace. The mystic's reward 
is immediacy, the experience of unity. He has a direct experience 
no one can deny, and with that experience comes a rare intuitive 
certainty as to absolute values. He confesses our own knowledge 
to be a mystery, unworthy to be trusted. "But he is certain that 
he and the whole world exist for an omniscient Self. He may not 
be able to convince others of this certainty but he is himself con-
vinced for he has his experience. His experience may be reduced 
to zero if his discipline is successful, but that very zero becomes 
his assurance that he has lost himself in God. 
~I . !l 
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Here his critics will intervene to remonstrate that even 
though his experience attains zero it is still his experience and 
therefore proves no access to God. Zero is a unity of emptiness, 
not of Godhead. To equate zero with the Absolute is the most hope-
less of all his paradoxes, for it would seem to deny any value to 
the goal which the mystic sought. But then "the mystic assures you 
that just this zero has infinite value, because it is the goal of 
the states of finite consciousness. Do you not want peace he says? 
Can anything be of more worth to you than attainment? If attain-
ment involves what for finite consciousness means the quenching of 
desire, of thought, and of consciousness, does that deprive the 
search for attainment of meaning? For now that you are finite, 
(25) 
all your passion is for attainment and peace." By reducing the 
finite to zero the absolute leaps to infinite value. 
Here the paradox of the mystic comes to its rightful 
place. It is now evident that the value of the mystical path is 
its contrast between the finite nothingness and the Absolute All-
ness. And only by virtue of this contrast does the mystic's pos-
ition hold its appea~. Therefore he is deceiving himself when he 
declares the Absolute to be the All. For the finite contrast 
always stands, and forever must stand over against it to establish 
its infinite value. It is the reality of the finite imperfection 
that throws into bold relief the infinite perfection. 
"What the mystic has positively defined, then, is the 
law that our consciousness of Being depends upon a contrast 
whereby we set all our finite exp~ence over against some · 
other that we seek or do not possess. As a fact, however 
it is not only the goal, but the whole series of stages on' 
the way to this goal that is the Reality ••• Being must be 
attributed to both the principal members of the relation 
of contrast, both to the seeking and to the attai~ent. 
Else is the attainment the fulfilment of nothing."l26) 
69. 
The failure of mysticism lies in this, that in seeking too 
little it gpasps too much. It seeks an experience that is too little 
' 
to hold the content which any conscious moment must hold. It is 
reduced to this alternative; either a unity of contrast or an exper-
ience of nothing. Only by an experience of nothing can simple 
unity ever be reached. For experience of something (including the 
Absolute) is always based upon a unity of contrast. The outcome of 
mysticism then will have to defeat either one aim or the other. It 
resolves itself to contrast or nothing • 
•• ~ 
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CHAPTER V 
MEMBERSHIP IN A COMMUNITY 
We have sought Reality through four types of individual 
experience. But the relation of finite experience to ultimate 
Reality remains unclear. The problem of how the human may know 
the divine continues unsolved. There is, however, a larger human 
world around the individual open to exploration. This is his na-
tive environment, the world into which he is born, and by v±rtue 
of which he comes to selfhood. In this social world he may perhaps 
find an answer to his finite paradoxes. 
meaning of social reality. 
Let us investigate the 
The analysis so far has failed of solution, Royce would 
say, because it has not recognized the social basis of all exper-
ience. "Our social consciousness is, psychologically speaking, 
the most deeply rooted foundation of our whole view of ourselves (1) 
and of the world. 11 The isolated individual attempt at knowledge 
is bound to fail. Its narrowness is self-defeating as we have seen 
in the chapters above. So it is that a great deal of critical anal-
ysis into the foundations of knowledge falls into paradox and hope-
less contradiction. The only intelligible foundation of knowledge 
~ is a recognition of the social nature of the knowing process. That 
is to say, the broader knowledge which we need is based upon an 
appeal to a community experience. 
• 
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In the same way we shall find that the dilemmas of moral 
activity are largely due to the isolation of the moral individual. 
Warring ideals and conflicting individuals need primarily some basis 
for uniting. The creation of a moral community through the right 
kind of loyalty is the urgent moral task. Likewise the religious 
path of mysticism has failed because it undertook to be what Plotinus 
called "a flight of the alone to the alone". Pure experience and 
simple unity instead of completing the meaning of life reduce it to 
zero. The abundant life of religion leads in the other direction, 
that is, in the direction of the religious community. 
We turn, therefore, to the experience of membership in the 
community. 
1. Interpretation and the Logical Community. 
At the clos~ of the last chapter we came again upon the 
irreducible fact of contrast. It appeared in the first chapter as 
one of the immediate data of experience, but later at the suggestion 
of·the mystic we tried to eliminate it in the interest of pure exper-
ience. Such pure experience, however, was found to be an experience 
of nothing. Unity of any conscious experience is inevitably a unity 
of contrast. Therefore our logical duty toward contrast is to accept 
it. And having once accepted it, our next undertaking must be to 
find a productive basis for the union of such contrast • 
For this task a new type of reasoning is needed. The 
dualism of percept and concept only perpetuates the contrast. Per-
captions deliver unconnected and meaningless glimpses in the fleeting 
present. Conceptions deal in the barren abstractions of lifeless 
universals. Deduction is based upon conceptions, induction upon 
I 
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percep_tions. In actual life, consciousness never comes in the form 
. ( 2) 
of either pure perception or pure conception. There is a certain 
unreality about the philosophic division into these opposing camps 
of artificial logical and epidtemological methods. No reasoning is 
possible at all upon series of unconnected perceptions, while the 
content of pure conceptualizing is empty abstraction. This need for 
synthesis has been commonly recognized since Kant, but just what this 
synthesis is or how it operates is a problem that has been largely 
overlooked. Kant made the third form of activity which he calls 
reason more purely conceptual than the sense and understanding which 
(3) 
it tries to(unite. Others such as Bergson and the pragmatists 
make perceptive knowledge the goal for which conception strives. 
But none of these give a satisfactory account of the.syn-
thetic cognitive process. Furthermore none of these account .for our 
knowledge of objects not accessible to perception or conception 
alone. The object of a perception is a datum, (i.e., a thing· or 
a change), while the object of a conception is a unwersal (i.e., an 
abstract character, type or quality). But all objects of knowledge 
do not belong to these two classes. How do we know our neighbor's 
mind, or the conscious acts of that mind? · Such objects are neither 
sense data norruniversal abstract qualities, and so Royce holds that 
dualistic forms of logic are unable to cope with the facts of exper-
ience. 
To meet this situation Royce, therefore, brings forward 
Charles Peirce's suggestion of o/triadic .form of logic. This seeks to 
overcome dualisms by a third term which mediates between the contrast-
ing .terms. The means by which this unity is accomplished is the 
'I 
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character of the third term as a mediator. It holds some common ele-
ment with each of the contrasting pair, bu~ remains distinct from each. 
In this way the third term forms a connecting link of ,understanding 
between the opposing pair. So concepts and percepts may be synthe-
sized by a third cognitive process possessing an element of each but 
having something more than both. 
This triadic logical suggestion of Peirce's i~ developed 
as enthusiastically by Royce as other Peircean suggestions have been 
developed by James. James develops his suggestion into the prag-
matic method of reaching truth. Royce develops his into the logical 
method of interpretation. Rqyce humanizes and enlarges Peirce in 
this way, even as James does in another, by bringing it into the 
realm of every day living experiences. James seeks the "cash value" 
which ideational bank-notes promise to pay. Royce finds experiences 
where neither credit-values nor cash-values are adequate, i.e., in 
crossing the boundary from one country to another. Here is required 
a process of exchange from one currency to another, and requires the 
offices of some mediating link. This new type of transaction re-
quired "is a process of interpreting the cash-values which are recog-
nized by the laws and customs of one realm in terms of the cash 
(4) 
values which are legal tender in another country". So truth may 
be extended beyond the narrow provincial limits out to the larger 
world of knowledge by interpretation across the boundaries. 
I 
Interpretation ios a relation of three objects or terms 
( 5) 
which brings them into determinate order. It is essentially a 
social form of knowledge involving more than the dyadic relation of 
individual to object or concept. It requires a community of three 
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to effect an interpretation: (1} the interpreter, (2} the meaning con-
veyed and (3} the one to whom this meaning is addressed. There may be 
instances where only one person is actually present, but if so he will 
assume each of the three offices in making his interpretation. If he 
is concerned only with himself he interprets himself to himself, thus 
maintaining the triadic relation. It may be his past self that he is 
interpreting to his fUture self, or his impulsive self to his objecting 
self, but he continues the role of interpreter by explaining or just-
ifying something to someone. In our social relations it is one neigh-
bor that we interpret to another, or one idea that is interpreted to 
an·audience of one or many. If one does not himself take the role 
of interpreter, then he addresses every expression of mental activity 
to a possible interpreter. Actually we take each part successively 
and simultaneously. 
By this triadic logic of interpretation our interior con-
scious life is transformed into the order of conversation. It is 
interesting to note coincidence at this point with the Watsonian be-
(6) 
haviorist 1 s characterization of thinking as sub-vocal language. 
Both recognize the normal flow of reflective consciousness as a kind 
of interior conversation, but whereas the behaviorist interprets 
this physic~lly, Royce interprets it socially. However interpreted, 
the common character and the important feature is the fact of inter-
pretation going on in every intelligent mind. This mental act of 
interpretation Royce believes to be a distinctly different process 
from other forms of mental activity. It differs in 11 the objects to 
which it is properly applied, in the relations in which it stands to 
(7) 
these objects, and in the end which it serves." 
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The goal of interpretation is logical unity. Its aim is 
the overcoming of contradiction and the individual isolation. Its 
method is the discovering of a mediating viewpoint in which separated 
elements may meet. This suggests, of course, the Hegelian dialectic 
which lifts thesis and antithesis to a higher synthesis. Pe±rce's 
(8) 
logic is not inconsistent with Hegel's but was arrived at independ-
ently from an empirical study, and in fields of thought that Hegel 
hardly entered (i.e., mathematics). Royce's development is the hu-
manizing and socializing of this method. His own summary of the 
characteristics of interpretation make these social and human traits 
preeminent. 
"First, interpretation is a conversation, and not a 
lonely enterprize. There is someone, in the realm of 
psychological happenings who addresses someone. The 
one who addresses interprets some objects to the oread-
dressed. In the second place, the interpreted object 
is itself something which has the nature of a mental 
expression. Peirce uses the term 'sign' to name this 
mental object which is interpreted. Thirdly, since 
the interpretation is a mental act, and is an act which 
is expressed, the interpretation is, in its turn, a 
Sign. This new sign calls for further interpretations. 
For the interpretation is addressed to somebody. And 
so -at least in ideal, the social process involved is 
endless."(9) 
Thus, to Royce, interpretation means a logical co~~ity. 
Its objects are signs, its relations are social, its end is logical 
unity. How does the Community of Interpretation help solve the 
difficulties of individualistic knowledge? 
First, it connects the isolated fragments of knowledge. 
Fleeting moments are linked together by present interpretation of 
past and future experiences. Finite facts are extended to larger 
meaning by the discovery that no fact is merely one's own but that 
facts are es~entially spiritual signs to be understood by social 
~I 
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reference. Contrasts are now accepted as candidates for comparison 
and spiritual unity, as variant members of one logical body. 
Second, it unites life's deep-lying contradic.tions. We 
come upon experience in the state that Royce calls "dangerous pairs'! 
Subject is paired against object, percept against concept, ideal 
against ideal, man against man and human against divine. The basis 
for unity of life's conflicts is the mediating third, distinct from 
each but sympathetic with both. It takes three to make a community. 
Third, it brings coherence to the aim or goal of life. A 
way was offered out of the despair of doubt by the activity of the 
will. But the wi 11 to know and the will to goodness are not enough, 
we also need the will to interpret, that is the will to form a commun-
(10) 
ity of knowledge. An effort was also formerly made to organize 
experience. The judgment-span there noted is already incipient inter-
pretation, but it needs to come more clearly to consciousness of the 
three-term relationship. The center of organization we found to be a 
self, which was defined as unity of meaning directed toward coherent 
ideal. This too was the beginning of the mental process Royce later 
calls interpretation. The new insight gained is the social nature 
of that organization at its best, even in the case of one self. The 
self in fact is never found except by an act of self-interpretation, 
and by interpreting the self, past and future, actual and ideal are 
bound together in one organizing effort. The self we- have seen fulf i]s 
the office of interpreter, interpreted and interpretee. The power of 
the ideal has also been noted but not the means to that power. It 
may be here observed that the power of the ideal lies not in its 
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dormant presence, but in its active interpretation. It is by inter-
pretation that one crosses the boundary from the ideal to the actual, 
from the narrow organization of life to its larger coherent dimensions. 
Interpretation is the spirit of every form of community for 
it is the interpreter who is the uniting link among the social con-
trasts. The stability of any community depends upon the regularity 
of its interpreting functions. "In case our interpretations actually 
approach success, a community of interpretation possesses such eth-
ical and religious significance, with increasing definiteness and 
beauty as the evolution of such a community passes from simpler to 
(11) 
higher stages." The ethical and religious implications of the 
community will appear in the following pages. A connecting link 
appears in Royce's word that "By the 1 real world' we mean simply the 
(12) 
'true interpretat ion1 of this our problematic situation. 11 
2. Loyaltz ~ the Moral Community. 
In the Will to Interpret, presented in the preceding sec-
tion, we have returned to the voluntary activ7ty renounced by myst-
icism. But this does not mean completing a futile circle, for we 
now come upon will at a higher level. At the interpretative level 
will may be seen from a somewhat more perspective viewpoint. The 
will-activity is after all the foundation of knowledge and life. It 
is not the will itself that defeats life's fulfilment as the pesrnmist 
and the mystic claim. The difficulty occurs in the confusion and 
conflict of wills, and if some way can be found to overcome this 
conflict, will may yet be capable of satisfaction. 
=-~;~ 
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Chapter III suggested a paradox of duty. The paradox may 
be restated in this way. I am the only one that can legislate 
upon my own duty. No external authority can ever justify or accept 
for me my moral responsibility. And yet left to myself, I can never 
find my clear duty. For myresires and impulses are so many that I 
{13) 
can not even know my own will. Social life may be offered as 
solution, but society has at least as many conflicting desires and 
wills as the individual. And even if society does speak with one 
voice as in accepted tradition, it is not my will, so why my duty? 
We are all social imitators, to be sure, but the outcome of imi-
tation is often revolt against social custom and the sharp conflict 
of reaction against the social will. 
We seek in vain for a clear call to duty from either 
self or society. Some motive is needed to unite self and society 
by appealing convincingly to both. Royce states our position thus: 
11 Nei ther within nor without then do I find what seems 
to me a settled authority, - a settled and harmonious 
plan of life, - unless, indeed, some happy sort of 
union takes place between the inner and the outer, be-
tween my social world and myself, betyi~:Q. my natural way-
wardness and the ways of my fellows." J 
This happy union of inner and outer Royce finds in the 
experience of loyalty. Such an experience one finds when some great 
social passion takes possession of him and defines for him his plan 
of life., Patriotism is an exanple of this kind of social passion 
.t
1 
which lifts a man out of himself, yet with the consent of the self. 
The experience of loyalty brings from beyond the isolated self some 
great cause which shows him a plan of action and says, "In this 
cause is your life, your Will, your opportunity, your fulfilment:~) 
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Such a plan at once resolves the contradiction of social 
will and self-will by uniting them in a persuasive cause. It is 
able to unite them because it is: (1) a social plan which calls upon 
the individual will for submission to the common interest, and (2) 
an exaltation of the individual who is glorified through his sacri-
fice and self-surrender. 11 Th:Us loyalty, viewed me rely as a person-
al attitude, solves the paradox of our ordinary existence, by showing 
us outside of ourselves the cause which is to be served, and inside 
of ourselves the will which delights to do this service, and which (16) 
is not thwarted but enriched and expressed in such service." 
Loyalty, Royce defines as the devotion of a person to a 
(17) 
cause, It is an attitude of will which overcomes inner conflict 
and unites the divided self. It is likewise the attitude of wil,l 
which unites the individual to the community of those who yoin in 
serving that cause. One may not have been right in his choice of a 
cause, but at least he knows unity of purpose in choosing and serv-
ing that cause. And having once chosen a cause the fatal hesitation 
and moral paralysis is over. The loyal are free from moral doubts. 
Their cause becomes their conscience and speaks to them in tones 
of authority which lies beyond them, and is yet their own, for they 
(18) 
have freely chosen it. Loyalty offers the peace and unity 
which we have sought, for it centralizes one's powers and creates 
satisfaction by virtue of organized action for a cause. 
Moral activity, therefore, will find its best expression 
in the service of a cause. A cause worthy to call forth loyalty 
will need, (1) to be larger than the merely private self of the 
individual, that is objective to his capricious will, and (2) to 
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(19) 
be able to unite the individual with other persons by some social tie. 
It will thus be seen th~ a cause is at once personal and super-per-
sonal. By its objective character it overcomes private caprice in 
the kind of union which a self can only give to a more-than-self. 
At the ssame time it is intensely personal because the social ties 
are intimate relations of family, friendship, community, etc. Being 
in this way a union of active selves a living cause can hardly be an 
artificial ab~tra~tion. All stable social relations may be pro-
ductive of causes which call forth loyalty. 
Loyalty, it will now be seen, is social. The spirit of 
loyalty is always awakened by a cause, and a cause is never a priv-
ate affair. It is a larger and more cohesive experience than the 
code of self-realization. The pitfalls of individual morality may 
be avoided only by a moral principle which at its very root is socim. 
Loyalty is this principle and it is unique in its ability to bring 
the individual freely to become social, that is to lose and find 
himself in a cause that expands that self to community dimensions. 
This self-expansion is never mere emotion that exhausts itself in a 
glow of sympathy, but rather a devotion of will that finds express-
{20) 
ion in social activity. Loyalty in its highest sense is "the 
(21) 
heart of all the virtues, the central duty among all duties; 11 
in its widest application it is nothing less than "the fulfilment of 
(22) 
the whole moral law." 
The hardest problem, Royce admits, is the problem of what 
cause to choos.e. With this he also recognizes that loyalty is apt 
to be harmful to the opponent of your cause. The success of your 
, 
cause may quite probably mean the defeat of his, so that by your 
81. 
loyalty you may deprive him of the chance to be loyal in thus 
destroying his object of loyalty. Also conflicting loyalties 
make social distunbanges and consequently loyalty is one of the 
chief agents for breaking dovm larger unity. Family loyalty ob-
structs clan loyalty, clan loyalty obstructs party loyalty, party 
loyalty obstructs national loyalty, and national loyalty obstructs 
international loyalty. "If loyalty is a supreme good, the mutually 
(23) 
destructive conflict of loyalties is in general a supreme evil." 
Even yet we are not free frorn conflict. How does loyalty save us 
from conflicting loyalties? 
Here is where the characteristic moral doctrine of Royce 
comes forward. Conflicting causes can only be united in a larger 
.cause, great enough to hold all lesser ones. This great uniting 
cause is loyalty to loyalty. Even though great this is a cause 
every man may choose, and in choosing it find his criterion of all 
his special causes. By this test Royce solves the problem of what 
cause to choose and how to unite causes chosen. A cause is good 
if it increases or furthers loyalty among men; a cause is evil if 
it decreases or destroys loyalty among men. Conflicting cauxes may 
be united if each man resolves to serve the univers~l loyalty that 
is the good in every cause. If each man chooses and serves his 
cause to the end that there shall be more loyalty in the world 
rather than less, then his individual loyalty may be a good not 
only to himself but to manking. Then every cause from every direc-
tion will pou~ like rivulets into the great stream of universal 
loyalty. 
... 
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This is the principle that will at ·last bring the self 
and his world into moral harmony. We found selves to be bundles 
of contradictions, not the least of which is the contradiction be-
~ tween desire and self-assertion and self-conformity. The meeting 
of these inner desires has come in "loyalty, which finds the inner 
self intensified and exalted even by the very act of outward look-
(24) 
ing and upward looking of service and obedience". Every man's 
loyalty is then his good, but how can my loyalty be your good? In 
so far as my loyalty increases our loyalty which is your good. If 
{ 25) 
I am loyal to "the cause of making loyalty prosper among men" 
my loyal act should have a little part in achieving your good. 
Loyalty to loyalty ~s a theory thus unites every loyal 
man into one universal cause. But how may this high-sounding 
theory become practical and effective among the jostling crowds 
of men? Royce admits that no man can be loyal to barren abstrac-
tions, and says tti can only be loyal to what my life can interpret 
{26) 
in bodily deeds". In reply to the question of hem universal 
loyalty can become a _practical working ~eme of life he says that 
every man's loyalty must begin at home by serving his own special 
cause. But supposing his personal cause conflicts with the person-
al cause of his neighbor? If ppp6sition is necessary then oppose 
only men's blindness in their loyalty, not their loyalty itself. 
How adequate .such distinctions may be to overcome the 
a_·.·,:, ~, bitter evils of conflict, we will later consider in the critical 
section of this study. At present we shall continue our effort to 
understand Royce's solution offered ~or the conflict of loyalties. 
to loyalty 
If one's moral principle is loyalty~then he will not permit his 
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causes to be chosen by mere caprice. His obligation to universal 
loyalty will lead him to shape his causes and his service toward 
that more inclusive end. Order and unity will then come among 
his causes in so far as they are conformed to one larger end. "My 
causes must form a system. They must constitute in their entirety 
a single cause, my life of loyalty. When apparent conflicts arise 
amongst the causes ••• ! shall deliberately undertake ••• to reduce the 
(27) 
conflict to the greatest possible harmony." The conimsting 
causes of any one moral individual will be a part of the manifold 
richness of his active life, the kind of variety in unity that 
gives any unity worth-while content. 
., 
Another avenue of hope for fragmentary loyalties is the 
possibility of growth. Normal loyalties like other living things 
are growing. Wherever insufficient loyalties are growing and en-
larging tiEre is promise of some kind of eventual sufficiency. Royce 
expects that without giving up oldiDyalties, new ones shall be 
(28) 
annexed. And new loyalties need not always conflict with old 
ones, in fact the more natural way is for the new to grow out of 
the old. This enlarging of personal loyalties should make union 
with another's personal loyalties ~matter simply of coincidence. 
In the evolution of loyalty there is promise of a more universal 
loyalty. 
Furthermore loyalty is contagious. By its very contagion 
a loyalty may spread very rapidly over a large social group. The 
natural barriers of national, racial and geographical separations 
may tend to obstruct this contagion. But as communications improve 
and every group comes to hear the point of view and feel the devo-
tion of every other group there will be better opportunity for the 
84. 
contagion of loyalty to become effective. Lesser breeds of loyalty 
may only stir up anti-toxins of antagonism but the larger creed of 
loyalty to loyalty will surely spread a contagious unifying influ-
ence. At any rate, unity grows with the endeavor to be loya~o 
the ideal of unity. The higher the ideal the broader the loyalty, 
and the broader the loyalty the deeper the obligation to realize the 
unification of all men and their loyal ties. "Whatever your special 
cause {and your special personal cause - your love, your home, or 
your calling- wnu must have) your true cause is the spiritual unity 
-{29) --
of all the world of reasonable beings." 
3. Love and the Religious Community. 
---
It is here that religion and morality meet. Chapters III 
and IV have shown two conflicting ways of life, moral activity and 
religious submission. In that contrast they appeared diametrically 
opposed, so that to choose one requ.ired by that same act the rejec-
tion of the other. Individualistic ethics and individualistic re-
ligion face in opposite directions. But in the socialized ethic of 
loyalty religion may find a natural comrade. For loyalty to a 
cause that is greater than self characterizes as well the attitude 
of religious devotion. 
In loyalty the conflicting aims of surrender and achieve-
ment coincide. For the moral achievement of the loyal is based upon 
,), the surredner of himself to the successful advance of his cause. 
Salvation and duty become two sides of the same shield. For the 
loyal···are saved by the unifying spirit of the cause which fulfils 
their duty in serving. Peace and striving become alternate 
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attitudes or even simultaneous experiences in which the peace of 
blessed unity pervades the earnest strife of action. 
It must be observed, however, that in religious exper-
ience loyalty becomes something more than it was among the moral. 
Here the cause finds metaphysical foundation, the loyalty becomes 
a devotion of love, the community appears sacred and the spirit of 
unity becomes divine. In its highest expressions the religious 
cause and community become universal. In fact the highest forms 
of loyalty to loyalty will inevitably be lifted up from th~oral 
to the religi6us level. Such high loyalty Royce finds best illus-
trated in the Christian religion. 
Christianity unites love and loyalty. Christian love as 
set forth by Jesus is not passive self-surrender as it has often 
been misunderstood to be. It is not identical with pure altruism 
or total self-abnegation, but is rather a call to heroic self-ex-
pression. The self is to establish loving relations with God and 
fellow-man and to find its fulfilment in these relations of love. 
The Christian is to be a creator of love whose duty to his neighbor 
is not only to love and serve him, but to make him also one of the 
lovers. Whatever problems of practical loving remain beyond this 
Jesus does not attempt to solve, but leaves to God the all-loving 
(30) 
Father. 
As the early Christian community develops, the meeting 
of these problems falls to Paul. He is everywhere in full agree-
ment with the spirit of his Master's teaching of love, but a fur-
ther development is necessary because there has come into his re-
ligious life a new experience. Jesus had built his doctrine of 
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love around two beings, God and the neighbor. Paul finds a third 
being which grows into prominence in his religious devotion. This 
third being is the Christian community whose head and unifying spirit 
is Christ. He calls this the body of Christ and it forms the early 
Christian church. Though its life is a "mystery11 which he explains 
in metaphors, it becomes the means of solving the practical problems 
of the Christ ian love, and "proves to be for Paul's re ligi<rus con-
sciousness, something more concrete than is the individual fellow-
(31) 
man." 
This Christian community is a visible reality, a present 
fact of human relationships, and yet a larger experience of unity 
that no mere human society could claim. In this community Christian 
love takes on a new meaning, for the neighbor and the lover of the 
neighbor are both members of the body of Christ. The value and duty 
of the individual Christian is therefore dependent upon his member-
ship in this body. The love of God had formerly appeared as love 
for the individual, now through Christ it appears as love for the 
community. So the relations of God and man, and of man to man 
come to clearer significance by their union in a community. "Chris-
tian love, as Paul c oncieves it takes on the form of Loyalty. This 
(32) 
is Paul's simple but vast transformation of Christian love". 
This form of loyalty rises above lesser loyalties. From 
the earliest tribal formations, some instinctive loyal impulse has 
been present. The cause of loyalty was not without its religious 
aspects, even in totem tribes where the unity was felt to be divine~ 
ly ordained. But in Paul's experience of loyalty, the community was 
quickened to new life in which natural differences and rivalries 
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were overcome in a more persuasive spirit of .unity. Elsewhere the 
growth of culture and social training provoked in the individual re-
volts of self-will. Instinctive loyalty is for self-protection 
and rests upon the fragile foundation of self-interest. Even such 
moral loyalty as developed in the section above is ever prone to 
conflict with other loyal groups. The natural law of loyalty makes 
for unstable equilibrium. 
The loyalty of the Christian community differs from all 
natural loyalties in its quality of love. Neither the self-inter-
est of instinctive loyalty nor the stern duty of moral loyalty can 
build a perfectly unified community. This perfect unity Paul found 
in the loving fellowship of the members of the body of Christ. In 
Jesus' teaching and example of God's love for the individual and 
of the brother's love for the brother, was the seed of true loyalty. 
And when that seed of Christian love grows up into the community 
its fruit is the perfectly unified loyalty of love. This is the 
Christian ideal. "So live together that the Church may be worthy 
of Christ who lov,es it, so he1p the individual b rather that he may 
{33) 
be a fitting member of the Church." 
The Beloved Community is the ideal and realization of 
Christian life in its primitive form. Through membership in this 
community the individual may find unity and peace, in its loyalty 
warring desires may be united, in its love empty, lonely selves 
may be fulfilled. Through the religious co~unity there is hope 
of salvation at last. For in the spirit of such a community we 
meet a life of power that is not our mvn. 
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It was our aim at the outset of this chapter to investi-
gate the human realities of our social world. But in this higher 
form of the Beloved Community we have come upon a life that is more 
than our own • Here we have found a love that transforms us from 
petty antagonists into one loyal body of devoted, harmonious members. 
By this transformation we no longer set rebellious wills against the 
collective will, nor do we abdicate our wills in self-renunciation, 
but we find our wills fulfilled in the larger organic will. What 
in our own power we could not do, this love which seizes us somehow 
transacts. "Now .such love comes from some previous love which be-
longs to the same high and difficult grade. The origin of this 
higher form of loyalty is hard to trace, unless some leader is first 
(34) 
there, to be the source of loyalty in other men." 
For the power of such a loyal life comes to the individual 
only as a member of a loving community. If so, how can such a 
co~~unity originate? The loyal individual-is dependent upon the 
loving community and the loving community upon a loyal leader. But 
where does the loyal leader get his loyalty? There must be some 
initial loyal impulse, some creative source. Also each individual 
finds a continuing source of love in the community and even after a 
betrayal shatters the community there may arise a yet more loyal 
spirit by the power of some atoning deed. At every point the 
loving community is upheld by a spirit greater than its visible 
self. "The origin of loyalty seems thus to resemble 1 in a measure, 
the origin of life 1 as the modern man views that problem. A living 
being is the offspring of a living being. And in similar fashion, 
highly conscious loyalty presupposes a previous loyalty, only a 
1 (35) 
loyalty of even higher level than its own, as its source." 
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This coming of new life was kno\vn to the early church as 
the miracle of grace. It means the creation of love and loyalty in 
the individual through his membership in the religious community. 
Every loyal member of a loving community is transformed to his 
loyal state by the saving power of this grace. Such experience of 
salvation is open to every one possessed of loving devotion to a 
superhuman cause. If the cause is merely human it is too small 
to call forth the transforming loyalty that saves the failing fin-
ite. But with a cause that is more than human the community of 
that cause is brought together in a spirit of unity that is more 
than natural. The saving grace of that more-than-natural spirit of 
unity is consequently divine. 
Loyalty at this elevation stands in need of a new defin-
ition. In his Philosophy of Loyalty, Josiah Royce begins with the 
simple form of devotion to a cause, but in following out the logical 
development of this beginning is led to a larger philosophy. In 
this larger view loyalty becomes not only a guide to ethical life 
but "a revelation of our relation to a realm which we have been ob-
liged to define as one of an eternal and all-embracing unity of 
(36) 
spiritual life".· Following loyalty by that path then brings 
us to the same point as by the religious path we have followed. 
From this position Royce proposes his final definition of loyalty. 
"Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as possible, the Eternal, 
that is the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form 
(37) 
of the acts of an individual self." 
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The highest conscious unity which a human member of a 
community may experience is already more than human. In this we 
have found the solution for the religious paradox. The individual 
finite seeker who seeks salvation by lifting himself up to divine 
levels falls back forever in his finitude. But the finite seeker 
who accepts membership in a loving community is transformed by the 
spirit of that community to a union on superhuman levels. There-
fore in loyalty to a beloved community finite selfhood is trans-
cended. The Eternal Self meets the loyal members in his community. 
In fact the "conscious and superhuman unity of life" is 
synonymous to Royce with 11 the Eternal". In finding the highest 
human unity we find God, for the Spirit of the community is the 
Holy Spirit of God. So the community is the key to the reality· 
we seek. Apart from it there is no salvation, but with it we are 
saved from human failure. For in the true community the spirit of 
the Eternal is manifest creating within us love. In the presence 
of love, ioyal ty may increase. In the presence of love and loyalty, 
(38} 
interpretation may thrive. 
So the logical community offers a solution for the in-
tellectual skepticism and pessimism of Chapter II, the moral 
community offers a solution for the ethical skepticism and pess-
imism of Chapter III, while the religious community offers a 
solution to the religious skepticism and pessimism of Chapter IV. 
Furthermore the community at its highest human level already 
manifests the presence of the divine. In the next chapter we 
find it the basis of union with God. 
CHAPTER VI 
UNION WITH GCID 
The social approach to reality has proved serviceable. 
It has overcome contradictions that remained hopeless from the 
individual point of view. But this does not mean the human social 
world is the whole of reality. Its conclusions and solutions are 
neither final nor self-sufficient. The community experience has 
meaning because its visible form is a manifestation of its invis-
ible reality. Here Royce parts company with all positivists 
whose love of human values he has eagerly shared. To him the 
community is a link between two worlds, a threshold from the so-
cial to the metaphysical. "Social experience seems to lie on 
the way to salvation. N0 rmally the way to salvation, if there 
be any such way, must lead through social experience. But when 
our social experience shows us any such way upward it does so, if 
it truly does so, because ef human social life is the hint, the 
likeness or the incarnation of a life that lies beyond and above {1) 
our present human existence." 
With Royce every finite problem can eventually find its 
answer only in a metaphysical solution. The solutions of the pre-
ceding chapter are fruitful because they are over-individual, and 
because in the over-individual experience of the community finite 
limitations are already partially transcended. The achievement of 
a community is its unity. In the conditions of human unity, 
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Royce finds the clearest suggestion of the way to unity 
with a larger than human life. The community is to him the key to 
the understanding of reality. In fact reality can best be under-
stood as a community. 
The problem which occupied Royce's life-long attention 
was: How can the finite individual find, know and unite with ul-
timate reality? In religious terms the philosophy of J 0 siah 
Royce is seeking for union with God. He gives different answers, 
his phraseology changes somewhat in thirty-five years of constant 
mental growth, but fundamentally his solution always lies in the di-
rection of what be comes toward the end of his life to call the 
community. That is to say, the problems, contradictions and fail-
ures of finite existence can only be solved by relating the frag-
mentary individual to a larger life. The finite goal is ever union 
with the whole of conscious life, the method of reaching that goal 
is always some form of membership in an over-individual Self. 
The meaning of every finite experience is intelligible 
only in this larger Self. To this conclusion every Roycean argu-
ment leads. In earlier form these arguments were more abstract 
and purely logical. In later form they have become so empirical 
and humanistic that some critics have even wondered if they repres-
ent a retreat from his former absolute position. One purpose of 
this chapter is to relate the earlier and later forms, in the be-
lief that the later interprets the earlier. Another task of this 
chapter will be to uplift the problems of the preceding chapters 
to the metaphysical level where Royce finds their solution. From 
the vantage point of the Universal Community previous dilemmas 
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may find more satisfactory interpretation. In such way the chapter 
hopes to draw together the metaphysical lines from all periods of 
Royce's thought into focus at the point of union with God. 
1. The Universal Community. 
It is impossible to understand the mature Royce Without 
His last course in appreciating what the community means to him. 
(2) 
Metaphysics devotes the first half of the year to the social 
approach to reality. In these lectures his point of view is that 
"communities are real" and that their reality may be "more important 
(3) 
than that of individuals". The presence of social reality is 
the condition of self-consciousness, the ground of intelligent 
knowledge, the basis for successfu+ conduct, the foundation of re-
ligious salvation. All these achievements are possible only be-
cause the roots of the social reach firmly into the metaphysical. 
It is in his metaphysic of the community that Royce brings his 
most distinctive contribution to philosophical thought. 
The social nature of reality is the foundatiom for Royce's 
characteristic philosophy of religion. Let him state in summary 
fDrm his claims for this social metaphysics. 
"The universe, if my thesis is right, is a realm which 
{4) 
is through and through dominated by social categories." 
"Not the Self, not the Logos, not the One and not the 
Many, but the comrrru.nity will be the ruling ca. tegory of such a 
( 5) 
philosophy." 
nThis essentially social universe, this community which 
we have now declared to be real, and to be in fact the sole and 
(6) 
supreme reality" may be termed "the Absolute". 
'L .v. 
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"!!'he doctrine of the community will prove to be a doctrine 
(7) 
about the being and nature of God." 
"To approach the problems of the philosophy of religion 
from the side of the metaphysical basis of the idea of the community 
is therefore, I believe, to undertake a task as momentous as it is 
(8) 
neglected." 
In substantiation of these claims Professor Royce builds 
(9) 
his arguments in the second volume of the Problem of Cbristianity. 
As with metaphysics elsewhere objective demonstration is successful 
in proportion to the problems solved. Every attempt to define the 
nature of reality is of necessity a kind of working hypothesis, con-
vincing by the coherent way in which it answers: our persistent 
questions. The world as a community seems to of'fer Royce a more 
satisfactory solution to his life-long problems than any other 
concept. Therefore it satisfies his definition of the real as "the 
(10) 
true interpretation of this our problematic situation".· 
To Royce th~re are two grades or levels of being, the 
individual and the community. That level of being which he calls 
the community is no mere collection of individuals, or even a 
. 
social group that happens to be in a· state of cooperation at some 
present moment. A community is the result of a time-process and 
exhibits the features of an organism whose life is a natural growth. 
t.:;i:. The selves which form a community are united by reference to a 
~~ common past and future, which has come to be the personal exper-
ience of all. A true community then is an organic being that 
requires certain definite conditions for its life. 
I 
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The first condition is the power of the individual to 
extend his life beyond the present. This self-extension is an 
essential character of all experience that reaches the self-con-
scious level. And it is more than simple experience for the self 
(11) 
is never a datum as we have seen. The same cognitive process 
of interpretation by which the self is arrived at, likewise pro-
vides an ideal-extension of that self in time and space. Therefore 
past and future events as well as absent spatial objects may be 
included among the possessions of self-experience. This extensive 
power of all higher consciousness is the means whereby a self may 
claim the community as his ow.n. For common events, fortunes and 
purposes may in this way become at the same time intimately his own. 
Without the pmver of ideal-extension the individual could never trans-
cend his own narrowness. By means of it his life may be identif~d 
with the cause of the most universal community •. It is this ex-
tended self ~ich is permanent enough and broad enough to be capable 
of community life. 
The second condition of a true community is social com-
munication. This requires a number of selves distinct and yet con-
nected. For the intercourse of communication consists of the meet-
ing of different points of view in a unity that maintains the 
difference. Values and meanings may thus circulate within the group 
and unite in a common purpose without loss of individuality among 
the members. A community is always based on communication. 
The third condition is the presence of a succession of 
common events. A true community is never a simple or a passive 
unity, but always a unity of action. Its life is based upon deeds, 
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past, present and future. By th~ condition a community is anchor-
ed to his tory. No vain imaginations of unity constitute a community. 
Ideal-extension or even communicating selves do not by so much create 
a community. There is still needed some factor objective to the 
communicating selves as common ground for their union. This objec-
tive common ground consists of events transpired in the past or 
anticipated in the-future which for all these selves are identical. 
Upon such common events in the maturing of time may arise the tradi-
tion< or social expectation essential to a community in the Roycean 
(12) 
sense, that is, 11 a community conscious of its own life". This 
last condition he considers the most important of all in creating 
a ( 13) 
the community as real unit. 
These three conditions of the existence of a community are 
set forth in Royce's latest connected published lectures, but the 
principles are inherent in his earliest writings. The development 
of these principles will unfold in the following discussions. Be-
fore going on, however, it should be noted that Royce's analysis 
of the community led him to regard it as a Self. A self is the 
product of a time~process, it is a unity of diversities held to-
gether by some purpose or plan which outlives the present. By 
these same chara€teristics you may recognize a community. Every 
{14) 
self behaves like a community and every community behaves like 
( 15) 
a self. Therefore, Royce concludes, the community is a Self. 
With this sketch of what the community means to Royce, 
we are_ready to inquire how the idea of the community affects the 
problems that have arisen in the finite quest of reality. These 
problems have grown chiefly out of difficulties in relating the 
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experience of a human self to the real world which is not himself. 
If the real world is through and through a social world, if the uni-
verse is a community, then there is some hope of being at home in 
this world. The social category dips into our own experience, the 
community is our most native environment. To say that the universe 
is a community is an hypothesis to be sure, but at least it is a 
suggestion that a human mind can understand. Its testing will be 
in taking it as a key to our various problems, and observing its 
success in unlocking them. 
Let us define the Roycean community as a Self composed £! 
member selves. When the community is universalized as Royce con-
ceives it to be, it becomes the Spirit of Unity of all reality, 
which is identical in meaning with his earlier term the Absolute. 
All reality then finds its unity in a Self which may be called the 
(16) 
Universal community or the Absolute or God. To this Self finite 
individuals belong as member selves to a great Community. From 
our experience as members of a human community, therefore, we have 
ground for· understanding our finite relation to God. 
The remaining sections of this chapter will seek to show 
how Royce applies this key - a Self composed of member selves -
to the problems that have confronted us. The problem of Chapter I 
was the finite present and some means must be found of transcending 
its fragmentary limitations. The doubt of Chapter II grew out of a 
realization of the inadequacy of human knowledge. This demands some 
way out of our ignorance and error. The moral activity in Chapter 
III became involved in conflict and self-defeat, and suffers by 
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its lack or a basis ror moral cooperation. The mystical surrender 
evaluated in Chapter IV sought peace at the price or unconsciousness. 
A relationship is needed that will preserve individuality when un-
ited in a larger whole • The solvent ror each or these problems 
Royce rinds in the conception or membership in an Absolute Selr. 
2. Finite and Inrinite. 
It is the rinite character or the human predicament that 
has created our chief difriculties. A finite creature seems always 
to be his own worst enemy, for his limitati~ns continually dereat 
his highest ambitions. Ignorance, error and·conflict confront him 
at every turn. At the root of these railures the first chapter 
found a certain bondage to the fr::g mentary, fleeting present. An-
alysis of consciousness revealed that a rinite being has direct 
knowledge only or present experience, while present experience is 
too narrow to constitute knowledge. The characteristic limitation 
thus appears as one of attention. "our rini tude means", according 
to Royce, "an actual inattention - a lack or successful interest, 
at this conscious instant, in more than a very few of the details 
(17) 
of the universe". 
The method with which Royce carries rorward his investi-
gations has been characterized by J. Loewenberg as "constructive 
(18) 
analysis". This is the procedure used in the above chapters, 
most or which have issued in contradictions rather than conclusions. 
But as noted in Chapter II, a little criticism may be a dangerous 
thing·· , while more thorough-going criticism if faithfully followed 
should evolve its own solution. So a little analysis may leave 
uncritical assumptions in a state of destruction but a more thor-
99. 
ough-going analysis should eventually prove constructive. The 
second chapter carried forward the analysis of present experience 
to a place of larger meaning, where thie experience appeared more 
~ complex than it had at first seemed. 
To this more thorough analysis of present experience we 
now return. The data present to consciousness upon examination 
yield up a wealth of associations, implic~tions and outreaching 
relationships. Unless these broader meanings be arbitrarily am-
. (19) 
putated in reducing experience to pure nothingness, they in-
evitably push back the narrow horizons of the finite present. 
When mental life is normally active it defies imprisonment and con-
tinually leaps over whatever arbitrary barriers may be set up to 
confine it. In free association one idea initiates another with 
no conscious effort. So irresistable is the motor character of the 
mind that immobility means loss of consciousness. 
But the rapidity of thought-succession does not solve 
the problem of enlarging the present. For this may only defeat 
the steady gaze of attention by the flickering confusion of end-
lessly passing moments. To "see life steadily and see it whole 11 
requires more than mental agility. It is rather a question of 
expanding the field of attention so as to hold a larger number of 
facts in consciqus unity. This is where the finite characteristic 
of faulty attention constricts human knowledge. Left to his typ-
·~J ical finitude, how can the individual see his larger meanings? 
Royce finds that every act of knowledge has a background which· 
makes it impossible to draw sharp boundary lines to the field of 
attention. 
• 
"Every concrete act of knowledge, in our conscious 
life, includes then a more or less deliberate abstrac-
tion from the background of recognized reality which we 
conceive as the world, for the sake of clearer attention 
to certain special objects of our present acknowledge-
ment. There results a contrast between this foreground 
and background of knowledge, the one containing the con-
sciously distinguished objects of our present beliefs, 
the other containing only what is acknowledged in the 
lump, as the single and undifferentiated whole called 
'the rest of the universer."(20) 
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The reality of this contrast in all conscious attention 
is undeniable. The presence of this contrast means the presence of 
a wider background to every proximate object of attention. By a 
voluntary act the individual can narrow the focus of attention or 
extend it. The background remains a conscious fringe even in the 
closest scrutiny of a single object. The background may come to 
clear consciousness by opening the attention-span to more inclusive 
dimensions. 
Such voluntary manipulation of the focus of attention has 
its sensory limitations, that is,limits beyond which the eye cannot 
see or the ear hear or limits as to the number of objects that can 
be held simultaneously. There are of course no spatial limits to 
ideas, and by ideal-extension the whole universe may become the ob-
ject of attention. But there are limits to the number of objects 
of thought that may be clearly cognized simultaneously. Only an 
infinite mind is without limitation in this power, but it is evi-
dent that in extending the attention span the finite mind may 
:·· approach in the direction of infinitude. 
Royce's contention is that there must be some community 
among objects of human knowledge. If the background which stands 
in contrast to the foreground of attention were wholly other, 
there would be no basis for its presence to consciousness as a 
• 
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background. A wholly other than consciousness cannot be asserted 
without denying it, for to assert it as wholly other is to admit 
knowledge about it. To speak of absent objects it to imply 11 that 
his own present idea of these existences, his present meaning, is 
(21) 
expressed in the existence of these same facts." These objects 
beyond one's knowledge then, it would seem to Royce, are related to 
objects concretely acknowledged in exactly the same way as to any 
moment of our conscious life the background is related to the fore-
ground of consciousness. Finite ignorance is then inattention to 
details present to but submerged in the background of consciousness. 
All differences rest upon an underlying unity. 
Reality then appears to be the world of possible experience. 
Whatever facts may be acknowledged as real are never wholly unrelated 
to the objects of conscious attention. This means that even in the 
fragmentary moment there is present as a background the larger world 
of objective reality. By voluntary act the individual may turn his 
attention upon other possible objects of attention, or again these 
objective situations may without his choice break in upon his atten-
tiva life. Even his own action is in a sense reaction from such 
objective situations. The world which forms the background of 
every conscious instant, which acts upon and cooperates with the 
finite act, is the real world. 
The reality of our search, therefore, is not distant. It 
~, is present to the finite individual in his conscious fragment. The 
thesis by which Royce refutes realism and establishes his system is 
this: nReality is not the world apart from the activity of knowing 
beings, - it is the world of the fact and the knowledge in one 
(22). 
organic whole". Every step of human investigation goes to 
• 
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substantiate the fundamental hypothesis of the sciences, that this 
reality is a "Well-Ordered Series". Facts are related in serial 
order, so that every fact has its next following fact. The inci-
dents presented to finite consciousness are "expressions of the 
.( 23) 
true world order". The world has the characteristic of Life, 
it expresses a purpose. "Its facts are incidents in a life, - yes, 
in a life of many lives, - a rationally connected social system of 
{24) 
beings that embody purposes in deeds." 
So we are justified Royce believes, in saying that ·'what-
ever the world contains, it contains in the form of a Self-Conscious 
Being. "It is a world with which we stand in Social Relations. 
(25) 
Its life cooperates with ours". The true world can be best des-
{26} 
cribed as a "world of socially inter-related Selves". 
It may be here objected that such a view of present real-
ity ignores the nature of time. How can a past wnich is no more 
and a future that is not yet be present in the reality of a conscious 
instant which the finite individual acknowledges? The experience 
of time, Royce finds to be a complex form of consciousness. Any 
consecutive analysis of the strewn of consciousness reveals change 
and succession. To be conscious means to be aware of change, and 
as sensations, emotions or ideas change they follow each other in 
succession one after another. A succession in turn involves a 
certain relation among the events that form a sequence. To observe 
this orderly relation is to be conscious of a series as a whole. So 
just as experience of space takes the form of a simultaneous pres-
ence of many facts, the experience of time inv~es the simultaneous 
presence of many events. 
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The temporal present has a two-fold meaning in our finite 
experience. 
as a whole. 
It may mean a series of events grasped by consciousness 
Or it may mean an element within such a series that has 
successors and antecedents. Our attention may turn from the element 
to the series and back again, or as in a musical phrase or sentence 
it may at once be conscious of thevhole and the succession which so 
constitutes it. "Present means any section of the time-stream in 
so far as, with reference to anybody 1 s consciousness, it is viewed 
as having relation to this unit of consciousness, and as in a single 
(2'7) 
whole of meaning with this unity~ 
The present experience in so far as it has any conscious 
unity is therefore already a time-stream. A "temporal fact is a 
(28) 
complex event having true succession within itself". In this 
way the past and future are always transgressing the present, and 
the present always contains a past and future within itself. The 
time-span of the normal finite attention unifi~s the successive 
elements into conscious meaning as they pass along. 
Time succession is a form of the will. But the restless 
pressing on toward an Other is not a futile striving for an alto-
gether beyond. The completion that the finite will seeks is not a 
mere future experience. It is partially present, for the whole 
includes the striving process as the series does the elements. 
Human insight may grasp this wholeness even while the will strives 
within the series. The whole series is not within finite grasp for 
it is infinite. But elements of an infinite series may be present 
to finite spans. So in the infinite span of time· there may enter 
the infinite presence. The temporal as well as the spatial present 
• 
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reveals a Life that is~ell_Ordered Series. And the relation of 
the finite to the infinite is manifested by the form of this comple-
tion. The double aspect of all present experience which exhibits 
facts in a vVhole and series in a larger Series is the key to the re-
la~ion of human and divine. 
The infinite point of view must be of the nature of our 
experience of wholeness, but extended to the absolute degree where 
all facts and series are present with equal clearness. From the 
temporal viewpoint events appear as successive, from the Eternal 
view as a succession. The eternal is present to each of us so far 
as we grasp successions of successive events. It is precisely the 
temporal order that taken in its wholeness is the Eternal. 
What is most characteristic of Royce here is his insis-
tence that the eternal includes the temporal without effacing its 
temporality. While the whole series is present to the Absolute, 
the successive elements of the series are essential to the whole. 
The events of time present to the Absolute a totum simul in which 
the progress of every step in every series is viewed as a present 
whole. The infinite point of view includes all finite viewpoints 
and maintains their variant distinctiveness. The Infinite Self 
unites and yet holds distinct the unique character of finite selves. 
The finite present therefore stands in the presence of God, for in 
the finite is manifested the Infinite and in the temporal there is 
present the Eternal. The finite limitation which seemed so irk-
some has shown meanings unlimited. In these very limitations 
Royce finds the clew to universal freedom. The finite finds mean-
ing in the Infinite. 
• 
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11 View yourself as an incident, or at best an episode, 
in the world-embracing process of evolution. And then 
when you have done all this ask afresh this one qaestion: 
How can I know all these things? And how can all these· 
facts themselves possess any Being? You will find that 
the only possible.answer to your questions will take the 
form of asserting, in the end, that you can know all 
this, and that all this Cfin be real only by reason of an 
ontological relation that, when rightly viewed, is seen 
to link yourself even in all your weakness to the very 
life of God and the whole universe to the meaning of 
every individual ••• The one lesson of our entire course 
has thus been the lesson of the unity of finite and of 
infinite, of temporal dependence and of eternal signif-
icance, of the World and all its Individuals, of the 
One and the Many, of God and Man. Not only in spite, 
then of our finite bondage, but because of what it means 
and i~Dltes, we are full of the presence and freedom of 
God.nt29 
3. Ignorance, Error and Absolute Knowledge. 
Doubt grows out of the disappointed will-to-know. The 
cause of this disappointment is human ignorance and error. No 
matter how greatly the will may be strengthened in its purpose to 
know, ignorance and error remain its unwelcome companions. The 
will-to-know is an essential foundation for knowledge, but the 
kingdom of knowledge is not taken by force. The greater the 
thirst the greater the lack. Wanting to know is not knowing. 
The postulating attitude of Chapter II is a brave way to meet a 
bad situation but it does not thereby change the situation itself. 
The attempt to act upon postulates in the third chapter only 
proved again the helplessness of will without knowledge. 
The problem of ignorance and error are therefore not to 
be vanquished by any bold stroke of the will. They may be ignored 
and thus vacated for one Who has no desires, but for anyone who 
wants to know or to act intelligently, his will-to-know increases 
the difficulty. If these traits then are eternally human, let 
them be recognized as such and taken for what they are worth. 
• 
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The section above offered a way of extending the limits of 
finite knowledge by enlarging the span of the present. Reality, it 
was claimed, touches every conscious instant. It is the world of 
possible experience which forms t4e background for every proximate 
object of attention. The meanings implied in the present moment 
are infinite, and the transitoriness of the present may be overcome 
by pushing out the horizons of attention to a view of these larger 
meanings. But, it may be objected, this ideal-extension is only 
psychologizing; the larger world is still subjective. How do you 
know objective reality while you still remain within the bounds of 
your private subjective experience? You may have transcended the 
present but you have not transcended the subject, so your knowledge 
is ye~nly of yourself. 
In this way the problem of ignorance returns. 
of the self may still be ignorance of external reality. 
Knowledge 
Even though 
a glimpse of the real is present, there is always a larger realm of 
reality beyond the widest span of human attention. The fartb.e::;>est 
possible extension of finite knowledge reaches but an infinitesimal 
part of the whole of reality. This larger part has been character-
ized as the realm of possible experience, but even so, the individual 
is at present ignorant of it. This lack of knowledge within 
possible experience is what Royce defines as ignorance. To him 
ignorance of reality does not mean absence of some object beyond 
possibility of experience, bu§ rather the lack of an experience 
(30) 
which it seems reasonable to suppose we might have • 
.............. ---------------------
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The problem of ignorance is therefore in the first place 
' 
an individual problem. It is the recognition that I do not know 
as much as I ought to know, as much in fact as.some others do know. 
The customary way of escape from this individual ignorance is by 
appeal to a wider experience, namely the racial and social e xper-
ience. So the individual belonging to a civilized and well-organ-
ized social group goes to school to learn from the experience of 
others. Every one who desires may overcome his narrow ignorance 
by learning of broader human experience. Even the expert in 
scientific fields whose knowledge may exceed that of his social 
group, refers his theory to the experience of others for verifica-
tion. The experience of the social and racial group attains a 
certain degree of organization to which the ignorance of the indiv-
idual may appeal for correction and the knowledge of the individual 
for supplementation. In this way the dangers of individual subjec-
tivity may be corrected by appeal to a larger and better organized 
experience. 
"The physiology of the sense~ then, rightly viewed, 
does not assert that all our human experience is vain-
ly subjective, including the very type of experience 
upon which the sciences themselves are founded. What 
science says is simply that there is a sort of indirect 
and organized experience which reveals more of phenom-
enal truth than can ever be revealed to our direct 
sensory states as these pass by.nt31} 
This indirect insight is what Royce later came to call 
interpretation, and the appeal to a larger organized experience as 
the scientific community. By such methods individual ignorance 
everywhere gives way before social progress in human knowledge. The 
social basis of knowledge characterizes all periods of Royce's 
thinking. The social nature of knowledge is evident at the lowest 
• 
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stages of conscious life where man "begins his intelligent life by 
imitatively appealing to his fellow's experience", and likewise at 
the· highest/expert levels where "the life-blood of science is dis-
{32) 
trust of individual belief as such". Every man thinks and to 
an extent verifies for himself, but this is based upon the assump-
tion that his experimen~s may be verified in the same way by his 
fellows, and his own limited experience supplemented by his fellows' 
experience. The organized experience to which the individual 
appeals is social in origin, and apart from the social conscious-
{33) 
ness truth is bound to be fragmentary and chaotic. 
Ignorance then may be defined as unorganized experience 
and stands in contrast to knowledge or absolutely organized exper-
ience. That no racial or social group in our human world possesses 
an absolutely organized experience goes without saying. But that 
every conscious act of human knowledge appeals to an absolutely 
organized experience is eq1ally incontestable. Scientific search 
never appeals merely to socially organized experienced for that is 
granted by all to be fallible. It rather appeals away from the 
fallibly organized to the absolutely organized experience. This 
absolutely organized experience is not present to the sens~ it is 
an ideal by which sense impressions are tested and accepted or re-
jected. 
This raises the question: Is there any absolutely organ-
ized experience? Royce would reply that this is equivalent to 
asking: Is there any absolutely real? For if there is reality at 
all it must be object of an absolutely organized experience. One 
cannot first say there is a reality unknown to us and then ask if 
there is an experience to which this reality is presented. "Reality" 
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and "organized experience" are correlative terms; let either go and 
the other vanishes also. 
"If the organized experience is a bare and ideal 
possibility, then the reality is a mere seeming. If 
what I ought to experience, and should experience if 
I were not ignorant, remains only a possibility,then 
there is no absolute reality, but only possibility, 
in the universe, apart from your passing feelings 
and mine. Our actual issue then is: Does a real 
world ultimately exist at all? If it does, then, 
it exists as the object of some sort of concretely 
actual organized experience of the general type 
which our sc~ence indirectly and ideally defines, 
only this type{g~~ried to its absolute limit of 
completeness." J 
This conclusion, Royce admits, may be denied by asserting 
that finite experience is the only reality. But to assert this is 
to declare finite limitation a fact, a reality and as such an absol-
ute truth. To whose experience is this absolute truth present? 
Surely not to the finite experience which argues its limitation to 
itself. The finite experience may know itself to be limited but 
how can it know there is no unity of experience beyond its fragmen-
tariness? For if any experience knew the whole of reality so that 
it could say "Beyond this there is no reality", it would itself be 
absolute experience. So absolute experience cannot be denied with-
out affirming it. The very assertion of finite ignorance as a fact 
affirms an Absolute' Experience for which the fact is true. For all 
truth is somewhere experienceq and the truth of our finite experience 
must be validated in an experience that sees all possibilities. 
(35) 
"Herein lies its d~finition as an Absolute." 
But again it might be objected that the finite individual 
could be in error even about his finite condition. His claim to 
ignorance might not be a truth at all, and the absolute character 
of truth in this way denied. The claim to error however is not so 
simple as it might at first seem. That error is possible few 
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would deny. But how error is possible is a question of far-reaching 
implications. The solution of this problem Royce arrives at 11 by no 
mystical insight, by no revelation, nor yet by any mere postulate 
such as we used in former discussions, but by a simple, dry analysis 
(36) 
of the meaning of our own thought". 
Single ideas or thoughts apart from judgments can hardly 
(37) 
be said to be either true or false. 11 0nly a judgment can be false." 
A judgment can be in error only by failing to agree with its intended 
object. Everything intended, Royce finds, is something known. So 
the object of an error would seem to be something knovm. But if the 
object of a judgment is already known how can there be error about it? 
On the other hand whatever is beyond knowledge is beyond error. That 
is to say we cannot be in error about what we already know, while on 
the other hand we cannot err about something we know nothing of. A 
Bushman cannot make mistakes in eapa.tions fbr he knows not so much as 
that there are equations. 
To be either true or false a judgment must refer to an 
objective reality. A psychological study of the relations of ideas 
may be interesting but it has nothing to do with truth or error. 
That is a question of relation of a judgment to an objective fact. 
But it may not be an indefinite relation to an o~jective somewhat. 
A judgment could not be said to be in error about a fact which it 
did not definitely intend. If you should say "The card is red", and 
a friend should come forward with a blue card you would say "That is 
not the card I meant". So every judgment to be true or false must 
mean or intend some definite objective fact. The assumption of 
common-sense is that every individual judgment has its onn definite 
I 
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object. But the individual judgment which knows its object thus 
definitely l~aves no room for error. 
A study of our consciousness of error shows it to be a 
complex of judgments. The erroneous judgment never stands alone 
' but is always interdependent with other judgments, all having a 
·common object. A friend may point out error from a neutral point 
of view, or later judgments from new viewpoints may recognize the 
fallacy of a past judgment. 11We cannot see how a single sincere 
judgment should possibly fail to agree with its chosen object." 
"only in the organic unity of a series of judgments having a con~on 
(38) 
object is the error of one of them possible." 
Royce illustrates this by two persons John and Thomas. 
John's judgment of Thomas is in fact a judgment of his idea of Thom-
as. The real Thomas may be quite different. But John can never be 
in error about his own idea of Thomas and he can never reach the 
real person Thomas so the isolated John is helpless to pass false 
judgment. For even though Thomas differs from John's idea of Thomas 
that does not affect John's judgment which was only of his idea of 
Thomas. The solution of this dilemma would require a third person 
who could know both the real Thomas and John's idea of Thomas. Such 
a third person might then pronounce John's judgment an error. 
This third person is to Royce the essential condition of 
all error. Such a person in his later days Royce called the inter-
~~ preter, and the environment wherei~udgments are actually possible 
the world of interpretation. In 1885 however he phrases this con-
dition of judgment as "a spectator, a. third person to whom John and 
Thomas were both somehow directly present so that he as it were in-
11(39) 
cuded both of them. The problem of knowledge is ever the problem 
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of relating the knower to his object. One individual and one ob-
ject are alone helpless to establish this relationship. Only a 
third person who includes each can unite the two. The solution is 
a community • 
It is evident at once, however, that simply another human 
mind cannot solve the difficulty. For a third human mind would have 
the same difficulty in unde~standing the real John and Thomas as 
they did with each other. The remlity of subjects, objects and judg-
ments must be present to the interpreter immediately. And that to 
which all facts and viewpoints are immediately present can only be 
the Absolute Knowledge. To solve the problem of error there is 
needed a rational Unity inclusive of thought and object, a conscious 
Unity to which are present all relations actual and possible. 
11What, then, is an error? An error, we reply is an 
incomplete thought that to a higher thoughtwhich in-
cludes it and its intended object, is known to have 
failed in the purpose that it more or less clearly 
had, and that is fully realized in this higher thought. 
And without such higher inclusive thought(~8)assertion 
has no external object, and is no error." 
To this conclusion it may be objected that such infinite 
thought might be only a logic~l possibility. But if so, Royce re-
plies, there is then no objective test of error. "The possible judge 
cannot give the judgment its complete object until he becomes its 
(41) 
actual judge." If the inclusive thought is not actual then is 
the judgment still separated from its object and all the old diff-
iculties return. The separate judgments waiting for a possible 
judge are lost without having any goal to be lost from. "Bare 
(42} 
possibility is blank nothingness." The conditions of error 
must be as real as the error. If one is denied actuality, so 
must the other be. Errors are possible only if eternally actual. 
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So "there is no stopping place short of an Infinite 
Thought. The possibilities of error are infinite. Infinite then 
(43) 
must be the inclusive thought. 11 The third person must the per-
feet all inclusive Knower • He must know not merely the error but 
the truth which the error denies. We do not make either truth or 
falsehood. We find them and they must be pfesent from the beginn-
ing. Except for the all-inclusive Thought, there is no truth or 
error, in~olated thoughts. Furthermore all reality as well as 
all thought must be present to the Unity of Infinite Thought. For 
reality is real because true judgments may be made about it. False 
and true judgments along with the reality to which they refer all 
exist in Absolute Knowledge. This is the logical outcome of ignor-
ance and error; it is the result of doubting when thoroughly pursued. 
The perfect Unity of life which knows us and makes our knowledge 
possible is to Rpyce a Self. 
"Such an Absolute Thought you can also call in its 
wholeness a Self; for it beholds the fulfilment of its 
own thinking, and views the determined character of 
living experience as identical with what its universal 
conceptions mean. All these names, 'Absolute Self', 
•Absolute Thought', 'Absolute Experience', are not in-
deed, mere indifferent names for the inexpressible 
truth; but when carefully defined through the very 
process of their construction, they are equally val-
uable expressions of different aspects of the same 
truth. God is knovm as Thought fulfilled; as Ex-
perience absolutely organized, so as to have one 
ideal unity of meaning; as Truth transparent to it-
self; as Life in absolute accordance with idea; as 
Selfhood eternally obtained. And all this the t~~~l­
ute is in concrete unity, not in mere variety. 11 
4. The Goal ££ M0 ral Striving. 
The previous failure of moral activity as reviewed in 
Chapter III lay in its seemingly inevitable tendency toward con-
flict. The determination to act in the cause of goodness was 
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baffled by the confusion and conflict found among human ideals of 
the good. The individual struggle with evil is a task ever at hand, 
but often the battle is lost through weakness and conflict. So in 
the confusion and conflict of ideals, in the thwarting and defeat of 
the cause of goodness the moral individual came to ethical skepticism 
and pessimism. 
A little more carefUl analysis, however, would have shown 
that even in all this confusion, conflict and defeat the Ought remains. 
Were it not for his moral ideal the pessimist would have no falling 
short, no tragic failure to despair over. Were it not for his ideal 
of clearly lcnown goodness the skeptic would have no cause for dis-
sa tis.facti~)n with his confused state. What was overlooked was the 
presence of a higher aim in the midst of, or more specifically in 
the recognition of, conflicting ideals. For in seeking to realize 
opposing ideals the ethical skeptic holds them together in his atten-
tion with the aim of somehow finding a unity among them. To regret 
the warfare of ideals is to have an absolute ideal, namely the ideal 
that harmony shall prevail. This is what Royce call.s. "the ideal 
of ideals", and "you cannot get away from that ideal save by re-
(45) 
peating the very process that has brought you to it." 
The unsuspected presence of this ideal of unity has far-
reaching consequences. When once it is discovered and consciously 
accepted as the ideal of ideals the individual need never lack for 
a moral task. His aim of unity becomes the goal of his every 
moral act. He will no longer set his will in opposition to his 
neighbor's, but will act as if he were at once his neighbor and 
himself. This is more than a golden rule for it does not stand 
off and measure a separate neighbor as if he were a separate self; 
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it calls upon you to act as one being. Your neighbor's aim may not 
be the same as your's and you will not try to force your own will 
upon him, but will rather seek to harmonize the two in a common cause. 
This does not mean all conflicts will mysteriously merge, but it does 
mean that the aim and obligation of every moral act is to try to 
unite the conflicts. In later writings Royce calla this aim loyalty 
to loyalty, in earlier statement the moral insight to aim ~ a unity 
(46) 
of conflicting wills. 
The goal of moral striving, then, Royce would call the 
organic union of life. This union is not something given or pre-
established in the nature of finite life. It must be achieved. 
"The facts of life show us a conflict of wills. To realize this 
conflict is to see that no will is more justified in its separate-
(4'7) 
ness than another." This realization of conflict was the stage 
of ethical skepticism. It is a state of negative harmony main~n-
ing that the one narrow aim shall not violate the rights of other 
aims. This negative stage may be overcome by positive acts in 
the direction of the organic union of life. Work must be found 
that will bring men into harmony rather than conflict, causes must 
be enlarged to unite rather than separate men. Organizations must 
be formed to enable isolated individuals to live a corporate life 
and achieve cooperatively a larger life for all. 
The moral demand is more than a negative ideal of harmony, 
it is the demand for a work, and an organization of work. It is 
th bli ti t " · all life 11 • (
4S) e o ga on o organ~ze This is "the positive 
(49) 
ideal task of the community in which moral insight is attained". 
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1fuat is moral insight? The vision that sees and the ideal that 
(50) 
demands "the perfect Organization of Life". This is the will to 
unity that seeks to end conflict, and the realization of that will is 
the victory in us of a Universal Will that unites separate ~~lls. As 
ignorance found solution by appeal to an Absolutely Organized Exper-
ience, as error found solution by inclusion in an Absolute Knowledge, 
so the will in conflict finds solution by the unifying power of a 
Universal Will. 
The reason for this will becomes clearer in a closer 
examination of the Ought. According to Royce it is impossible to 
(51) 
subtract the ought from reality. It appears psycholbgically as 
(52) 
one of the fundamental data of experience. Whenever an indiv-
idual seeks to recognize facts, acknowledge objective situations, or 
organize his conscious experience the Ought is involved. It is in 
fact the category by which all the other categories of experienced 
{53) 
reality emerge. The Ought is involved in every moral act, for 
every moral act seeks an ideal. 
To seek an ideal is to desire that which is not fully 
realized in present experience. Thus it appears that the Ought is 
a category of the time-process, it has to do with acts, with their 
intentions and consequences as they follow one another in sequence. 
The moral obligation :ls the seeking of an other, a better than 
what is present. Th0 eoal of the Ought is fulfilment, harmony or 
union with its aim. But as elsewhere noted the nature of time is 
an eternal succession in which the seeker forever pursues a fleet-
ing goal. The fulfilment of the temporal Ought can only come from 
the Eternal completion. This need not mean an infinite regress for 
the Eternal·to Royce is the present wholeness of the temporal 
(54} 
succession. 
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So the Ought followed to its logical conclusion upon any 
path leads to the Absolute. For the ideal is ever normative and 
the true norm stops nowhere short of perfection, or the Absolutely 
normal. Every moral act therefore in its normative character 
seeks the Absolute. The moral workman seeks absolute accuracy, 
the moral character seeks absolute perfection, the moral knower 
seeks the absolutely true. In the same way the moral skeptic 
would need to seek absolute harmony and unity, the moral member of 
society absolute organization, the moral individual absolute fulfil-
ment. For 
"however you define your moral philosophy, it is indeed 
true that by the Ought you mean, at any temporal in-
stant, a rule that, if followed, would guide you so 
to. express, at that instant, your will that you should 
be thereby made nearer to union with the divine, near-
er to consciousness of the oneness of your will and 
the Absolute Will, than you would become if you acted 
counter to this Ought.n(55} 
From this it would follow that the goal of moral striving 
is union with God. For the Ought present in every moral act seeks 
the perfection that is found nowhere short of God, the fulfilment 
that only the Eternal can complete. This does not contradict the 
former goal of the organic union of all life; it simply carries 
this union to its highest levels. In fact the organic union of 
human life is impossible without the Universal Will, as we have 
• \ seen, to unite separate wills, the Absolute Knowledge to unite 
knower and object, the Absolute Self to unite finite selves. 
• 
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The failure to find such completion is what the finite 
experience means by evil. That such failures are the frequent ... _lot . 
of finite beings is ecp.ally clear to our experience. Finite life 
is by nature a struggle with evil, and yet the Eternal whole seems 
to be good. How to reconcile the evil that we experience with the 
good that forms our definition of the Absolute constitutes the prob-
lem of evil. 
Royce recognizes the first cause of evil to be our finite 
characteristics. The limitations, conflicts and tragedies of 
finite existence have been dwelt upon sufficiently in previous dis-
cuss ions. The finite as such is essentially evil because it falls 
short of completion. The finite in cooperation with the Infinite 
may overcome evil, in ways to be suggested later. But the nature of 
finite being is fragmentary and in so far as suhh beings seldom win 
perfect union with God in time they are bound to live in conditions 
to some extent evil. This does not mean that every individual is 
the sole finite cause of all the evil that visits him. A substan-
tial part of this evil results from the individual's connections 
with his fellows and with nature. 
"Man echoes, in his passing experiences of good and ill, 
the fortunes, the interests, the ideals of vast realms of 
other conscious and finite life, whose dissatisfactions be-
come per accidens, part of each individual man's life, even 
when tne man concerned cannot at present see how or why his 
ovm ideals, or what he takes to be his own concerns are 
directly such as to make these dissatisfactions his fate.n~6 
The solidarity of the social and moral order is one of 
Royce's fundamental presuppositions. To assert that every individ-
ual misfortune is the result of his own sin is refuted by clear 
facts of human life. That individuals frequently suffer for the 
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sins of others and the social sins of the race is likewise verifiable 
by facts open to every unprejudiced observer. The vast strivings of 
the race together with the strivings of Nature-life may account,Royce 
believes, for our organic pains and instinctive emotions that are 
(57) 
otherwise unexplainable. 
In addition to these, which might be called the unconscious 
conditions of evil, there are certain conscious conditions. The 
presence of the ideal is a condition of tragedy. Whoever seeks a 
beyond takes the risk of not reaching it. The higher the ideal, 
the deeper the longing for perfection, the more sorrow of disappoint-
ment there is bound to be. If one did not care to attain or try to 
reach a better, then that disappointment could have been avoided. 
Therefore the very consciousness of an ideal is the condition of 
sorrow. This is the necessary correlate of being an idealizing 
animal. 
A third condition of evil is revolt against the ideal. To 
recognize the ought and then to choose not to follow it is the most 
serious form of moral conflict. The remorse, not_ to mention the 
objective evil consequences, of wilful rejection of duty may be 
reckoned as the bitterest dregs of the cup of evil. The hopeless 
situation of the traitor is portrayed nowhere with more understand-
ing than does Royce in his chapter on "Time and Guilt" in the Prob-
(58) 
lem of Christianity. The keen edge of this kind of evil is what 
he calls "the hell of the irrevocable", the realization that 11 I 
d t d ill b hereafter"·(59) was my owvn es royer an w e my own 
The sdUtion of the problem of evil lies in understanding 
the 
not onlyAmeaning of evil, but the meaning of life human and divine. 
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The individual who thinks himself to be an independent being has 
little ground for solving his problem of evil, as suggested in 
Chapter III. But when once the relations which link the individual 
to his fellows and to God are clearly seen there comes meaning into 
his sorrows. Royce's view of the· solidarity of the moral order 
implies that 11all Selves are known without any true separation, in 
(60) 
the organism of a single world life." On the basis of this 
oonception of solidarity he makes certain suggestions toward solv-
ing the problem of evil. 
The individual's finite connections, it has been noted, 
are the cause of a substantial part of his evil. In fairness it 
should also be stated that a substantial part of his joys likewise 
come through his finite connections. But the evil creates the 
problem. \Vhat attitude may the righteous individual take toward 
sufferings resulting from the crimes of others? It is his moral 
duty not to attach blame to others but to accept his olvn responsi-
bility for a neighbor's sin. Recognizing that sin arises in part 
at least from a common human nature that each man shares, it is 
not becoming in the righteous to stand aloof. If nothing human· 
(61) 
is alien to me, then "all human sin ••• is in some sense my ovm". 
Accepting such responsibility should mean a personal undertaking 
to atone for the ill done by a fellow-man. It is possible to turn 
evil into good by some work of atonement. The values destroyed by 
a sin may not be restored, but the sorrow of that may form the 
starting point for the creation of new values. Furthermore, many 
. 
evils of the human world are social evils in which the whole group 
participates unwittingly. Such may be overcome by awakening the 
• 
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moral consciousness to reform, so it is not at all necessary to be 
impotent before finite evil. 
The tragedies arising from the presence of the ideal are 
in no small part due to a misunderstanding of the purpose of life. 
If happiness were the goal of moral striving it would be self-defeat-
ing. For, as noted above, the very act of striving toward an ideal 
is the cause of unhappiness. Peace in the temporal order seems ever 
to be won at the price of victory, for 11 it is my first business, as a 
moral ~gent, and as a servant of God, to set before myself a goal 
(62) 
that in time, simply cannot be attained." As noted in Chapter IV 
the condition of mystical peace is experience of nothing. The more 
one is alive to the meanings of life the more he must press on to 
some goal, that is, the more discontent he is with the present. 
The answer to this problem is the recognition that our 
lives "ought to be unsatisfactory, just because olir ideals are so 
{63) 
much vaster than our present form of experience." The pain of 
the finite struggle may become a glorious pain if seen in its larger 
meaning. For its suffering is the very condition of its progress, 
in laborious advancement toward fleeting goals. It is the finite 
privilege to invite the pain of growth, to reach after the highest 
ideal in full awareness of the cost of its demands. This form of 
evil is in reality a part of the good itself. 
The characteristic Roycean twist to the argument is his 
conception of the finite struggle as part of the perfection of the 
Eternal. Perfection may be achieved, so far as we know, only by 
struggle. The good that we experience is always of triumph over 
evil, and there is no reason to suppose God's goodness would mean 
anything to him if it was not such an achievement. The finite is 
aq 
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not external to the Infinite, but rather is included in the larger 
whole. To Royce 11 the divine fulfilment in eternity can only be 
(64) 
won through the sorrows of time." God's fulfilment in the eter-
nal order ••• is to be won not as the mystic supposed, without finitude 
and sorrow, but through the very bitterness of tribulation, and through 
(65) 
overcoming the world." This offers two suggestions of meaning and 
comfort to the finite being in his evil. 
In the first place, this view shows him that he does not 
suffer alone. In every tragic experience God suffers with him. 
For if God does not know what the finite knows, in that respect he 
would know less than the finite being. God in his perfection must 
know the experience of sorrow and evil, so there is no depth of 
pathos or bitterness in our finite lives which God does not share. 
Even though we may not understand the meaning of the evil there is 
strength and comfort in the realization that "our sorrows are 
(66) 
identically God's own sorrows". 
In the oo cond place, this view sh<JN s a purpose in finite 
evil, namely as a contribution to the achievement of divine perfec-
tion. If the pain and evil of struggle here somewhere achieves 
eood it is not in vain. The endurance of finite trials is then 
no mere self-centered Stoicism, but "a willingness to cooperate ••• in 
the divine task of giving meaning even to the seeming chaos of our 
(67) 
present temporal experience." This does not mean the divine 
right of the evil present to remain. It is rather a call to over-
come evil by reforming when possible, by enduring joyously when 
impossible. "In being faithful to our task we too are temporally 
expressing the triumph whereby God overcomes in eternity the tem-
{68) 
poral world and its tribulations." Such triumph is not some far 
f 
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off event but the present eternal completion of God fulfiling in his 
perfection the longings of finitude. And in this triumph we bear an 
essential part for with "no longing in Time, there would be no peace 
{69) 
in ESarni ty. 11 
There remains the difficulty, heightened by this conception 
of God's union with the finite, of the evil human will. The cooper-
ation in God's perfection by a righteous human will struggling 
against evil is conceivable. But how about the finite will that 
chooses evil in open revolt against obligation to the moral ideal 
and God? The consequences of such evil acts increase the suffer-
ing of other finite beings, as well as the evil-doer himself. No 
sin is an isolated act, and in the closely-knit moral order it must 
be somehow atoned. The evil will may be temporally overcome by 
other finite wills which take up the conflict against evil. "Such 
evils are justified only by the eternal worth of the life that en-
(70) 
dures and overcomes them". That is to say, the eternal "power 
that makes for righteousness" enters into warfare with every evil 
will in so far as it is evil. 
To Royce, therefore, the evil purpose of a human will does 
not sever the union of God with that w:i.ll. He is just as much con-
cerned in the evil will as in the good will, but to defeat rather than 
to fulfil it. The whole moral order as well as God's perfection 
depends upon the defeat of that evil will. This does not mean, 
that the evil will is separated to stand in isolated defiance. It 
rather means that the evil finite will is held as the condemned 
element whose vanquishment is the condition of the triumphant good-
ness. As the goodness of the moral man depends upon the existence 
of an evil impulse thwarted, so the perfection of God is reared on 
the thwarting of evil wills. 
• 
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11God's will, we say to the sinner, is your will. Yes, 
but it is your will thwarted, scorned, overcome, defeated, 
In the eternal world you are seen, possessed, present,but 
your damnation is also seen including and thwarting you. 
Your apparent victory in.this world stands simply for the 
vigor of your impulses. God wills you not to triumph. 
And that is the use of you in the world - the use of evil 
generally -to be hated but endured, to be triumphed over 
through the very fact of your presence, to be willed 
down even in the very life of which you are a part.u(71) 
Evil then is real. But it is never a whole or complete 
(72) 
instance of being. To Royce evil is "explicitly finite". The 
Absolute in its individuality is not evil, but'in its wholeness of 
experience is unquestionably inclusive of evil. To the mystical 
v view evil is unreality, but this denies the motive for ;.monal effort. 
To the realistic view evil is the result of the individual's free 
will, and only so far as he chooses evil does it enter his life. 
This clears the Divine Will of responsibility for finite evil, and 
solves the problem by the simple formula that all suffering is the 
penalty of the individual's own sin. But the difficulty is that 
such a view denies the facts of experience on one hand and admits 
a moral fatalism on the other. For if the sufferer is getting his 
just deserts, whoever wrongs him is thereby a minister of Gdd's will. 
To both mysticism and realism Royce's idealism is to be 
sought in the solidarity of the moral order. This moral solidarity 
is not limited to human levels but unites God and man in a mutual 
experience and problem of evil. The solution of evil lies in 
recognizing that God suffers in finite evil, and that finite evil 
is a means to the perfection of God. To separate the temporal 
and eternal orders is an artificial dualism, for the eternal is the 
whole of the temporal in constant fulfilment. The experience of 
evil therefore does not separate the finite from God but rather 
• 
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cements the union. 
(73) 
"In the Absolute I am fulfilled." God 
completes the ideal that I aim at and temporally miss, "even through 
and because of rrry sorrow". 
In this fulfilment God's triumph is my triumph also, and 
sorrow can be tnanecended even in the midst of the finite evil. As 
the next section willshow, the finite is not absorbed or transmitted 
into effacement in its unity with God. On the contrary, the finite 
character in its evil is ··included and seen as good in the larger, 
richer life. 
5. Communion of Spirit. 
The mystical undertaking seeks simple unity by reducing 
consciousness to pure~experience. When this path is followed to 
its logical conclusion it arrives at what Chapter IV has shown to 
be an experience of nothing. The extreme mystical surrender of 
consciousness is welcomed only by the more fanatical. The mystical 
goal of union with God is not so different from the desire of all 
finite creatures reaching after the more abundant life beyond. And 
to the majority of sober mystics this normal experience of conscious 
union is equivalent to what Christians call communion. The posi-
tive way of communion may achieve what the negative path could not. 
"Chris.tianity" says Royce, "stands before us as the most 
effective expression of religious longing" as well as "man's most 
impressive vision of salvation,and his principal glimpse of the 
(74) 
home-land of the spirit." It is the business of philosophy to 
evaluate the teachings of this religion. To Royce the "central 
(75) 
idea of any distinctively Christian metaphysic" is the doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit. He is surprised at the neglect of theologians 
• 
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fDom the early days of the church to the present toward this doctrine, 
and the general unclearness of Christians toward the third person of 
the Trinity. The one tenet that is both essential and truly histor-
ical to Christianity is the presence of the divine spirit in the 
(76) 
Church, thereby redeeming mankind. In so far as the Christian 
creed suggests a theory of the divine nature or of human salvation 
(77} 
this is the capital article of that creed. 
It is in the community that the Spirit fully dwells. This 
is what Royce means when he says that salvation is through the com-
munity. He distinctly repudiates salvation by merely social means, 
and points out that when social experience is uplifting it is so 
because it is 11 the incarnation of a life that lies beyond and above 
(78} 
our present human existence". The divine life is expressed in 
the community, and though we may not know the divine character com-
(79) 
pletely, we do know the presence of the Spirit in the church. 
Where two or three are gathered together in the spirit of unity 
there is the clearest divine manifestation. And having experienced 
God in the community, having seen the Father in the Founder of the 
Christian Community, it is then possible to understand the meaning 
(80) 
of incarnation. 
Incarnation means the presence of the larger divine Self 
in the human self. This means that the incarnation is a social 
process. God is present in social relations that unite men and (81} 
reconcile them to a higher life. The spirit of true unity is the 
incarnation of the Divine Self that transcends and binds together 
conflicting selves. The Universal Community is incarnate in lesser 
communities so fa~ as they create worthy devotion. Furthermore the 
incarnation is personal. The Divine Self unites with the human 
• 
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self by no mystery of substance or transfusion but by the natural 
social relations of common experiences and harmonious wills. These 
social relations are not, however, a fellowship of equals, but rather 
an incarnation whereby the Larger Self completes, fulfils and redeems 
the lesser self. Thus "to regard the life of our most fragmentary 
selfhood as the divine life taking on human form, - this is of the 
(82) 
deepest essence of religion". 
To understand this social and personal character of the 
incarnation is to see that Royce means to defend individuality. 
When he says, "our Idealism especially undertakes to give a theory 
of the general place and of the significance of Personality in the 
( 83) ~-
Universe" he means human personality as well as divine. The 
human self is in and for God, and attains meaning only through God, 
11but in God still dwells as an individual". Even in most perfect 
union with God the self Royce believes is "not as something lost 
(85) 
in God 11 • Union with God is, in fact, the ground of human 
individuality. 
The problem of individuality, Royce finds for the most 
part too easily disposed of. He treats it historically and con-
structively in his supplementary essays to the The Conception ££ 
(86) 
God, and mathematically in his supplementary essay to "The World 
- (87) 
and the Individual. The entire two volumes of these lectures are 
in fact concerned with the problem, and it is discussed again in 
(88) 
his Ingersoll Lecture on Imn1ortality. Ro~ce recognizes three 
(89) 
aspects of Being: experience, types or laws, and individuals. 
The contents of experience are more or less immediately given, 
general types are discovered in abstract thinking~ but in neither 
• 
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of these ways, do we reocgnize individuals. The individual is not 
definable by mere thought nor presentable to mere experience. For 
the experience would consist of only such facts of immediate feeling 
as colors, forms, tastes, touches, pleasures and pains, while the 
thought would be filled with barren ideas of patterns, types, 
schemes, class conceptions and definitions. 
is unique, a something that has no likeness. 
But an individual 
"The individuals are, as we are sure, the most real 
facts of our world. But yet there is ••• something end-
lessly fascinating about our human inability to show 
anybody else, or to verify by even our own immediate {90) 
experience, just in what way they are thuss~ndividual'! 
It is in love that Royce finds his clew to a solution to 
this problem. The lover makes his beloved an object of exclusive 
interest. He loves an individual exactly because there is no 
other to be compared or likened unto her. She is unique, peerless, 
incomparable. He may have difficulty describing the uniqueness 
or in giving logical proof for it. But he is none the less sure 
of that unique individual. In fact he wills that 11 there shall be 
(91) 
none precisely like the beloved". 
Loyal human love, therefore, offers the best example of 
the individuating principle. And it operates effectively not by 
abstraction or impression, but by virtue of will. Individuation 
is to Royce a teleological principle. The unique individual is 
real only as the object of a purpose which intends it and is sat-
isfied by it. "An individual is a being that adequately expresses 
"(92) 
a purpose. Wherever life begins to organize around ethical 
interests, to purpose definitely and accept obligations distinctly 
its interests become exclusive. The kind of ethical love that can-
not serve two masters is the heart of the individuating principle. 
• 
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We as individuals possess our individuality because we 
fulflfi a purpose. It will be recalled that for Royce all reality 
is defined in just this way - i.e., fulfilment of purpose. It 
would follow then that the chief characteristic of rem ity is in-
dividuality. The teleological character of reality is the raison 
d'etre of individuality. No finite being can verify directly the 
fact of individuality or perfectly attain it. This is yet another 
way in which finitude left to itself fails, for our human longings 
are never completely satisfied nor our finite purposes absolutely 
fulfilled in our level of life. But if it is the nature of ultim-
ate Reality to have a purpose which intends each of us, then our 
individuality is established. Only as fulfilment of a world pur-
pose can each of us have our individuality~ This world purpose, 
(94) 
this ultimate Rea1ity is "God in whom alone we are individua1s 11 • 
The moral individual is differentiated and individuated only by the 
fact that 11 the Absolute finds in him the fulfilment of an exclusive 
interest, such as in this individual world, nobody else can or from 
(95) 
God's. point of view, nobody else shall fulfil~ 
Thus the world and the individual imply eahh other. 
Individuals imply a teleological world, and this kind of world-
reality requires individuals for its fulfilment. This should be 
fruitful both in understanding the nature· of God and his relation 
to the human individual. As the individuating principles are will 
and love, so the Reality that sustains individuals must have the~e 
characteristics. The Absolute for Royce cannot be a mere collec-
tion on the one hand or an impersonal world ground on the other. 
For reality is individuated and is thus the expression of selective 
• 
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purpose. Whatever else God may be he must be an ethical Being 
of Will and Love. "We have good reason for saying that it is the 
Divine Love which individuates the real world wherein the Divine 
(96) 
Omniscience is fulfilled. 11 
(97) 
So God is Personality. "God is thus a Person, because 
for our view he is self-conscious, and because the Self of which 
he is conscious is a Self whose eternal perfection is attained 
through the totality of these ethically significant temporal striv-
ings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of 
(98) 
finite Selves". Self-consciousness for God, however, need 
not be limited to the same self-and-other situation of our finite 
contrasts. We may find four contrasting aspects or functions 
which seem essential to the unity of the Absolute. The Absolute 
functions.as Thirucer of ideal systems, as Experiencer of the data 
that fulfil these ideas, as seer of such fulfilment, and as Will 
or Love which individuates by attention, purpose and choice, in-
dividuals in the unity of their relationship. These contrasting 
functions are by no means set forth as a final or complete des-
cription of God. Royce. has no disposition to count t~e persons 
of the Godhead, and is not. concerned as to whether they be three 
(99) 
or twenty. His chief concern is that the unity of the Godhead 
be not empty, but full of the concrete and rich variety of liv-
ing reality. 
This suggests the characteristic Roycean view of finite 
union with God. This union is not the simple unity of the mystic 
(100) 
which leads to empty nothingness. It is a unity of contrast, 
variety, individuality. The positive religious experience which 
fulfils the desire of the futile negative path is a complex rather 
than a pure experience. ·It is active as well as receptive, it 
• 
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calls upon the human will not to surrender but to advance. The 
unity which Royce seeks is a union of active wills. The unity 
of the Absolute is infinitely complex for it is 11 the unity of 
many Wills, each ·one of which finds its expression in an individ-
ual life, while these lives, as the lives of various Selves, have 
(101) 
an aspect in which they are free. 11 
Nothing finite can ever be absolutely free, because of 
its inevitable dependence. But such freedom as is essential to 
the fulfilment of individual life consists in the uniqueness which 
c?nstitutes individuality. No matter how dependent the finite 
individual may be upon God, he should not be lost in God for it is 
his union with God which maintains his individuality. This is so 
because God is an Individual of individuals, that is, the unity of 
God's life'is the unity of finite individuals whose variety com-
posesthe concrete complexity of his unity. The very character 
of God's unity demands the unique sanctity of the finite individ-
uals. The finite being is free in his attention, and in his 
choice of his moral goal. He is unique in his individuality 
which he expresses in his attitude toward this moral goal. He 
may fulfil the Absolute Will or he may resist that Will. In 
the first instance his will is completed, in the second instance, 
overcome, but the total outcome is always different because of 
his choice. "The right eternally triumphs, yet not without 
temporal warfare" in which the individual may freely choose the 
(102) 
winning or the losing side. 
our union with God is then a unity of active Wills, a 
fellowship of unique Individuals~ It is a unity of Spiritual 
{103) 
life which Royce calls · communion. This conscious union 
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consists of God's intimate knowledge of our finite experience to-
gether with our realization of God's presence in our finitude. 
Again and again Royce returns to the refrain, 11 God knows 11 or "He 
(104) 
knoweth the way that I take". God shares with us our suffer-
ing, he experiences immediately our finite ways, or else he is 
not more but less than we. We live in the communion of the 
(105} 
Spirit, we are 11 full of the presence and the freedom of God 11 • 
Whatever brings us into union with the community, whatever solves 
our moral conflict, whatever overcomes and completes our fragmen-
tary, ignorant, erroneous, evil finite life may be recognized as 
the Spirit calling us intoounion with God. 
Such union with God cannot be less than eternal. It 
is in the realization of this relationship that Royce finds the 
foundation for his conception of immortality. The whole question 
with him hinges upon the issue of individuality. By our strivings 
to find and express ourselves to each other.we find hints of our 
real and variant individuality. But this individuality we do 
not have in ourselves nor ever complete by ourselves. Only in 
union with God can we reasonably find or express this individual-
ity, which for God has an essential and infinite purpose. Be-
cause God eternally needs the unique expression of individuals, and 
because these individuals can only find their unique expression in 
an eternal process of realization, we have in this way a rational 
(106} justification for human immortality. 
Whatever of human life has meaning finds such meaning 
(107} 
in "the abiding and supreme unity of the spirit". 
• 
PART THREE 
CRITJDAL ISSUES 
"Critical philosophy holds no 
theoretical opinion sacred just as 
it holds no earnest practical faith 
as other than sacred." RAP p.261. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELIGI~S THOUGHT 
Philosophy of religion has grown up from scholastic 
soil. Its whole complexion has been colored by this background 
which maintained theology as the queen of the sciences. With 
the preeminence given to a revealed religion it was the place of 
philosophy to serve as faithful handmaid in def~nsive and apolo-
getic offices. The aim of its task was largely an intellectual 
demonstration of accepted faith, its method~ priori, deductive, 
rationalistic, its conclusion abstract, subtle and difficult. 
Josiah Royce held a deep respect for scholasticism. He 
appreciated its bold intimacy with ultimate realities and enjoyed 
its logical subtleties. But he was too modern to be confined by 
it. His interests were scientific, humanistic and social as well 
as metaphysical. Therefore his philosophy is something of a re-
volt against scholasticism and the traditional philosophy of re-
ligion. It is not merely. revolt, however, for that were no 
distinction in this golden age of positivism. Royce transcends 
both scholastic and positivistic dogmas by standing in a·larger 
1
• world than either could possess. His aims, methods and conclu-
sions breathe a freer air than that of either the school or the 
laboratory. 
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Spinoza stood at the threshold of the modern age with 
one foot in either world. His philosophy of religion sought val-
iantly to be scienfific, won the crovm of heresy, but settled back 
eventually to rigid scholastic lines. Hegel laid out the dimen-
sions for modern philosophy of religion at the opening of the nine-
teenth century. His aim was avowedly concrete and empirical, but 
his system ruled his facts and the speculative mold set firm again. 
Royce in turn faced his century and produced his philosophy of re-
ligion. His life-long problem, the finite experience of Reality, 
sought continually to unite the human and the more than human. 
The following chapters will evaluate his success and failure in 
thiscundertaking. It may here be noted that h~ contributions 
to religious thought, such as experimental aim, the voluntary 
nature of religious experience, a sociai philosophy of religion, 
and new paths in theism, are contributions all moving in a direc-
(1) 
tion that brea~ away from scholastic molds. 
1. Experimental Aim in Philosophy ~ Religion. 
Throughout his life Josiah Royce maintained an honest 
respect for facts. His opening lecture in the second series of 
(2) 
the Gifford Lectures was on( "The Recognition of Facts", and 
it is characteristic of his approach to every problem. Whatever 
his success in this may have been it was ever his aim to be open-
minded and to see things as they are. No worthy human activity 
can be even imperfectly developed "until a very great number of 
men have this, the very first, most elementary requisite of con-
scious morality, namely, the power to see the facts of human life 
(3) 
as they are". 
• 
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The traditional method of Idealism has kept logical 
considerations to the fore and carried on operations from behind 
these conceptual breastworks. It was to such logically shielded 
operations that William James referred by the characterization of 
"tender-minded". But few realists are able to claim that Royce's 
mind was tender, or unwilling boldly to greet the facts. Santa-
yana says that "Royce never recoiled ••• from bitter fact" and 
speaks of the sanest element in his piety as "joy in the hard 
truth, with a touch of humor and scorn in respect to mortal 
(4) 
illusion§". J. H. Philp admits that "no idealist" has sought 
to keep his doctrines grounded in empirical facts more than he 
'(5) 
(Royce) has". A. K. Rogers finds Royce "taking the finite 
fact seriously" and11 dealing with the actual difficulties that con-
front the realistic mind. Royce keeps throughout close to the 
(6) 
ground of empirical reality". R. B. Perry notes that "his 
(7) 
thought always retained a naturalistic and empirical flavor". 
C. M. Bakewell says, "Professor Royce has done excellent service 
in making it plain that idealism not only permits but compels 
respect for the facts precisely as experience reveals them, coun-
sels docility in interpreting nature, and adopts the experimental 
(8) 
attitude'~~. 
In the last months of his teaching at Harvard Royce 
confessed that "the whole intention with which we approach our 
idealism is the intention to be as realistic as we can. Define 
the nature of fact in such wise as to take so little account as 
you can of what ever belongs to your own nature, your own interest, 
(9) 
your own reason." This objective interest, this consistent 
• 
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fairness gives an entirely different flavor to the philosophy of 
Royce from that of the average zealous exponent of a viewpoint, 
over-anxious that his side shall win. He so lived his philoso-
phy of loyalty to loyalty that he cared little for the fortunes 
of personal views and everything for the universal cause of truth. 
His factual interest and realistic temper bring new life and con-
. {11) 
tent into the theories of being. His tolerance led him to find 
common ground even with philosophical antagonists. An unprej-
udiced philosopher of religion is in himself a contribution to 
religious thought. 
In discussing Royce's philosophical growth, it was 
stated in the introductory part of this study that his develop-
ment was in general from abstraction to concretion. This was 
not intended to mean however that Royce's earlier thought was 
totally abstract. The Religious Aspects of Philosophy,(l885), 
dealt with concrete problems such as the warfare of moral ideals, 
altruism and egoism, ethical skepticism and pessimism, the possi-
bility of error and the organization of life. ~ Spirit o:f 
Modern Philosophy (1892) was the "story of Philosophy" of that 
day, quite as readable and with more body than Will Durant's 
(11) 
popular book of that title. The Conception of ~ (1897) 
stresses the experience of the Absolute and pleads :for the human 
individual. Studies o:f Good and Evil (1898) investigates prac-
--cm-
tical issues in direct style. The World and the Individual 
(1899-1901) exhibits the bony skeleton of a system but only 
rarely loses touch with the facts of experience. The :fruit 
of his later years is ripe in human values, and the system 
• 
• 
138. 
sketched -in outline before is now shaded in with the richer colors 
of life. His terminology is gradually humanized and ideas former-
ly concrete to him become concrete to his audience. He claims no 
radical change of view and yet his ethic becomes loyalty, his logic 
and epistemology interpretation and his metaphysical ultimate the 
Beloved Community. Royce's practical interest will come before 
us again in the following section. 
The devotion to the factual and the concrete is all a 
part of Royce's experimental aim. The empirical method was to 
him the foundation of any worthwhile investigation or fruitful 
theory. "Reasoning is an empirical process,whatever else it al-
(13} 
so is". 11 If Idealism means anything it means a theory of 
the universe which simply must not be divorced from empirical 
considerations, or from the business of life. It is not as 
many have falsely supposed a theory of the world founded upon 
~ priori speculation and developed safely in the closet. It is, 
and in its best historical representatives .always has been, an 
{14r) 
ef'fort to interpret the facts of life." To him there can 
be no knowledge without experience. 
But the empiricism of Royce is critical rather than 
dogmatic empiricism. He sees that pure experience is imposs-
ible except in forms where it becomes (as in a mystical trance) 
. (15) 
unconsciousness. Furthermore he recognizes that what 
science means by the empirical method and what common-sense 
means by the appeal to experience is a larger affair than in-
dividual observation. The number of facts verifiable by any 
one individual is necessarily small. What we actually do in 
c• 
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the verification of facts is appeal tog roup or racial experience. 
It is a special, curr-ulative empiricism that achieves the advance-
ment of the sciences and human knowledge. 
So the empirlcal method in its practical working out is 
by no means a mere succession of sense impressions. It is in 
every effective case the mingling of experience with ideas or 
rather the organization of experience by ideas. Its boundaries 
can only with unwarranted and arbitrary assumption be dravvn 
around sense impression or individual observation. In its true 
activity the em~irical method is at once over-individual and 
" (16) 
metempirical. This means that no realm of investigation 
may logically be closed against the empirical method. Pure em-
piricists, Royce keenly observes, nwill of course know quite a 
- (17) 
priori and absolutely that there is nothing absolute to be known~ 
But Royce refuses to accept arbitrary limitation of the 
empirical method and undertakes to apply it in his investigation 
even of absolute reality. "I can find my p:ha.ce in the world only 
by discovering where I stand in the whole system of experience ••• 
Therefore, when I inquire about the real world, I am simply asking 
what contents of experience, human or superhuman are actually and 
(18) 
consciously found by somebody." Temporal experience Royce 
finds essentially dissatisfying. It ever "teasingly and fascin-
atingly calls for something which if you could get would be the 
(19) 
Being, the Reality". The lines of our human experience run 
outward but so far as we can discover they never run out. There 
is no stopping place for the persistent empiricist short of the 
(20) 
Absolute Experience. To Royce this sense of the absolute 
• 
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reality, unity and worth oi' all experience is the true insight of' 
the empirical method. 
The i'ollowing oi' the experimental aim as Royce has pur-
sued it is a distinct contribution to religious thought. It has 
broken away i'rom rigid scholastic and traditional lines, it has 
i'aced the i'acts oi' our world realistically, it has sought ever 
the concrete, it has maintained 11 a growing edge" (Hocking's term) 
toward lii'e and human values. Finally it has carried its exper-
imental discoveries into the metaphysical realm, and has sought to 
know God through our most venturesome outward-bound human exper-
iences. When empiricism deals with spiritual experiences it is 
not handling foreign objects as in the awareness oi' things. It 
is holding commerce in the coin oi' its own realm which is spirit-
ual as the mind that experiences. 
2. The Voluntary Nature of Religious Experience. 
Josiah Royce has oi'ten been mislabeled an Hegelian. 
This misapprehension has assigned to him a certain intellectualism 
that upon closer examination proves unwarranted. Royce acknowledges 
obligation to Hegel as to other idealists but declares that his chief' 
(21) 
indebtedness is to Kant. Ai'ter Kant he acknowledges obliga-
(22) 
tion to Schopenhauer and Lotze. Morris Cohen, whose acquaint-
ance with Royc~'s teaching entitles him to a hearing says "The 
truth is that a carei'ul survey oi' the whole corp~s oi' Professor 
Royce's writings i'ully bears out his contention ••• that his phil-
osophy is not in any true sense Hegelian. Such a survey seems to 
me to show how proi'oundly Royce's philosophy has been influenced, 
not only by the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical 
--
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reason, but also by the metaphysic of the Critique of~ Reason". 
Then in a footnote he adds "In his general attitude to the impor-
tance of the 'practical' in philosophy Royce, like James, has been 
(23) 
profoundly influenced by Lotze" • 
To understand this relationship is illuminating in giv-
ing the voluntary element its proper place in Royce's philosophy. 
Kant's emp~asis upon the primacy of the practical reason, Schopen-
hauer's philosophy of the Will, and Lotze's interest in the prac-
tical values of life influenced deeply the position of Royce. If 
practical interests captivated him in his student days they came 
steadily into even larger prominence as his thinking matured. To 
overlook the preeminence of the will in Royce's philosophy of re-
ligion is to miss one of the cornerstones of his system. His 
development of the voluntary nature of religious experience is 
one of the distinctive contributions to the thought of our time. 
A. K. Rogers claims that "for the first time a central place is 
given to activity or will, as against more thought or intellect 
(24) 
on the one side and feeling on the other". Aliotta says "In 
Royce's system the different streams of reaction from intellect-
ualism ••• meet and merge in a harmonious whole: voluntarism and 
neo-Hegelianism, contingentiam and the historical method, the 
(25) 
philosophy of values and pragmatism". 
Royce's appreciation of practical values and his in-
sistence that philosophy should meet the practical test come for-
~ 
ward at every turn. He defines philosophy as "a reasonable 
account of our own personal attitude towards the more serious 
(26) 
business of life". He insists that warm blood flows in 
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philosophic veins and that philosophy is no affair of debating 
clubs but "a struggle-of humanity to make its OMI deepest inter-
(27) 
ests articulate". It must be justified by its bearing upon 
life. He was against too much thinking and had 11 a profound con-
tempt for deliberate excesses in the work of reasoning". "Let 
(28) 
him be confounded who cannot do anything but reason." Logic 
and life are not to be divorced for they naturally belong together 
(29) 
in "extremely intimate relations". "The best expression of 
(30} 
your reason is your life." 
This concern with practical activity, however~ was more 
than interest, it was conviction. Royce believed that truth may 
only.be found in terms of activity and reality in terms of purpose. 
Therefore he called himself pragmatist and voluntarist. His prag-
matism linked him with James and Dewey, but never confined him to 
their mental horizons. Royce recognizes the motor aspect of thought, 
defines it as a plan of action or a way of behavior, declares that 
(31) 
thought is "either action or nothing". He agrees with James 
that our ideas are significant because of what they lead to but 
for Royce they lead further than they do for James. The truth 
of ideas cannot possibly consist in the instrumental value which 
v they may happen to have for any individual man. The instrumental~t 
is so far as he goes true, but his account is true if al;_all "as 
a report of the objective constitution of a certain totality of 
(32) 
facts". Truth as Royce sees it is at once pragmatic and 
(33) 
absolute. Therefore (34) he calls himself an Absolute Pragmatist. 
C ..... 
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For similar reasons Royce comes to term himself an Ab-
(35) 
solute Voluntarist. He finds all logic ·to be a logic of will. 
To find the absolutely true means to discover what Royce calls a 
voluntaristic truth, "a truth about the creative will that thinks 
(36) 
the truth". In so doing one finds that his own constructive 
processes have a certain absolute nature and conform to certain 
absolute laws. Every empirical truth is relative, but all rela-
tive truth is subject to conditions which are absolute. In many 
ways Royce says, "I find myself at one with recent voluntarism ••• 
But for my part, in spite or in fact because of this my voluntar-
ism, I cannot rest in any mere relativism ••• Hence we acknowledge a 
truth which transcends our individual life. We will the eternal 
we define the c:eternal ••• we can define the truth even of relativism 
(3'7) 
only by asserting that relativism is after all absolutely true." 
So Royce finds that voluntarism must form an essential 
part of every philosophy which does justice to our metaphysical 
interests. For these interests are concerned with directing our 
will, defining our attitude toward the universe and adjusting our 
ideals to real situations. But he does not believe that voluntar-
ism can remain narrowly pragmatic. His clearest statement of 
his type of voluntarism is the following. 
"I have long defended a philosophy both of human life 
and of the universe, which I have preferred to call an 
"Absolute Voluntarism. I developed such a philosophy 
partly under the influence of James, but long before re-
cent pragmatism was in question. In its most general 
form, this philosophy to which I myself adhere, asserts 
that, while every metaphysical theory is the expression 
of an attitude of will there is one, and but one, gen-
eral and decisive attitude of the will which is the 
right attitude, when we stand in the presence of the 
universe, and when we undertake to choose·how we pro-
pose to bear ourselves towards the world ••• For if 
there are absolute standards for the will, (and 
in my opinion there are such standards), then the 
world of the will is no world of fictions. If there 
is one, and but one, right attitude of the will to-
wards the universe, this attitude, when once assumed 
is essentially creative of its own realm of deeds ••• 
Its so-called successes are no merely transient 
successes. For if there is any true success at all, 
every such success, however petty it seems, has a 
world-wide meaning. The realm of true success is 
not merely a world of change. For deeds once done 
are irrevocabl~4 ~nd every deed echoes throughout 
the universe. "l v8 J 
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From this it will appear that the voluntarism of Royce 
has a distinctly religious character. The activity of ~uman will 
in seeking truth end reality, in forming purposes and in affecting 
deeds meets the Eternal Will and thereby attains absolute signif-
icance. Thus all voluntary life has religious meaning for it 
stands in the presence of the Eternal. Royce would go a step 
beyond this and complete the circle by insisting that all relig-
ious experience has a voluntary character. Whether it is 
religious knowledge, religious decision and purpose or religious 
deeds of service - all is impelled by the activity of the wili. 
Vfuatever else it may be religious experience is at least voluntary. 
The development of this voluntaristic view of religion 
Royce works out thoroughly in its various expressions. In his 
first religious work he develops his voluntarism along the line 
of postulates which are not particular creeds but the taking of 
risk because it is worth taking. The fundamental postulate of 
religion is that "universal goodness is somehow at the hear_t of 
(39) 
things •" In his next religious work he stresses will as the 
individuating principle that makes reality more than types and 
the Absolute more than a "wilderness of Godhead". In his great 
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metaphysics of religion he defines being as "to have a purpose" 
and shows union with God to be a union of wills. In his later 
works he presents the voluntaristic religion of loyalty, offers 
the will as a source of religious insight and as the key to re-
{40) 
ligious personalities and communities. 
Royce's philosophy of religion is built upon his volun-
tar ism. The postulating, planning-to-act will is the key to re-
ligious knowledge. The loyal will devoted to a universal cause 
is the heart of religious ethics. The loving, individuating 
will is the principle that expresses the Divine Life and estab-
lishes our unique worth and immortality. The will-to-interpret, 
to devote and to atone maintains the religious community. The 
goal-seeking, cooperating, interacting wills are the ground for 
. ( 41) 
the union of God and man. 
3. A Social Philosophy of Religion. 
Our century will be marked by its appreciation of 
social values. Not the least eager in pursuit of social inter-
ests is religion. Social gospels within the churches and re-
ligions of humanity without the churches demonstrate this interest. 
Psychologists of religion (notably Durkheim, Ames and King) have 
found religion to be nothing more than an organized effort to con-
serve social values. Social and empirical theologies have been 
written. Josiah Royce's contribution has been a social philoso-
phy of religion. 
The distinctive thing about Royce's social philosophy 
is the far-reaching implications of i~. Much social philosophy 
is thi~ because merely social. Auguste Comte seeks ~orshippers 
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for humanity, but his philosophy falls into contradiction and 
meaninglessness because humanity is the end as well as the begin-
ning. Self-worship is a contradiction of the true meaning of 
worship and even if humanity should bow down to humanity what is 
gained thereby? It does not appear that any problems are solved 
for things aqual to the same thing are after all the same. Hu-
manity means to Royce all .... -~·. that it does to the positivists, 
but this for his thinking is only the beginning. The human 
social world is only an infinitesimal fraction of the social uni-
vers$. The social roots in the metaphysical. All raality is 
social but the human social is not all of reality. Rather is 
our visible society the hint or likeness of the vast community 
invisible. Royce's philosophy must be called a social met3-
physics of religion. 
The first postulate of Royce's idealism is "that our 
(42) 
ideas have something beyond them and like thenin. That there 
is something beyond our experience and that that something is 
another experience is the basic assumption of all his thinking. 
(43) 
,Experiences form a uniform and regular whole of laws of sequence~ 
That is to say, reality is a conscious organism, resembling the 
conscious life of our experience in its largest dimensions. The 
largest conscious organism of which we have actual knowledge in 
our human world is a community. Therefore reality while its 
ultimate details are beyond our mental grasp may in general 
(44) 
principles be posited as a social organism. 
It is not a sufficiently accurate characterization to 
. 
designate Royce an absolute idealist. For to him the Absolute is 
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not an entity without relations. The Absolute of Royce is a 
Social Absolute, and its property is always to have relations 
within its life. Simple unity Royce finds a sheer impossibility. 
It is necessary "to regard the Absolute in its wholeness as com-
pJlising many Selves, in the most variant relations". For "who't-
ever conceives the Absolute as a Self, conceives it as a form 
inclusive of an infinity of various but interwoven and so of 
{45) 
intercommunicating Selves". Royce's Absolute is no barren 
abstraction but to him the richest and most concrete of facts. 
Every proximate fact within his observation leads to this ult-
imate fact. In the Divine Community everything that is real, 
concrete and living has its place. The Absolute is a social 
universe. 
Even William James recognized that Royce was not to be 
classed with other absolutists. In his Pluralistic Universe he 
confesses that Royce's treatment seems "infinitely richer and 
thicker than that of any other idealistic philosopher". Again 
he declares that "Royce makes by far the manliest of the post-
hegelian attempts to read some empirically apprehensible content 
{46) 
into the not ion of our relation to the Absolute mind. 11 J. S. 
Bixler in his recent study of James notes this point. 
11 0f all the hypothetical absolutes he encountered, 
James fQund that of Royce the least uncongenial. 
Ever and again we find partial exception made for 
Royce in the midst of James' anti-absolutistic ti-
rades. The reason seems to be not so much James' 
respect for the ingenuity of Royce's reasoning, 
though this is mentioned, as the almost pragmatic 
character of Royce's absolute. The ideas of 
which it was composed were defined in terms of 
purpose and a valiant effort was made to keep the 
absolute it~~lf from indifference to huwan good 
and evil." ( J 
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The social nature of Royce's metaphysics has even led 
some to call him a pluralist. G. H. Howison speaking at the gath-
ering to celebrate Royce's sixtieth birthday notew certain indi-
cations of "a concrete and social idealism" which gives him hope 
that Royce may have changed in the direction of what he calls a 
(48) 
"primordially harmonic pluralism". Hoernl~ in his recent 
study of idealism classes Royce as a spiritual pluralist for the 
following reason. "I~ might be thought that Royce should be 
classed as an Absolutist, but he uses the term 'Absolute' as a 
synonym for •God' and though his thought has in it a more pan-
theistic strain than that of most Spiritual Pluralists, yet he 
does conceive God at bottom as a personal spirit, and thus would 
have to be classed as a Spiritual Pluralist rather than an Absol-
(49) 
utist." While Mary w. Calkins does not go this far she does 
qualify his form of absolutism by emphasizing its relation to 
personalism. She would call him either a personal absolutist 
. (50) 
or an absolute personalist. 
It does not seem probable that Royce would call himself 
a pluralist. His condemnation of all views which hold to inde-
pendent beings and his insistence upon final unity is sufficient 
testimony to that. No pluralist has cared more for the rights 
of individuals, but for him this very condition of individuality 
was depen~ent upon an absolute unity. His was a pluralistic or 
numerical monism, with true regard for the plurality but with 
equal regard for the·organic unity. This evinces the truly 
social nature of his philosophy for the social organism is pre-
cisely such a unity of plurality. The looseness or compactness 
i. 
I 
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of the social group may be open to interpretation, but the fact 
of its being a unity of plurality is incontestable. It is inter-
esting to note that Royce's grounds for rejecting Leibniz 1 s plural-
ism are that it is not social enough. "our theory ••• is in strik-
ing contrast to this Monadology of Leibniz. In Nature, as in man, 
we find individuality linked in the closest fashion with inter-
communication, with mutual interPependence of individuals, and 
with a genuine identity of meaning and of Bing in various indiv-
(51} 
iduals.n 
The religious bearing of this social metaphysic of 
Royce's is everywhere apparent. The environment of the human 
world,the universal home of every individual, is the Divine 
Community. The individual is unthinkable in isolation. His 
unity and coherent meaning are to be found only in his fundament-
al social relationship which is ultimately his union with God. 
(52) 
"Our relations with the universe are essentially social." This 
unity is not given, it is an achievement in which all wills coop-
erate, a community built by the united efforts of God and man. 
God is thus real and accessible in the same way as our fellovnnen. 
By communion of spirit, unity of purpose, interaction of life and 
will, cooperative achievement and membership in a common life, the 
unity is achieved. In this larger life ''the ties which bind v.s:r-
ious finite individuals together are but hints of the unity of 
(53) 
all individuals in the Absolute Individual". 
This conception of a social universe stands at the can-
( 54) 
ter of Royce's philosophy of religion. From that position 
broad issues as well as specific problems take their solution. 
Religious knovlledge is "not a lonely enterprize" but interpreta-
~-
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tiona evolved through social experience. These make for a reli g-
ious insight that sees a unity of facts and brings us into intimate 
(54) 
personal relation with "the whole wherein they are Wlited". 
Religious loyalty is devoted love for the sacred community. One 
can never be genuinely loyal to a detached individual. True loy-
alty like true friendship is to the union of the individuals,to 
. (56) 
the ideal united life that neither could have alone. The 
religious community is essential to salvation. Sin is choosing 
to forget or to narrow the ~ttention with regard to an Ought that 
has already been recognized. The salvation that overcomes sin 
will therefore be a process that broadens the field of attention 
and obligation. The social nature of salvation, Royce illustrates 
by the meaning of the Beloved Community in primitive Christianity. 
The thesis of his two volumes on the Christian problem is that 
the success of Christianity has been a social success. "The ideal 
of the positive and spiritual union of mankind in the church is 
~57) 
the most fundamental ideal of humanity." 
Yet the religious significance of the community is al-
ways more than the humanly social. It is the peculiar genius of 
Royce to insist that the social world extends ever beyond our 
narrow horizons. He speaks with pride of his membership in the 
human race, but he talces even deeper satisfaction in his member-
ship in the community universal. He seeks reconciliation with a 
moral, spiritual and social universe. 
"This life is real through us all, and we are real 
through our union with that life. Close is our touch 
with the eternal. Boundless is the meaning of our 
nature. Its mysteries baffle; our present science, 
and escape our present experience; but they need not 
blind our eyes to the central unity of Being, nor 
make us feel lost in a realm where all the wanderings 
of time mean the proce~g8whereby is discovered the homeland of eternity."\ J 
-4 
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4. New Paths in Theism. 
Josiah Royce considered it shameful that men should 
ever have treated religious philosophy as if its aim were to be 
. (59) 
"a storehouse of formulated traditional answers 11 • He maintains 
that a philosophy of religion should operate empirically by seek-
ing to find some element in reality that shall have religious 
significance. In order to do this it is necessary to know real-
ity for only so can we discover its religious significance. 
Therefore Royce attacks the problem of the finite experience of 
reality, as we have seen in the six chapters above. By this di-
rect philosophical investigation of reality Royce arrives at 
theistic views that make a rather unique contribution to trad-
itional arguments for God. 
Royce's experimental method, as we have seen, brings 
him to the facts~ But exactly because he takes the experimental 
character of things seriously, he insists that facts only have 
meaning to us as present to experience. A fact outside of all 
experience is contradictory to all the conditions of reality as 
we know them. Undoubtedly there are facts beyond finite 
experience, and for that very reason there must be experience 
beyond human. By this line of reasoning Royce arrives at his 
essential belief in God as the All-Experiencer. Facts demand 
experience, and facts beyond us demand an Experiencer beyond us. 
Thus does the experimental pursuit of facts lead to God. Real-
ism either leads to the Absolute or to nothing for unless the 
"Things-in-themselves" ·,::.. ~·--· whether atoms or unknowables have 
place in one unity of consciousness with the thoughts that mean 
. ( 60) 
them they mean nothing. 
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If these finite ideas about reality are in error, even 
3!,~~ 
i 
that is a situation which only proves God in another way. A care-
ful scrutiny of error shows that it can only be possible where 
ideas intend objects and have a certain relation to reality that 
is known to be in error. So a larger consciousness holding idea 
and object in one inclusive experience is necessary to effect the 
possibility of error. A persistent finite individual might then 
assert his ignorance of objective reality and seek to avoid the 
consequences of Royce's argument in that way. But in reply 
Royce would ask, How do you know you are ignorant of reality? If 
you insist you do not know reality, how can you assume there is 
any reality to be ignorant of? Or if the persistent one twists 
again and denies any reality outside of his ignorant experience, 
Royce would then inquire how he can know there is no reality be-
yon~ himself? Every admission of error or contention of ignorance 
can be sustained only~~ffirming an All-Knower for whom that fact 
is an object of knowledge. 
The introduction of this theistic argument from ignorance 
and error created no little stir in philosophical circles. G. H. 
Howison, then a teacher at the Massachusetts Ins~tute of Tecbnol-
ogy, reports a meeting with Edward Everett Hale in which the latter 
expressed interest in 11 this striking young man from California". 
Mr. Hale went on to say that he seemed noticeable surely. "What 
do you think I heard him doing in a lecture the other day? Why, 
nothing less than showing that our human ignorance is the positive 
(61) 
proof that there is a God- a supreme Omniscient Beingl" 
William James friendship for Royce is well known, but it is re~ 
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markable to find that this chief adversary who hugely enjoyed 
damning the Absolute had in an early review of The Religious 
Aspects of Philosophy found Royce's theistic argument from error 
inescapable. James says: 
nThe more one thinks, the more one feels that there 
is a real puzzle here. Turn and twist as we will, we 
are caught in a tight trap ••• An 'Over-Soul' of whose 
enveloping thought our thought and the things we think 
are like fractions, - such is the only hypothesis 
that can form a basis for the reality of truth and 
error in the world. To the lay reader this absolute 
Idealism doubtless seems .insubstantial and unreal 
ennugh. But it is astonishing to learn how many 
paths lead up to it. Taken altogether they end by 
making about as formidable a convergence 9f test-
imony as the history of opinion affords."l62) 
Another unexpected development of Royce's theistic 
thinking was his voluntaristic argument. The causal argument 
for the existence of God did not appeal to him and as we shall 
see in the next chapter he ignores the fact of creation. It 
was his feeling that the argument from creation and design had 
been worn threadbare, and so instead he reasoned from his volun-
taristic premise. The deepest postulate about reality he finds 
to be that something corresponds to our ideas. An agreement 
between my ideas and external reality is essential to any knowl-
edge of our cooperation with it. An idea being for Royce a plan 
of action it is always directed toward some goal. This goal is 
the external meaning of the idea, it is the reality with which 
agreement is sought. If our ideas and purposes are to reach 
any fulfilment reality must be consonant with idea; it must be 
a conscious purposive reality. 
• 
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The proof for the conscious or purposive nature of real-
ity need not be any wearisome abstract line of reasoning at all. 
To prove that your objective Ohher is a conscious Being with an 
absolutely orderly mind, or a purposive Being with a morally con-
sistent nature, simply act. All you have to do is perform some 
individual deed and then try to undo it. At.once you learn that 
your environment is an Absolute for a deed once performed can 
never be undone. The irrevocable consequences of your voluntary 
deed prove a universe that.responds with absolute order. This 
is what Royce means by Absolute Pragmatism, that the practical 
workings of every deed are absolute in their character. In the 
same way every opinion is an intelligent deed that may be true or 
false, but in either case its consequences reach throughout the 
universe in absolute effect. 
A Reality that responds to my every act or purpose in 
an absolutely coherent way cannot be other than Absolute Conscious-
ness. This is no remote abstraction but the most concrete and 
intimate response of every active moment. Every act of your human 
will is "an effort to adjust your will and your conduct to the in-
tents of a supreme will which decides values, establishes the rule 
of life, estimates purposes in the light of complete insight". 
Your loyal will and in another way but quite as surely the evil 
will is 11 in constant touch with the master of life; for you are 
constantly doing irrevocable deeds whose final value, whose actual 
and total success or failure, can only be real, or be known from 
the point of view of the insight that faces the whole of real life, 
and with reference to the purposes of the will whose expression 
. (63) 
is the entire universe 11 • 
·• 
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Other Rpycean paths of approaching God are by individ-
uality and unity. These antithetical types of human experience 
each lead to a theistic view. The fact of individuality, which 
we everywhere affirm, is not easily explained. As we have noted 
in the chapter above, Royce finds the principle of individuality 
in Love and Will. A universe of individuated reality therefore 
demands a universal, loving Will. On the other hand, the spirit-
ual unity which pervades the human community at its best is not to 
be explained in terms of human society, for the natural law of the 
latter is conflict. The effective unity of spirit that calls us 
out of petty disputes and welds our lives into a universal commun-
ity cannot be less than eternal. 
Thus in various ways: by truth or error, by loyal or 
evil will, by individuality or community does Royce lead us to 
God. "There is nothing in the universe absolutely sure except {64) 
the Infinite • 11 
' 
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CHAPTER VIII 
OMISSIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
1. Disregard of the Genetic Factor. 
One of the first problems to confront Josiah Royce as 
a philosopher was the choice of a method. He early differenti-
ated two v~ys in which human thought may deal with phenomena, 
namely: 11 by an historical examination of their genesis, or by (1) 
an analysis of their structure as they now exist". At that 
time he admitted the value of both methods as "possible ways of 
unifying human experience". He felt no direct conflict between 
them, bu~ regarded each essential to thorough investigation, and 
reflected that neither of the two can ever conquer the other. As 
each method is discussed, however, there can be little doubt to 
which he gives the preference. Acquaintance with his later pos-
ition confirms the importance of his declaration that "each man's 
(2) 
self-analysis must be the foundation of all his philosophy 11 • 
It is evident that Royce here (in 1880) chooses the analytic in 
preference to the genetic method. 
He is no doubt influenced in this by his experimental 
aim. His re.solution to face existing facts with careful scru-
tiny of things as they are, his desire to start with the present 
experience and proceed only by cautious analysis undoubtedly 
suggested this method. We have traced his philosophy unfolding 
by self-analysis from the finite present to union with God. The 
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starting point is the present in space and time from which point 
analysis of meanings leads by centrifugal expansion in all direc-
tions. For Royce the entrance to past and future is only through 
the ante-chamber of the present by expansive analysis. The gen-
etic method would start from a point ·as far back from the present 
as possible and work forward, while Royce begins with "analysis 
of the present state" and works backward. 
It is natural in pursuing consisten~ this analytical 
method that Royce should lose sight of the genetic principle. 
Furthermore his favorite science was mathematics. He admits 
the analytical philosophical method to be founded on the math-
ematical sciences and regrets the lack of interest ~mong his 
fellow-philosophers in them. This mathematical interest turns 
his philosophical observations into such molds as statistical 
groupin~ well-ordered series and self-representative systems. 
If he had maintained a little more active interest in the biol-
ogical sciences his thinking might have turned more into channels 
of growth, evolution and emergence. Likewise his concern ~or 
eternal realities and values seems to have somewhat eclipsed his 
{3) 
interest in the temporal and historical developments. 
The absence of a genetic principle in Royce's mature 
system appears in his attitude toward causation. He regrets the 
111.Ulhappy slavery of the metaphysics of the past to the conception (4) 
of causation", and relegates the causal factor to a subordinate 
place in his own thinking. Cause is to him but a special in-
stance of Being, a particular phase of minor significance. From 
the lower category of cau&tion he holds it vain to try to deduce 
higher meanings. He admits cause and ef~ect as one instance of 
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relationship in the factual series, but the series is the signif-
icant fact, the cause an incidental factor of its serial structure. 
( 5) 
"Being is everywhere deeper than causation". 
Royce's revolt against causation has a certain justification • 
. 
He decries a deified cause on the one hand and a mechanical cause on 
the other. There has been too much bowing down before cause, both 
as final explanation and as final determination of all life. As a 
bare concept cause explains nothing and determines nothing, unless 
it shows the reality whose character is manifested in a causal way. 
Royce sees this reality as purpose rather than puwer, as the corres-
pondence of idea and object in which the fact of the latter fulfils 
the meaning of the former. But if this purpose actually does any-
thing or this idea has any part in achieving its own fulfilment it 
will be hard to deny it causation. 
Without causation at theoonter of reality, Royce's meta-
physics is structural rather than functional. We may agree that 
Being is everywhere deeper than causation, but Royce's implication 
seems to make the is deeper than the becoming. His denial of sig-
nificance to cause seems to imply a stationary or fixed reality that 
remains a rigid standard corresponding with the right idea of it. 
Ideas would then not affect reality at all, but only apply to it 
(6) 
for verification. Absolute truth and absolute reality are open 
to the interpretation which Royce sometimes seems to make that a 
pre-established order in awaiting the "hits and misses" of our ideas. 
If every finite idea regarding the constitution of the empirical 
world "has its correspondent decision, ~ or no in the facts of 
the truly real, then the fulfilment of the ideas about experience 
I 
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in the facts of experience to which they refer is once for all a 
(7) 
wholly determinate fulfilment". This "final constitution" of 
reality suggests a structural metaphysics. 
It is elsewhere evident, however, that Royce does not 
want a rigid structural metaphysics. His persistent definition of 
reality as fulfilling a purpose, his emphasis everywhere on activ-
ity, his delight in pragmatic and voluntaristic tendencies would 
suggest a functional metaphysics as his intention. And yet it is 
difficult to see how any reality can function except in causal op-
erations. Either purpose causes the resulting fact or fact and 
purpose are found in mysteriously preestablished structural rela-
tions. 
The difficulty is enhanced by Royce's neglect of the 
creative functions of reality. In his earlier statements, the 
Absolute was conceived as Knowledge or Thought, later as Experience 
and then as Will. But the functions of the Absolute Will are sel-
ective, attentive, individuating, never definitely creative. "We 
do not regard the Universal Thought as in any commonly recognized 
(8) 
sense a creator~' Royce decided early that the power functions. 
{9) 
of reality were not fruitful or solving his problems. But to 
omit power functions entirely is to surrender likewise the power 
to function. The logical conclusion would seem to be a metaphys-
ical theory offering description rather than explanation, structure 
rather than function. This throws into question the whole·volun-
tary and teleological character of Royce's system. Either the 
power functions of reality, (i.e., creation and causation) must be 
admitted to a more central position or the distinctly purposive 
nature of his metaphysics given up. 
,. 
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Royce's disregard of the genetic principle in his metaphysics 
has, therefore, serious consequence. He sought to analyze existing 
facts, succeeded in recognizing their fleeting character, but viewed 
4lt them ever from a stationary point of view. He sought to group facts 
into statistical laws and gained a self-representative system instead 
• 
of growth, development, evolution of life. He sought to break the 
chain of causal necessity, but dismissed function with cause, and re-
tained to that extent a structural view of reality. He neglected 
and 
creative factors in so far withheld from purpose the power of active 
fulfilment. These philosophical intentions seem to have been 
thwarted by neglect of the genetic factor. 
2. Ethical Principle Inadequate. 
The ethical principle by which Josiah Royce is everywhere 
recognized is loyalty. It was only ten years before his death that 
he.began teaching this doctrine, but by this of all his teachings is 
he best remembered. Into this doctrine he put more of his life than 
his logic, and its popular appeal illustrates the intuitive response 
of life to life. In his Philosophy of Loyalty Royce hoped to show 
that his philosophical idealism was not "remote from life, but ••• in 
(10) 
close touch with the most practical issues. 11 
We have traced in a preceding chapter the effective way 
in which Royce employs this doctrine of loyalty. Its chief value 
we found to lie in its substitution of a social for an individual-
istic ethic. There are certain conflicts and self-thwartings 
which the isolated moral individual can only escape by loyal mem-
bership in a moral community. Loyal devotion to a great cause 
does enable the individual to unite his will with the common will 
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of the moral community, to find his life by losing it. But at that 
point we were confronted with the problem of what cause to choose. 
The possibility of conflicting loyalties re-introduces all the former 
(4t difficulties of conflicting wills supposedly overcome. To this 
Royce replies with his 11 loyalty to loyalty" submitted as the final 
way out of human conflict. 
Here, it is our conviction, Royce turns in retreat and 
carries his ethical principle away from pressing concrete issues 
back to the security of abstraction. Heretofore his loyalty is 
devotion to an objective cause, the thoroughgoing and practical 
service of a community. Loaylty like duty is in and of itself a 
merely formal principle, subject to the dangers thereof. Loyalty 
surpasses duty by its seemingly stronger bond of objective refer-
ence. As Royce unfolds the meaning of loyalty it has to a certain 
point gratifying objective reference. Loyalty is to unite the 
conflict of inner and outer wills, it is to centralize your powers, 
release you from moral doubts by making the cause your conscience. 
A cause for Royce is over-individual and socially uniting, it uni-
fies selves into one larger life, it is based upon stable social 
relations. A living cause is a community. Then the possibility 
of conflict between communities appears and to transcend this 
Royce seeks to universalize loyalty. 
The goal of loyalty cannot stop short of universality, but 
(tit Royce reaches the universal by retreat rather than advance. Instead 
of leading loyalty out to the objective universal community, he leads 
it back into the universal concept of its subjective principle. 
11 Loyalty to11 had formerly pointed to an objective situation, now 
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it points reflexively upon a subjective state of loyalty. In so 
doing it becomes reintrenched formalism. Every ethic needs a 
formal principle, but the material factor is quite as essential. 
~ The promising feature of Royce's doc~rine of loyalty was its appar-
ent desire to unite the formal and material into one synoptic eth-
ical principle. The disappointing feature is the retreat of 
loyalty from the objective social cause to the subjective abstract 
concept. 
The motive for this retreat seems to have been Royce's 
desire to simplify moral confusions by reducing all to one formula, 
universally applicable. He declares his aim in the preface to 
~lfe Philosophy of Loyalty as a desire "to simplify men's moral 
issues, to clear their vision for the sight of the eternal, to win 
. (11) 
hearts for loyalty". But there is a point at which further 
simplification clouds rather than clears the vision. An in-breed-
ing principle which defines its meaning in terms of itself, avoids 
rather than solves difficulties. Royce's ethical principle is a 
simple unity open to the same criticism he urges upon mysticism, 
that it tends toward experience of nothing. A unity of contrast 
demanding loyalty to something other than loyalty would seem more 
consistent with the Roycean position elsewhere. 
As a matter of fact Royce does not confine himself purely 
to his own simple formula. When he begins to operate with the prin-
~ ciple of loyalty he is able to proceed because his mind leaps over 
formal boundaries. "Whatever your special cause", he says at a 
later time, "your tr>ue cause is the unity of the whole world of 
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(12) 
reasonable beings". He is ever seeking the unity of conscious 
personalities, and the welfare of the universal community of life 
is the true goal of his ethical striving. Loyalty is "the heart 
of all virtues" to him because his loyalty irresistibly seeks the 
(13) 
welfare of a concrete community. In the Religious Aspects of 
Philosophy, where Royce develops his earlier ethical expression 
this objective goal comes out more clearly. He begins, with the 
formal principle of "producing in men the moral mood", extending 
the moral insight among men as the first moral commandment. But 
the moral insight says "act as one being" and then we ask what are 
we as one being to do. The reply is that we "must aim at the 
destruction of all which separates us into a heap of different 
(14) 
selves, and at the attainment of some higher organic aim". This 
higher organic aim he calls the perfect Organization of Life. 
This is Royce 1 s deepest ethical, religious and metaphys-
ical motive, "an organic union of life". His principle of loyalty 
to loyalty is an attempt to serve that aim, but its formal character 
is self-defeating. When we undertake to apply it we are nearly as 
helpless as before. If we have not yet chosen our cause, its 
only advice is "Decide, knowingly .!f. you ~,(i~norantly if you 
1 ) . 
must, but in any ~ decide and have !!£ ~"· This, as w. R. 
Sorley points out, is to say that the principle of choice is 
(16) 
"Choose". An ethical principle that helps us in our choice 
1.,. between right and wrong by saying "Choose" does not enlighten us 
greatly. If we have already by some unadmitted power made choice 
of our cause, and find it in conflict with the loyalties of others 
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we are advised to oppose not our adversary's loyalty, but only his 
blindness in his loyalty. This suggestion teaches us to forgive 
our enemies while we kill them, but how does it stay our killing 
hands? It is kindlier perhaps to call an enemy blind than evil, 
but it does not unite us who remain in helpless conflict still. 
So the simplicity and formality of Royce's ethical prin-
ciple of lo~lty defeat his moral goal of unity. For the stronger 
the loyalties to particular groups the more bitter do conflicts 
become. Loyalty to the enemy's loyalty leaves him still an enemy. 
What is needed is some cause larger than either of our loyalties, 
and a fitting organization to unite us in its service. Loyalty 
then becomes the means to that larger end, rather than the end in 
itself. To make loyalty the end of human endeavor is equivalent 
to making patriotism the end of a nation's life. Patriotism as 
an end in itself ferments into a fury of blind passion or subsides 
into the dumb assent of "my country right or wrong". Loyalty like 
patriotism when left to itself, either defies or despairs of right 
and wrong. 
The principle of loyalty when joined with other criteria 
and goals of ethical conduct is a valuable aid. Royce is able to 
demonstrate its usefulness because he surreptitiously brings in 
other elements with it. It is to him "the fulfilment of the 
whole moral laVl11 because he imports the whole moral law into it. 
, , It is the "central duty among all duties" because the other duties 
are present therewith. A strict confinement to fue literal 
(17) 
boundaries of loyalty to loyalty issues in very little. There-
fore Royce's ethical principle as stated in his Philosoph¥ of 
Loya~~ is inadequate to meet the demands of our moral situation. 
---------------------------------------~ 
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3. Criterion of Religious V~u~ Y-nclear. 
The science of axiology has come forward to its greatest 
prominence in the ten years that have elapsed since the death of 
Josiah Royce. The term "axiology" appears nowhere in his writings, 
and yet the stream of value~theory which reaches as far back as 
Plato flows in modern times through territory most familiar to 
him. With Kant and Lotze Royce early took up his philosophical 
abode, than whom none have contributed more to our modern value 
movement. He was the contemporary of Nietz~he, Ritschl, Windel-
band, Rickert and HBffding, a colleague of MUnsterberg and James, 
so it is inconceivable that the problem of value could have escaped 
his attention. 
It did not. His interest in value is apparent in all 
periods and departments of his thinking. In 1913 he considered 
(18) 
the human problem a problem of value, while in 1881 he had al-
ready been concerned with worth-judgments and the nature of their 
'(19) 
insight into human life. Value entered his psychological think-
ing as manifested in his definition of feeling as 11 our present 
(20) 
sensitiveness to the values of things". Value was fundamental 
in his metaphysical thinking as shown in his insistence that the 
world of appreciation is a deeper reality than the worl~fdescrip­
(21) 
tion. Antonio Aliotta terms Royce's system "a philosophy of 
values" and believes that "To Josiah Royce must be ascribed the 
credit of having placed the philosophy of values upon a more solid 
. ('22) 
speculative basis" • It may be noted that Royce's psychological 
rooting of value in feeling, his distinction of the appreciative 
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and descriptive approaches to reality, his grading of individual 
and over-individual values, and his relating of values to ideal 
obligations are suggestions largely followed in value discussions 
today. 
It is, hherefore, the more perplexing to find in one 
whose mind was so absorbed with value problems no clear or con-
nected development of value criteria. We have observed in the 
preceding section Royce's inadequate criterion of moral values. 
When we come to his treatment of religious values which seems to 
have been his foremost interest his criterion is even less evident. 
In The Religious Aspects of Philosophy Royce declares 
religious values to be unique, and not to be dissolved into lower 
or more commonplace elements. He selects three elements as essen-
tial to religion, viz, a moral purpose, a feeling of devotion and 
something in the nature of things that answers ro that purpose and 
feeling. The burden of his argument is that the Infinite Thought 
is "an object of infinite religious worth". But no effort is 
made to disclose his criterion of this infinite religious worth 
or of the three essential elements of religion. In The World and 
the Individual Royce finds the three essential problems of philos-
ophy of religion to be: "God, the World, the finite Individual and 
(23) 
the most fundamental relations that link them together". He 
confesses his earlier use of Infinite Thought not entirely satis-
C-- factory and defines his present undertaking as an effort to unite 
it with Will in a synthetic relationship which he calls Individual-
ity or Self. This registers a development in his appreciation of 
the religious value of personality, both human and divine. But 
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again we are shown no reason for this new emphasis or any criterion 
for this change in religious valuation. In The Problem of Christ-
ianity Royce finds Christianity the most satisfactory of all relig-
~' ions, and selects the three most essential religious values of 
Christianity, viz: the chur~h or Beloved Community, sin or the 
moral burden of the individual, and atonement or the reconciling 
,,I 
deed. He furthermore confesses his desire to place loyalty at 
the summit of religious values, but in none of these value-judg-
(24) 
ments does he share with us the criterion of his choice. 
In his Sources of Religious Insight, Royce conducts his 
most direct and systematic study of religious value as such. The 
value investigated is religious truth, and he inquires into "the 
(25) 
ways in which religious truths can become accessible to men". He 
considers individual and social religious experience, the synthetic 
use of the reason, and the effort of the will to conform itself to 
the laws of the world. Each of these sources are found inadequate 
and loyalty which unites the moral and religious interests solves 
the religious paradox. Sorrow has likewise a religious value, for 
the will is made perfect only through suffering. The crowning 
source of religious insight is found in a unity of spirit which en-
larges the narrow finite vision to see the universal unity of meaning. 
It might be contested that these sources of religious in-
sight are criteria of religious value. But this does not seem to 
be their exact status. They are rather instrumental religious 
values contributing to the intrinsic value which is religious truth. 
They are the ways or means in which truth values may be accessible 
to us. And in the criticism, rejection or acceptance of these 
... ·-·----- -_. 
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instrumental religious values Royce does not show us his criterion 
of judgment. The individual experience is not social enough, the 
social not metaphysical enough, but what of reason and will? He 
tiJ confesses at one point that they fail because of their separateness • 
..:.-
~What we most need at this point is some source of insight which 
shall show how to unite the lessons that the preceding sources fur-
(26) 
nished." This unifying source is loyalty. 
It was suggested in the section above that loyalty is 
serviceable to Royce as an ethical principle because he draws into 
it all the virtues. The present discussion shows that this is 
exactly what he does in employing it with religion, and that loyal-
ty is not itself the criterion of religious value but is service-
able because it includes and unites other sources of insight. nyet 
this source of insight (loyalty) includes in a beautiful and spir-
i tual unity the true sense of our individual experience, of our 
(27) 
social experience, of our reason, and of our will." From this 
it would appear that Royce's true eriterion of v&ues both moral 
and religious is unification. Whatever separates life into frag-
ments is disvalue, whatever unifies' life into organic wholeness 
is value. The closing chapter bears out this criterion by de-
claring that unity of spirit is a source of religious truth be-
cause it brings a larger view, i.e., insight to a unity of meaning. 
In fact this organic union of conscious life as previously noted 
is the dominant Roycean principle running through his whole 
. (28} 
philosophy. 
--~ 
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Royce illustrates this principle in the realm of truth 
values by appeal to the knowing community, in moral values by de-
votion to the mora~ community, in religious values by membership in 
the church invisible. But is this an adequate criterion? Appeal 
to the knowing community would have all the fallibility of consensus 
gentium or a popular referendum, which is notoreiously subject to 
foolishness and error. Loyal devotionfo a community may become a 
very immoral thing if the community is a gang of thugs or a corpor-
ation devoted to illicit profits and inhuman explmitation. Member-
ship in a church visible or invisible may be shrouded in deceptive 
superstitions, indulgent of immorality, an outrage of justice and 
beauty. Is solidarity its own excuse for being when it is by that 
the more destructive of all but social values? Unification is a 
tremendous weapon of evil as well as good, of error as well as truth, 
of stifling dogmatis~ as well as craative discovery. By itself it 
is no sufficient criterion of value. 
To these criticisms Royce would reply that he did not 
mean merely human unity. His totality is absolute, his whole is 
intended ever to be inclusive of God. He would claim that his 
true test of value is the absolute test of infinite completion. 
There is no stopping place for him short of absolute values, thus 
his final test of value might be stated as "Is it absolute?" In 
this larger insight it would appear that unification is only a link, 
(i the link that is to measure our finite issues on absolute standards. 
But why is an absolute any better than a relative? Is this an 
arbitrary choice in which Royce is exerting merely his personal 
taste over against the taste of relativists, or asserting the 
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longings of a tender-mind repugnant to a tough-mind? Royce leaves 
this question for the most part unanswered, and his choice of the 
Absolute as well as his choice of other valuooappears to that ex-
~ tent arbitrary. 
It might be inferred, as the most reasonable hypothesis, 
that Royce's motive for the Absolute is his longing for perfection. 
The goal of every value is undoubtedly its most perfect fulfilment, 
and when Royce finds no stopping place short of the infinite, he is 
evidently following every value to its infinite perfection. Thus 
the absolute truth is the perfection of truth, the absolute good-
ness is the perfection of goodness et cetera. But how does this 
I 
criterion assist us in choosing between good and evil when we do 
not know what the perfect is? Royce wou~d say that the solution 
is to recognize the existence of a Being who possesses absolute 
perfection and who knows the true from the~lse. Then by organic 
uriion with him, we become conscious of the absolute truth of 
values. That is Royce's last word, and we still wonder how the 
human mind can know the thoughts of God. His way is an eternal 
egress that leads us finally beyond our limits of knowledge. 
Royce's criterion of value is thus fleeting. 
"(29) 
eternal, so is the escape. 
4. View of the Self Problematic. 
---- -- --- ---- -----------
If the pursuit is 
There is one notable exception to Royce's disregard of 
the genetic factor, namely in his discussion of the empirical self. 
In his early psychological study he shared with J. M. Baldwin a 
pioneer interest in the psychology of childhood. His view of the 
a• (, 
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mature self was reached by study of genetic principles, thereby 
bringing to it an empirical enrichment. The welf grows out of 
racial situations which call upon it for imitation and reaction 
thus giving rise to self-consciousness. This self-consciousness 
is always a contrast-effect of ego and non-ego in which the sub-
ject sets his own idea, intent or act over against the rest of 
his social world. When these contrasts are remembered or imag-
ined we become self-conscious in memory or idea and thus develop 
ability to carry out these self-distinctions ev~n when alone. So 
the self-conscious individual holds before his attention a more 
(30) 
or less continuous contrast of self and other. 
This contrast with other-than-self also appears in the 
consciousness of an ideal. The self is an idealizing animal and 
continually contrasts the actual unsatisfactory present experience 
with an ideal possible experience. It is another case of the 
empirical self in contrast with a not-self, which calls forth im-
itation or renunciation. If the ideal is renounced it passes 
from attention, but if accepted it becomes the most real thing 
about the self, giving unity, direction and meaning to the collec-
tion of empirical states. My "unifying motive is, above all, 
the presence of an ideal of what amidst all the confusion of my 
{31) 
life I mean to be". "By my ideal I learn to know myself." 
The ideal becomes the means of organizing the self into a unity 
of multiple elements which remains stable over long periods of 
time. Therefore the self--is a time-transcending, complex, unity 
of conscious life directed toward a goal. 
, , 
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The value of Royce's illuminating discussion of the self 
up to this point cannot be too highly commended. The origin of 
self-consciousness in social situations, its foundation upon the 
contrast of ego and alter, its organization around an ideal or 
purpose, and its time-transcending unity of complexity contribute 
no little to current thinking upon this subject. But when Royce 
passes over from theempirical to the metaphysical view of the 
self he leads us into another world entirely. There the valid 
contrast of ego and alter is lost in absorbent unities that 
seem to involve him in serious difficulties. 
The primary source of difficulty seems to lie in an 
overworking of the principle of self-extension. When Royce in-
corporates an ideal into the self, or identifies the serf with 
an ideal he employs a legitimate use of the principle of self-
extension. But in identifying the relf with this ideal not-self 
he seems persuaded to assume that any and every not-self may be 
united with the self in the same way. He is further persuaded 
by the ability of the finite self to transcend time-gaps to be-
lieve that this same self may transcend all other gaps and extend 
itself without limit. There is of course no limit to which a 
vagrant imagination may wander or no conceivable possibility to 
which an inquisitive mind may not eventually arrive. But Royce 
seems nothing daunted at translating these logical possibilities 
into metaphysical realities. His conclusion appears to be that 
the real or metaphysical finite self is capable of infinite ex-
pansion so that it may actually become identical with the whole 
. (31) 
universe and God. 
~= = -~ 
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The difficulty here is that such a self becomes elastic 
to the point of extravagance and confusion. Beginning with the 
thesis that the self is identical with its ideal meaning he goes 
on to assume that the self is whatever its idea may mean. If a 
self has an idea of any object then it is identically that object 
simply by virtue of its power to think of it. This outdoes the 
ontological argument, which only asserts that the most perfect 
idea must exist, by declaring myself to be the most perfect idea 
I can think of. This savors of the extravagant form of mysticism 
that ems "Rejoice with me, for I have become God" - a mysticism 
Royce elsewhere condemns. Further than this,. relf-consciousness 
being built on con~rast, I am led by what I am to think of what I 
am not, and so I am what I am not. To such nonsense the doctrine 
of self-extension would logically seem to bring Royce. 
The self-elasticity that stretches from zero to infinity 
eventually denies the contrast on which it is built. That which 
means everything is in danger of meaning nothing. In R~ce's 
predicament it means that he has no little difficulty in disting-
uishing a self from what is not a self. He is able to say that 
"any finite idea is so far a Self" and at the same time hold that 
when "any finite instant of life is fully developed, and perfectly 
embodied, this Vfuole meaning of the instant becomes identical with 
(33) 
the Universe, with the Absolute, with the life of God". If the 
same identical concept can reach from this fractional instant to. 
the infinite whole, it is not surprising to find it applied to 
nearly everything in between, including the community phenomena 
of the social world and much of the natural phenomena of the so-
- -::"''IIII 
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called inorganic world. In fact it is difficult to find anything 
left that is not to Royce a self. This confusion appears in 
Royce's evident intention that there shall be different grades of 
being, but his seeming inability to show how he distinguishes be-
tween a state or fraction of mind, an individual mind, a social 
mind and an Absolute mind. He does differentiate "consciousness" 
in nature by our inability to hold co~munication with it. But 
the other grades of being are left in a state of more or less flowing 
confusion. 
The confusion is multiplied by doubt as to whether Royce's 
self-extension is after all actual or only ideal extension. He 
refers to it now as one, now as the other and the consequences of 
real self-extension are entirely other than the consequences of 
ideal self-extension. 
The community is referred to as a self and the self as a 
community. And yet Royce repudiates fusion of consciousness. 
Neither James• compounding of consciousness or Fechner's planetary 
theory of mental life satisfy him. In fact he declares that a 
member of a community 11 is shut off at each present moment by var-
ious barriers from lives of other selves" and again notes ~he 
"psychological and ethical barriers which now keep all of these 
(34) 
selves sundered". Even in the immediate past, selves in a 
community can hardly unite. It is in the distant past or fUture 
that community selves have a truly common life. A community of 
memory or of hope is an ideal community, and the individual self 
unites with a community by ideal-extension. But if the identity 
of individual with community self is only in remote past or future 
how can the community function as a self in the present? 
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The Absolute is likewise for Royce a Self. Everything 
is present datum for the Absolute in whose experience we are all 
enfolded. Rocks, trees, men and communities are all equally a 
part of the Absolute Self as partial conscious elements to the 
( 35) 
whole of consciousness. Finite experiences and ideas are 
psychical elements in God's consciousness, finite wills are con-
(36) 
stitutive of the Divine Will. So the Absolute Self is made 
up of the experiences and conative impulses of finite life. 
Finite ignorance, error and evil is thus a part of God. If 
finite minds do not know each other directly, they must remain 
as mutually exclusive psychical elements in this Supreme Self. 
If finite wills conflict, quarrel and hate, these tragic discords 
must remain in God. Royce insists that the finite experience is 
not swallowed up or transformed in the Absolute Self but continues 
unique. So, as in his view of the community, we have mutually 
exclusive and discordant elements somehow held in organic unity. 
Is this unity again only ideal? 
The problem of the one and the many Royce finally 
solves by mathematical demonstrations proving to his own satis-
(37) 
faction that the part is equal to the whole. So the mental 
state is equal to the whole mind, the individual oo lf to the 
community, the finite self to the Absolute. Now if this is 
merely ideal~extension of the self the identity would be simply 
thought comparison or logical coincidence. In that case 
Royce's God has no real existence but is only an ideal such as 
Uncle Sam or Santa Claus. But in this event it is difficult to 
see what metaphysical progress he makes, or how real problems 
are solved. The empirical content of the self may be transformed 
• 
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by ideal-extension but how could the metaphysical position of the 
self be in this way altered? 
On the other hand if Ro}le e means the self-extension to 
be an actual extension of the metaphysical dimensions of the fin-
ed ite self it leads to the extravagances pointAout above. In this 
case the part is constitutive of the whole and the whole no more 
(38) 
than the parts. "Were I not, God could not be 11 • This suggests 
complete identity of the finite and absolute selves, which in turn 
implies only one self. By this we should be forced to conclude 
ei·ther that myself is all there is or that the whole self is all 
(39) 
and I am nothing. · To this problem the following chapter 
will return • 
l 
• 
CHAPTER IX 
RESULTKNT PROBLEMS 
1. Is Royce:•s Method Truly Experimental? 
The experimental aim of Josiah Royce's philosophy is un-
questioned. \Vhat has been questioned is his success in consistent-
ly and effectively achieving an experimental method. He refutes 
the claims of the so-called 'pure empiricists', he desires our in-
telligent experiences selected, reconstructed, organized. He 
does not consider himself bound by the limitations of the empir-
ical sciences, but rather extends the limits of experience to 
the boundaries of metaphysical inquiry. In these ways he arouses 
the suspicions of other·· self-conscious empiricists. 
Of these none is more effective in criticism than· John 
Dewey. It may be well therefore to let him speak for those who 
find in Royce an abuse of the experimental method. Dewey des-
cribes the selective character of Royce's experience in this way. 
"Professor Royce dives arbitrarily from the·region of concepts 
into the chaotic sea of experience, and fishes out here and there 
just that particular experience which is required at that time to 
give body and tone to thin and empty categories". From this he 
concludes that Royce's "apparently larger concession to and rever-
ence for empirically given elements thus turns out to be mainly 
( 1) 
nominal". In reply to this Royce would probably say that our 
voluntary~tcntion is by nature selective, that in fact its 
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selective character is what makes our experience distinctively what 
it is. The barb of Dewey's criticism, however~ is that Royce cares 
first about concepts, only secondarily about empirical facts and 
that his selection of them is arbitrarily guided by the concept he 
·is trying to prove. Royce does describe his task at one point as 
seeing what in thines answers to our ideals, and no doubt his con-
cepts do consciously cr unconsciously shape his view of empirical 
facts. 
The matter of fact open to empirical observation is that 
every intelligent thinker, every investigator who is creative enough 
to form hypotheses selects empirical facts to test them. In so far 
as our attention is active and concentrative it will select certain 
points in the field of possible experience for conscious focus. Royce 
employs empirical means· to discover the selective character of atten-
tion. Then he uses selective attention to find empirical data by 
which to test his theories, as to all appearances Dewey himself does. 
The real issue here is open-mindedness. If either Royce or Dewey 
become so bound to his theory that no form of empirical evidence can 
shake him from his theoretical position he is denying the experimen-
tal method. The flexibility of Royce's mind is admitted from all 
sides, recognizing his continuous mental growth, and in some cases 
believing his later position to have entirely outgrown his earlier. 
It would be difficult to say that either purely empirical or purely 
conceptual factors motivated this growth, for he seems to have been 
guided by both to the end. 
Of interest for philosophy of religion is the question 
whether Royce presents a "fair sample" of religious experience. A 
r;~ ----- ·-· . -- --------~----------------~-=========~==============~~~~~ 
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comparison with James's religious writings reveals certain omissions 
in Royce. The latter did not have the same interest as James in 
following every vagrant variety of religious experience. Abnormal 
~ religious experiences and such normal experiences as conversion 
and the worship side of mysticism are largely overlooked by Royce. 
Such comparison should recognize, however, a difference between 
these two men beyond that of temperament. James was primarily a 
psychologist and his study of religion followed to quite an extent 
psychological interests. Royce, on the other hand, was primarily 
a philosopher, and while each dipped into the other's field, each 
was impelled by the genius of his own profession. It must be in-
sisted, nevertheless, as Royce himself insisted, that nothing human 
is foreign to the philosopher. While Royce is not to be held 
responsible for scientific investigations, he is at least account-
able for interpretation of such investigations. That he does 
interpret a large number of religious experiences contributes to 
founding his philosophy of religion on empirical data. But that 
he ignores conversion, worship and in general the feeling aspects 
of religious experience, calls into question the adequacy of his 
selection to represent a complete religious life. 
The point at which Royce and James unite in their empir-
icism is in permitting validity to a larger realm of experience. 
Each of them accept as valid religious experience while positivists 
~; would limit the empirical realm to the data of sense. Tb the 
'· ' 
latter Royce's experimental method is wholly invalidated because 
he exceeds the traditional dimensions of their field. Tt is diff-
~cult to see how he could have conducted a philosophy of religion 
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on a positivistic level, for religion maintains its life and value 
on the assumption that religious experience is experience of the 
beyond-human. Certainly the whole metaphysics of religion would be 
~ priori excluded by the positivistic empiricists. Neither phil-
osophy nor religion in their fullest implications can be confined 
to this narrow form of experience. They should be founded upon 
experience and throughout keep close to the ground of experience, 
but must eventually reach out to interpret ultimate realities. 
v Royce carries his method from empirical data out ~6 these far-
reaching interpretations • 
. 
Interpretation, is in fact, the method which comes to be 
Hoyce 1 s most characteristic method of investigation. He believes 
this method to be capable of~scovering reality in a more satisfac-
tory way than either perception or conception, induction or deduc-
. ( 3) 
tion. That interpretation is a fruitful way of working over the 
perceptive and conceptive data is evident to all. But Royce seems 
anxious that interpretation assume the offices of inductive and 
deductive procedure as well. The difficulty here, as Professors 
Hocking and Jacks have pointed out, is that interpretation is not 
a primary cognitive function. It is 11~ ~post facto· description 
of what has taken place, when say a scientific discovery has been 
11(4) 
accomplished. The initial steps of knowledge 11muu be present 
in some simpler and more immediate fashion before the interpretative 
( 5) 
~ process can begin". The process of discovering must go on first, 
-
'· . 
and then after the discovery has been presented interpretations of 
it may be worked out. Now if Royce means to substitute interpre-
tation for the simpler activities of experiment and induction he 
would seem to be denying his experimental aim. 
'\ 
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It has been noted that Royce is no pure empiricist. He 
declares that only the mystic who will have nothing but siWple and 
immediate unity with reality can be called a pure empiricist. Royce 
(4a undertakes to investigate empirical facts and ultimate realities by 
a method that unites experience and interpretation. If his inter-
pretations swallow up the deliverances of experience, then his ex-
perimental method fails. The result would be a structural view of 
both experience and reality. We have noted Royce's disregard of 
genetic factors. Causal sequence and creative functions belong 
to experience and with these omitted his experimental view is apt 
to set into static forms. If Royce means to omit these functions 
and if he means that interpretation shall be the whole procedure 
of his philosophy he seriously endangers his experimental aim. 
But it does not seem in character with Royce's procedure 
to mean that. It seems more consonant with his aim and activity 
to consider these as extreme statements that overshot the mark. 
Causation is not meant to be completely ruled out but only to be 
shown inadequate to explain everything. Creation is neglected 
because it was abused by "Special Creationn theologians. The prin-
ciple of growth was intended and partially observed though not 
made sufficiently central. Interpretation was proposed as a 
third cognitive process and applied rather bDoadly. But Royce's 
illustration of passing over the boundary from one realm of know-
~-- ledge to another suggests that he intended it to be added on 
rather than to swallow up the more primary methods. Interpreta-
tion is used by the scientific empiricists constantly and if Royce 
meant to use it merely as an auxiliary method it would not deny 
his experimental aim. 
-' 
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so our conclusion is that Royce is for the most part 
successful in his experimental aim. He does not confine himself 
to traditional empirical boundaries, he does overlook certain ex-
periences of importance, he does seem to crowd the experimental by 
the structural and interpretative. Furthermore the evidence of 
experience is contradicted by certain inconsistencies that will 
appear at the close of this chapter. But his approach tq reality 
and his view of reality is by no means entirely divorced from ex-
perience. In the broader sense, and in a more or less synthetic 
way, Royce's investigation of finite experience of reality may be 
called experimental. 
2. Is the Roycean Unity Successful? 
The Roycean unity is open to question both as to intention 
and achievement. In the first place there is uncertainty as to the 
kind of unity he meant to posit. Some discussions seem to imply 
that unity was to him an ideal rather than an actuality. Unity is 
not found but achieved. The union of the individual with his com-
munity is by "ideal-extension", the true community is after all an 
ideal rather than a present fact. It might follow that the ab-
solute unity of the universe is also for Royce an ideal. Other 
discussions suggest the world unity as a unity of meaning, or a 
mathematical infinite, or an all-inclusive concept. The inference 
from these might very naturally be that the unity Royce intended 
~. was only that of a logical possibility. 
In the second place, even if Royce may have intended a 
real unity, there is question as to the success of his philosophic 
achievement. The attempt to make the community into a self as real 
r: 
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as individual selves and conscious of its own life is laboring with 
serimus difficulties. For the behavior of a community is quite dis-
tinguishable from the behavior of an individual, and the self-con-
sciousness of the community is not the creation of the whole but of 
the individual members, each viewing the whole from his particular 
point of view. To ascribe community life to the Absolute is to 
suggest more a collective than an organic whole. Furthermore the 
Absolute is made to hold such contradictory and discordant features 
that its harmony at least seems incongruous, perhaps even forced. 
This Self composed of member selves each of which is an individual 
whole acting in opposition to or disregard of other individual 
wholes casts further doubt upon the success of the Whole of wholes. 
If we may take Royce at his word he intends all reality 
to be unified. In concluding The World ~ the Individual he 
declares that "the one lesson of our entire course has thus b:een 
(6) 
the unity of finite and of infinite". He refers to "our theory 
of the unity of Being" and insists that for his theory the world 
(7) 
"must be One". As to the community Royce insists that no inter-
pretation is real unless "the corresponding community exists and 
wins its goal". "Unless both the interpreter and the community 
(8) 
are real, there is no real world." The whole direction of Royce's 
thinking is toward unity. It is the measure of his progress, the 
condition of every value in his system. A unity of life on higher 
qjr levels is the key to every solution for his problems, and if this 
unity is not real nothing is then accomplislied. 
The question of Royce's success in reaching this intended 
unity of all reality is not so easily answered. Royce undertakes to 
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establish this unity by investigating four possible conceptions of 
Being. He finds the realist's view of reality independent of any 
knowing subject as logically self-destructive because his world !. falls apart into irreconcilable dualisms. The mystic's view is 
quite as abstract, for it holds the external inaccessible and 
surrenders all effort to escape subjectivity. Critical rational-
ism reduces Being to truth, but valid possibilities of experience 
are not yet real, for our ideas require an actual object other 
than themselves. To meet the demands arising from these three 
unsatisfactory views, Royce brings forward a fDurth conception 
of Being, namely, a unity of external and internal in which the 
external reality fulfils the whole intent of the internal mean-
ing. This view of reality he argues from the character of facts 
found always linked in orderly series to ideas which mean them, 
and the character of finite ideas and experiences which forever 
mean more than is clearly present. Because the object you mean 
can not be independent of your meaning, and because its meaning 
cannot be wholly fulfilled in your present experience, the ob-
ject must be present to an insight that includes your conscious 
intent and the larger meaning. "The One is in all and all are in 
One. All meanings, if completely developed, unite in'one meaning, 
(9) 
and this it is which the real world expresses." 
This larger insight is for Royce a conscious Self, 
(\1t inclusive of all reality. The detailed application of this view 
has been followed out in Chapter VI above, employing it to solve 
the problems of finite limitation, ignorance and error, moral 
_conflict, and the relation of the finite individual~~he Whole. 
--~ 
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There is no need for repeating these arguments, but they must be 
held in view while evaluating the success of Royce's world-unity. 
That he follows this view persistently to original and suggestive 
conclusions may be readily granted. Whether the unity arrived at 
in this way is successful cannot finally be answered untdlother 
considerations come before us.· 
What may be observed at this point are the conditions of 
Royce's unity. He invests everything in the unity of one Absolute 
Self. The unity of this one Self then demands that everything else 
be a state of that Mind. His unity is built first upon the assump-
tion that material objects are not material at all but states of the 
divine consciousness. It is built secondly upon the assumption 
that all finite beings are nothing more than fluent phases of this 
one Mind. Now one may find it difficult to harmonize these assump-
tions with experience, but once granted the rest follows. That is 
to say, if Royce is willing to surrender all things and selves, for 
the truly organic selfhood of the Absolute, there is no denying him 
his unity. His initial assumptions may be challenged, but with 
those assumptions he is bound forever to final unity. 
The purpose of the present discussion has been to see if 
the Roycean unity is to be taken seriously. We have found that 
Royce intends his world-unity to be taken seriously, and that he has 
committed himself to a logical position that establishes his system 
as a monism. He is not as purely monistic as other absolutists 
have been, his unity has persistently sought to be a unity of con-
trast, in which individualistic and pluralistic values have been 
approved. But the final word with Royce has always been unity, not 
difference. "All varieties of individual expression are thus sub-
ordinate to the unity of the whole."(lO) 
.. > 
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This is fundamental to the questions that are to follow. 
If Royce's unity is not real, then nothing is transformed and his 
solutions are only verbal. Vfhile, on the other hand, if Royce's 
(~ unity is final it involves certain consequences that must be clear-
ly recognized. The last chapter suggested some of the difficulties 
confronting the self if the Roycean unity should prove to be meta-
physical. Having decided that this unity is actual, we shall now 
have to face the difficulties inherent in such a view. These en-
danger the theistic character of the Absolute Self and the individ-
ual autonomy of the finite self. 
3. Is His Doctrine of the Absolute Theistic? 
- - - -- ----- -----
The Roycean Absolute is attacked from both directions. 
There are some who find it not unified enough, and others who find 
it too unified, to be theistic. The first of these urge that a 
unity composed of vigorously contradictory selves must be an aggre-
gate and cannot therefore be an organic Self. It is argued that a 
Self composed of member selves must work injustice to either the 
larger Self or the member selves. The section above has sought to 
press this issue upon Royce for decision and found that he would 
subordinate the partial selves rather than inpugn the unity of the 
Whole Self. "There is, then, at last but one Self, organically, 
(11) 
reflectively inclusive of all the selves, and so of all truth." 
This should be answer enough for those who would question the 
.j 
' · seriousness of Royce 1 s unity. These critics may then shift their 
a ttaclc upon the Roycean view of the finite self, but if Royce is 
(12) 
willing to sacrifice the finite he thereby silences the cry that 
his Absolute cannot be a unified Self. 
I, 
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There remains for consideration the other difficulty that 
the Roycean Absolute is too unified to be theistic. The former crit-
icism was that the Absolute falls short of theism, while this view 
would urge that it goes beyond theism, that it is pantheistic. A 
philosophy of religion built upon monistic lines is at once open to 
the suspicion of pantheism. With Royce's persistent emphasis on 
the unity of all reality and his just as persistent determination 
to call that unity God the suspicion is not easily allayed. God 
is identified not only with the Absolute, but with all life, in-
eluding man and his world. The following statements coming from 
different periods represent fairly well this pantheistic tendency. 
1. "God's life includes in the organic total of one 
conscious eternal instant, all life, and so all good-
ness and evil." (RAP,p.457) 
2. "For the Self is all that is, and his world is the 
chosen outcome of his eternal reality."(SMP,p.307) 
3. 11 God •• is the very life of the world taken in its 
wholeness." "The One is all, and all are in the 
One. 11 (WI, vol. i, fP .395, 394) 
4. "Man the community may prove to be God. 11 Or "the 
whole universe ••• both a community, and a divine being". 
(PC, vol.i, p.409, preface xxxvi) 
In his first book Royce freely confesses that he is 
"quite indifferent whether anybody calls all this Theism or Pan-
(13) 
theism". He holds that it differs from the common form of 
either position which traditionally has conceived God in terms of 
power, either external or internal to the world of things. Royce 
finds the power conception of God (including the problems of caus-
ation and creation) contradictory and fruitless. 11God as Power 
would be nothing, or finite. God as Thought can be and is all 
(13) 
in all." It is only for convenience that he ventures to call 
r 
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this Universal Thought God, and is not to be confused with the God 
of traditional theology. It is rather the God of the idealistic 
tradition from Plato downwards. This suggests a leaning toward pan-
theism, though he is consciously standing on neutral ground. An 
earlier phrase, "our hypothesis is not yet pantheistic, nor the-
istic" seems to characterize his conditlon at that time as one of 
' 
uncertainty. 
His next publication, seven years later, represents na 
considerable advance in the organization of the philosophical doc-(14) 
trine which was set forth in the former book. 11 In this work 
(15) 
he seems to imply that he is theistac though the reference is not 
entirely clear. The clearest advance toward theism is the attribu-
tion of fuller personality to the Absolute. The former character-
ization, "Infinite Thought" now becomes "Self" or 11 World-Selfn. In 
that same year (1892) Royce published an article on The Implications 
(16) 
of Self-Consciousness, in which he declared, "the Infinite is 
unquestionably a Person, and this Person is as unquestionably the 
(17) 
world-possessor". During these years he seems consciously to 
have been moving toward theism, so that in 1895 when he delivered 
his lecture on ~ Conception of God at the University of California 
he declares that his "conception of God undertakes to be distinctly 
(18) 
theistic, and not pantheistic". To substantiate this he points 
out that his view is not of any Unconscious Reality into which 
,., finite individuals are absorbed, nor of any Universal Substance 
before whose law our ethical independence crumbles, nor of any 
Ineffable Mystery that we can only silently adore. In distinction 
from these his conception of God, he believes, preserves every 
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ethical predicate that religious faith in its highest form has 
ever ascribed to God. Without wishing to be a slave to tradition 
he feels 11 disposed to insist that what the faith of our Fathers has 
genuinely meant by God" is essentially identical with the outcome of 
his philosophy. 
From these statements it should be evident that the direc-
tion of Royce's growth was toward theism. At the time of publish-
ing his first work, he was neutral and undecided with reference to 
(19) 
this problem. He confesses lack of clearness during the years 
that followed this publication, as to how his doctrine ought to 
apply to the problem of Individuality. By 1892 he is giving a more • f 
personal note to his Absolute, and by 1895 he accepts Individuality 
~s the central problem confronting his idealistic view, and develops 
the Will of the Absolute in order to give it proper: place. By 1899 
he devotes the Gifford Lectures to "a deliberate effort to bring 
into synthesis ••• the relations of Knowledge and Will in our con-
(20) 
ception of God". He recognizes that his earlier concept 
"Thought" was inadequate to express the meaning of Individuality, 
so he undertakes to reorganize his conception of God around Per-
sonality in its fuller content. From the time that he reached a 
view giving central place to the individuaililty of God and man, he 
considered his philosophy distinctly theistic. 
The question of regarding Royce as a theist, however, 
will have to be settled on more objective considerations than his 
desire or intention. It will first be necessary to distinguish 
the essential meaning of theism, and then in this light to study 
the logical implications of the Roycean position. Theism, 
etymologically, means belief in God. Common usage has confined 
190. 
its application to belief in one God, and collaboration with corre-
lative terms has placed its meaninB midway between deism and pan-
theism. Deism means belief in a God wholly transcendent, pantheism 
belief in a God wholly immanent, while theism means belief in a God 
at once transcendent and immanent. 
Royce everywhere repudiates an external God, and it is 
probably in reaction from deism that he will have nothing to do 
with creation and causation. His interest and argument seek ever 
for an immanent God. This emphasis on immanence has led the ~ag-
ority of his critics to pronounce him a pantheist. William James 
declared of the Roycean philosophy, "It is pantheistic, and un-
doubtedly has already blunted the edge of the traditional ~eism 
(21) 
~ft protestantism at large." That there is no little evidence in 
support of such a view, was suggested at the opening of this sec-
tion. The emphasis upon qod's oneness with the unity of all 
reality has settled the question for many. ~heism1 of course, 
includes immanence, but it is distinguished from pantheism by its 
insistence that there shall also be transcendence. 
J. W. Buckham holds that Royce's philosophy "only lacks 
the supplementary truth of transcendence to become a fresh and 
(22} 
illuminating expression of Christian Theism". M. W. C~lkins 
on the other hand maintains that Royce's God is transcendent and 
(23) 
theistically Christian. ¥fuen we turn to Royce himself, we 
find him maintaining a certain kind of transcendence. In order 
to make clear what Royce's position is, it will be necessary to 
distinguish two kinds of transcendence, external snd internal. 
External transcendence would insist that God be outside of and 
other than his created system. This kind of transcendence Royce 
• 
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will not have. Internal transcendence, on the other hand provides 
for differentiation within the system, in which God rises above fin-
ite details to hold them in perspective. This kind of internal 
transcendence Royce maintains. He describes God as "One Absolute 
World-Self, who embraces and is all reality; whose consciousness 
( 24) 
includes and infinitely transcends our own". The Self that 
holds time and all other successive finite details in perspective, 
{25) 
"viewed so to speak, from above and in its wholeness 11 , Royce 
calls transcendent. On these grounds he meets in his way the 
immanence-transcendence test of theism. "God is immanent in the 
finite, because nothing is which is not a part of his total self-
expression. He is transcendent of all finitude, because the 
totality of finite processes is before him at once, while nothing 
(26) 
finite possesses true totality." 
This locates the issue in the problem which kind of 
transcendence is the test of theism. If internal transcendence 
is sUfficient:, then Royce may be a theist. But if external 
transcendence is essential to theism Royce would be a pantheist. 
External transcendence if complete, would be deism and to that 
extent a denial of theism. If transcendence is partial, (which 
is equivalent to saying partially immanent) it would seem to be-
come involved in a system that unless arbitrarily truncated would 
include both God and man. If God and man be included in one sys-
~ tern his transcendence will of course be internal to that system. 
This leaves us vri th two forms of theism, dualistic and 
monistic. The theist who insists upon external transcendence v!ll 
be confronted by the dualistic dilemma with no basis for uniting 
the two worlds. It is difficult to see how this dualism can 
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escape deism. For if the divine and human systems shou~d meet it 
would merely be accidental coincidence unless there is some inclus-
ive orunifying system. But·if there is a unifying system it re-
41t turns again to monism. It will then be objected that the monistic 
theist has as much difficulty avoiding pantheism as the dualistic 
theist has escaping d~m. If God is the \Vhole how can he effect 
transcendence? Royce would reply: Because he is Personality and 
by pe.rsonal experience we lcnow how the whole mind transcends its 
parts. 
By viewing reality as Personality, therefore, Royce val-
idates his claim to theism. It may be contested that the differ-
once between his monistic theism and personalistic pantheism is 
not wide. But after all what does the label matter? Royce stands 
on theistic ground in his reaction against deism on the one hand 
and impersonal pantheism on the other. Vfuether his position is 
theistically satisfactory will have to be decided on the rrerits 
of the case rather than on the terminology. Is Royce's monistic 
position sufficient to escape the difficulties of crude pantheism 
and preserve the values demanded by theism? Is his internal 
transcendence effective or does it slip bacl{ into the engulfing 
immanence? 
Absolute theism cannot overlook the following difficulties. 
All reality may be personal, but is constituted of discordant ele-
~ ments, thus endangering the unity of God. The evil, error and ig-
norance of the finite is carried up into the Infinite, thus im-
pugning the goodness, truth and knowledge of God. The parts are 
equivalent to the Whole, thus leaving uncertainty as to what after 
• 
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all is God. The \Vhole is identical with the part, so why not call 
the part the whole and avoid the unnecessary and gratuitous assump-
tion of an Absolute beyond empirical demonstration? 
For each of these difficulties Royce has his answer. All 
concrete, active, living unity is a unity of contrast, so the con-
tradictory elements in God contribute to the rich variety and 
wealth of meaning in his life. The evil and error which enter 
God's experience are necessary to his complete knowledge of all 
facts, but do not impugn his goodness and truth, for he overcomes 
ignorance and error with his larger insight, and renounces evil 
by triumphing over it in his victorious goodness. The parts are 
futile and defeated in and of themselves; it is only by union 
into the Whole that they find meaning. God is the Whole that 
saves the parts by organizing them into perfect life. The Whole 
may be identical with the part only in a self-representative sys-
tem, which is to say the Vlliole of God is present in every meaning 
or expression which he manifests in the part. The Absolute is 
no gratuitous assumption, for every partial view of reality falls 
into contrad~ction and only the Absolute explains. 
From this it should be evident that Royce can neither be 
waved aside at the first cry of pantheist, nor readily disposed of 
by the traditional arguments brought against monism. For the mon-
ism of Royce is laid out upon personalistic lines and while the 
absolute nature of it may lead us to suspect an eventual falling 
into pantheistic difficulties, the way to such difficulties must 
be demonstrated, not truren for granted. Distinctions of value are 
the property of Personality, and to that extent his internal 
I 
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transcendence may be effective. But how about the finite beings 
who are thus reduced to theistic parts and cosmic impulses? It 
may appear that the finite self is the vulnerable point in Royce's 
philosophy. 
4. vVhat Becomes of the Finite Self? 
The Roycean unity is a triumph for the Whole, but it re-
mains to be seen what becomes of the finite part. A philosophy 
that finally reduces all reality to one Self may have to cope with 
(27) 
rebellion from 11 an insurgent self-assertiveness". While on the 
other hand, the finite self which accepts part-hood in the Absolute 
Self is thereby confronted with the necessity of proving that he 
is himself a self. For monism endangers the individual autonomy 
of the finite being both morally and psychologically. 
Royce does not attempt to defend the complete independence 
of the finite self. This position illustrates again faithfulness 
to his experimental aim for it is the evidence of empirical and 
scientific investigation which urges this conclusion upon him. 
The finite individual is dependent upon his heredity, his geograph-
ical and social environment, the physiological condition ~f his body, 
and the ideal values that he approves afar o~f. In ihe complexity 
of factors which influence the finite life, Rpyce draws the sober 
inference that man's autnnomy is to quite an extent limited. He 
is part of a world whose metaphysical implications are infinite, a 
~ network of determinative relations outside of which he cannot 
step. In this his finite situation the individual has only free-
dom to direct his attention. To Royce the choice of the finite 
will is simply the power of giving attention to this or that 
ideal or object. 
--~----------- -~~--------~---~~- --~~·---------~----
195. 
The question at issue is, Does such limited freedom 
appear sufficient to permit a moral situation. Royce maintains 
that it does, for the freedom of attention is the power of giving 
one's self to an ideal, which is an act of purpose. Therefore the 
4lt selective power of attention, subject of course to limitations, 
chooses both the content of knowledge and the goal of conduct. 
This individuality is to Royce only possible because an Absolute 
Will gives selective attention thereto. But while this Absolute 
Will determines the general form of finite willing, the finite 
will is unique in its own detailed selective choices of attention. 
Furthermore the total result cl all willing acts is different be-
cause of my will. If my will is evil·it will eventually be over-
ruled but the total grouping and organization of all wills is 
different because I have willed. Likewise my own condition is 
influenced by my selection of attention, and therefore I have 
sufficient control over my action to be in a moral situation. A 
part which partially determines itself and (in smaller part) the 
Vfuole may be a difficult conception psychologically, but there 
can hardly be doubt that Royce reserves for it some moral respon-
sibility. 
The more serious question is the dubious possibility of 
psychological autonomy for the Roycean finite self. When this was 
discussed in the previous chapter it was not yet determined wheth-
er Royce intended the process of self-extension to b~efr ideal. 
We have since concluded that he seriously means the finite self to 
be identical metaphysically with the Absolute. That being so the 
difficulties there noted come before us again. Royce would of 
I 
' 
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course repudiate the extravagant statement that I am vihat I think 
of. In fact he seems eager to maintain epistemological dualism 
in our human world. He emphasizes the contrast between ego and 
alter, denies to immediate experience the possession of intelligent 
knowledge, and argues that facts and events can only be bound to-
gether into a meaningful cognition by interpretation. The self-
conscious finite ~eing is such by his contrast with fellow man and 
the Absolute. The object of knowing seems not to be identical 
with the human knowing process, for "What is, is other than the 
(28) (29) 
mere ideau, and 11 Wna t we know we transcend 11 • 
It is only in the Absolute that knowing and object of 
knowledge are one. From that perspective all finite selves are 
as if in telepathic connection, while from our limited point of 
view our minds are clowed to each other. Royce asks us to con-
ceive, for the sake of argument, a world of mind readers in 
which the experience of each is an open book to all. This of 
course he admits as impossible to us but holds that such is exact-
ly our appearance to the organic World-Self. By this organic unity 
the monads of the spiritual world cease to be mereli monads. 
"They are 'windowless' (as Leibnitz said of the 
Monads that in his doctrine made up the universe of 
finite beings); but they are windowless only to one 
another's finite view in the world of space and time 
relations. From above they are open to the light of 
the reflective Self, in whom they live and move and 
have their being. It is with their relations as it 
is already within our own finite lives, in so far as 
we are indJLvidual bits of the Self ••• And as the 
moments ofWfinite thought are to me when I reflect 
upon my own meaning, and upon the relations of the 
many moments of my life, so my neighbors and I are to 
the larger Self, when discoursing together about the 
same objects, we find o~35}ves as it were but moments 
in his inclusive unity." 
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This quotation is very illuminating in understanding how 
Royce actually gets his World-Self organic. He notes that finite 
selves are windowless monads to each other, that their very self-
hood implies their mutual conscious exclusiveness. He further 
~- recognizes the difficulty of this exclusive privacy for the organ-
iu unity of the Self that includes us. Therefore he finds it 
necessary to fuse our selves while. in the reflective consciousness 
of the Absolute. In the unity of the World-Self windows appear 
and we become as if mind readers. "The experience of each individ-
ual would there be directly and organically related to the exper-
{31) 
ience of all." 11 The communion of spirits, then, is genuine, 
although we have no cnnsciousness of a spiritual mind-reading of 
{32) 
other finite beings." 
So the epistemological dualism of the finite world is 
submerged in the epistemological monism of the Infinite world. In 
this way Royce escapes the difficulty of dissociated personality 
in the Absolute by denying his thesis that the finite is not trans-
formed in the Absolute. He saves the unity of the World-Self by 
at last denying the ultimate distinctness ~nd self-identity of 
finite selves. For his metaphysical monism had all along insis-
ted that finite beings were but parts of the Infinite Self. Now 
by sacrificing their epistemological distinctness to the organic 
selfhood of the Absolute, he has surrendered their identity com-
pletely, and it does not appear what can save them from being lost 
in the "wilderness of Godhe'ad11 • It might be argued that the fin-
ite selves are not transformed but are eternally preserved in the 
organic unity. This is a possible statement of Royce's view, but 
gains nothing for it eternally deprives the finite of attaining 
any distinct identity of selfhood. 
• 
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This failure of finite beings to attain distinct or unique 
selfhood could hardly be stated more plainly than Royce does when he 
(33) 
says that "there is and can be but one complete Self" or "There 
( 34) 
is then at last but one Self". In one instance he speaks of the 
world containing many knowers or ideas and then adds parenthetically 
(35) 
"or many Selves, if you are pleased to use that word". At 
another time in a concluding summary of his argument he says, "The 
world of life is then what we desired it to be, an organic total; 
and the individual selves,are drops in this ocean of the Absolute 
(36) 
truth". Thus is the organic unity of the Absolute Self vindica-
ted by violating finite selfhood. 
The seriousness of this position is its subtle denial of 
the greater part of the other values Royce has achieved. In the 
first place it denies his experimental method, for consciousness as 
we know it is ovmed by private individuals, and resists complete 
fusion into larger units. Royce assumed the community to be a 
true self and so claimed empirical ground for over-individual self-
hood. But more careful analyms shows no truly empirical evidence 
of a community self that transcends its members or views them as 
whole. There is an experience of wholeness about an individual 
self that is contradicted when applied to either a moment of con-
sciousness or a social unit· • Royce admits that from our finite 
experience we are windowless monads, but goes diametrically counter 
to this empirical evidence in asserting that the privacy of our 
(~ self-consciousness is lost. 
" 
Furthermore this violation of finite selfhood is a denial 
of his logic elsewhere. His consistency is denied by departing in 
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this instance from his thesis that the finite experience is not 
(37) 
altered, transformed or absorbed in the Absolute Self. Likewise 
his thesis of unity-in-contrast suffers by the ultimate .fusion of 
metaphysical and epistemological contrasts between finite selves 
and between the finite and the Infinite. His assignment of Per-
sonality to God is open to question when the whole meaning of per-
sonality as we know it in our ·world is denied. His elaborate 
proof for the existence of God and the unity of the Whole is under-
mined by conditions that challenge the reality of the self that 
produced the argument. If finite experience and selfhood are un-
trustworthy how can we trust either the arguments they produce or 
the Self constituted by such experiences and 11 sel ves 11 • 
If finite beings are denied selfhood even the character 
of God comes in for suspicion. Is it ethical for God to lead fin-
ite beings through their maze of tragic failures and sufferings to 
perfect his own eternal peace? Royce seel{s to justify this pos-
ition by suggesting that if there were no strivings in time there 
could be no peace in eternity. His implication is that finite 
beings eventually enjoy the peace of eternity as part of God, but 
if they are not real selves they would seem to be the losers and 
God the gainer. For the gain is the eternal insight and perfect 
wholeness which belongs only to the \'lhole. A God who makes finite 
beings a meaps to his end rather than ends in themselves falls 
short of the finite standards of morality. With selfless finite 
~ beings it is furthermore not so clear that moral freedom is 
adequate. 
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Finally, Royce's reduction of all to one Self denies his 
social metaphysics. For how can there be a social universe of one 
Person? A society in every sense that we know and use that concept 
means a plurality of persons. Royce does try to maintain that every 
~· self is in and of itself a community, but if a ~f is a self and a 
community a conwunity they are not identical. A d~ssociated per-
sonality seems to have amultiplicity of selves but each is exclus-
ive of the other and would certainly not be accepted by Royce as 
a community. Normal personalities may play the part of a cast 
of characters but the one self plays and knows it is playing them 
all. True social relations and a~ fide community require a 
plurality of distinct personalities. Such plurality Royce has 
surrendered to a lonely universe of one Self. The Roycean God 
is a Solipsist. 
5. Are These Con~~~~o~ Warranted? 
For Royce the supreme good is spiritual unity. To this 
end he bends all his efforts and pursues the whole course of his 
thinking. For this chief value he is obliged more or less con-
sciously to sacrifice other values, and make v1hat have turned out 
to be rather serious concessions. We are now ready to answer the 
question of an earlier section~ Is the Roycean unity successful? 
The answer is negative. The unity for which Royce concedes so 
much is not successful. It is unsuccessful eventually because 
Absolute Unity exacts too heavy tribute of other facts and values 
to maintain its divine right to rule. Itn violation of finite 
selfhood comes to mean a denial of the logic and value of Absolute 
Selfhood. 
4CJ 
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In fairness to Royce it should be recognized that by no 
means did he intend to surrender as much as the section above has 
urged upon him. He believed that his form of final unity con-
served these other values which we have maintained are denied by 
the logic of his absolute position. If one believes with Royce 
that true selves can be members of a truly organic Self, there is 
hope of saving the values of all. But if one presses the question 
of epistemology (which by the way Royce held as the key to all met-
aphysics) it becomes evident that all experiences must unite in 
the Absolute Self into a monism of consciousness that denies self-
hood to the parts. For the only other alternative is a unity of 
mutually exclusive selves which in turn denies the ore;anic unity 
would 
of the Absolute Self. Selves in part-whole relationl'be a contra-
diction denying true selfhood either to the whole or the part. 
Vfuat motive, then, led Royce to seek spiritual unity 
with such persistent determination? Clearly, because in this way 
he thought to conserve the greatest values. Acquaintance with 
his thought as a whole suggests three types of values that he 
seemed to treasure: logical values, personal values and socialval-
ues. The logical values are manifested in his desire for a uni-
fled, coherent system on the one hand, and a reasonable interpre-
tation of empirical facts on the other. His phrase 11 The Organiza-
tion of Life" best expresses this logical demand that the data of 
experience and reason work together toward an organic whole. This 
organic whole was the absolutely organized Experience, Infinite 
Thought or Absolute Knowledge. The personality values are mani-
fe sted in his definition of Being in terms of purpose, his emphasis 
-
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on Individuality and his decision that the Absolute shall be a Self. 
The social values are manifested in his view of the social origin 
of self-consciousness, the social basis of science, of knowledge, 
of ethics and religion. He called ours a social universe and the 
Absolute a Universal Community. 
These seem to be the motives underlying Royce's monism. 
He believes these values to be best realized in an Absolute. But 
we have seen the difficulties into which an absolutism falls, mak-
ing concessions that eventually deny exactly these logical, per-
donal and social values. Unity is like Pleasure in that he who 
would embrace her loses her. Perhaps she may be wooed by under-
taking to win the inherent values more modestly. Perhaps if 
less attention were given to the unity more could be given to 
the values Royce seeks to realize in that unity. 
It has been the contention of this study that the commun-
ity is the key to understanding Royce and solving the difficulties 
he faced. The Roycean way of operating with this conception was 
to take the comnnmity as a Self composed of member selves. But 
as we have seen, this eventually reduces all reality to one 
lonely Self and defeats the truly social value of his community. 
Let us now give up Royce's unwarranted assumption that a commun-
ity is a Self and in view of the empirical evidence define a 
community as a social system composed of member selves. Upon 
this basis let us extend our view to the farthest metaphysical 
horizons, as does Royce, and.posit that our cosmos is a universal 
community, that is, a social system composed of member selves. 
This would differ from Royce's view, however, in maintaining 
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that instead of one self there are many, all of wmich are included 
within a universal social system. For our alternative view the 
system is not a Self but the home of all selves. This alternative 
view, it is contested, preserves the social, personal and logical 
-
11 
values which Royce sought but failed to save in his absolutism. 
As our subject is philosophy of religion, the first ques-
tion that will naturally come forward will be, Vfuat kind of theism 
does this view permit? This view permits two possible theisms, 
namely finitism or creationistic personalism. Finitism is the 
(38) 
view of William James and other thinkers who are content to 
leave their philo.sophy in ultimate pluralism. For them God is 
another finite being greater than our human kind, but still finite. 
Such a view preserves the social and personal values, but it leaves 
a good deal to be desired logically. For it leaves untouched such 
embarrassing questions as: vVhat caused the finite God and the fin-
ite men? Vlha.t mainta:1ns the life of such beings? What relates 
plural entities into a social and metaphysical system, etc~ This 
view lacks coherence and organization as well as unity. 
Creationistic personalism, related _to the personalis-
(39) 
tic teaching of Borden P. Bowne, is the remaining possibility for 
a social universe. This view distinguishes two forms of metaphys-
ical monism: quantitative monism or singularism which holds that 
all reality is one in number, and qualitative monism that finds 
reality to be of one kind. Royee in company with other absolutists, 
holds to both of these forms of monism, maintaining that reality 
is one both in number and kind. Creationistic personalism accepts 
qualitative monism but rejects the quantitative form. The world 
is of the stuff that minds are made of, but there are minds 
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instead of mind. The entering wedge that thus distinguishes minds 
in epistemological dualism. It was seen above that in conceding 
ultimate epistemological monism Royce surrenders the uniqueness of 
individual minds. The absolute theist goes the whole way in monism, 
~ qualitatively, quantitatively, metaphysically and epistemologically. 
It is difficult to see what individuality can be saved in this melt-
ing-pot of the Absolute. The creationistic personalist, on the 
other hand, is qualitatively a monist, quantitatively a pluralist, 
metaphysically a monist, epistemologically a dualist. Thus he 
differs from pluralism in his qualitative and met~physical monism, 
(40} 
from Absolutism in his quantitative and epistemological pluralism. 
{!1) 
Let us now turn aside from the nart of affixing labels" 
to the problems involved. For the personalist all selves are real, 
but the finite selves receive creation and life - maintenance from 
the Supreme Self. Finite selves are expressions of the individuat-
ing will of the Supreme Self but are not part of him. All dwell to-
gether in one social system which may be called in Roycean language 
the Universal Community. This saves the uniqueness and autonomy 
of the finite selves and at the same time permits the Supreme Self 
to be something more than the Vfuole of the parts. The transcend-
ence of Royce was so narrowly marginal that his God could alnios t 
as easily be all or nothing. The shadow of pantheism stalks 
everywhere through his pages and if he escapes it by this slight 
margin, he is ever on the verge of slipping back under its penum-
bra. In the end he carries all reality into the one Self and 
his community becomes divine solipsism. Person~lism, on the con-
trary, mainta1ns the epistemological gulf between selves whether 
human or divine. This permits the transcendence of every self 
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from its objects of knowledge, and preserves a self-identity and 
distinctness that makes social life truly possible. 
If it is not yet clear how creationistic personalism es-
capes the difficulties of other pluralisms, let it be pointed out 
4lt again that all selves are dependent upon the Supreme Self for their 
existence. But how can they be related if not parts of the whole? 
They are related by their qualitative unity. That is to say they 
• 
are all minds, characterized by intelligent and voluntary activity. 
They are thus related by common purpose. But if the finite selves 
rebel against that purpose, then the will of the Supreme Self con-
tinues faithful in purposing the life and individuality of the 
finite selves. The very existence of the finite selves being de-
pendent upon the Supreme Will, their relations continue by the 
faithful purpose of this Relator. This view is consequently a 
monistic theism. God is not transcendent outside of the system, 
but transcendent to other selves within the system. The decisive 
difference between absolutistic and personalistic forms of theism 
rests upon the ways in which finite beings ~re related to the Di-
• 
vine Being. The absolutist offers a necessary whole-part relation 
while the personalist offers a voluntary relation of creative 
purpose. 
Questions may next arise concerning the universal commun-
ity which we have called a social 1JYstem. If this system is not a 
self it would seem to be impersonal and therefore unaccountable in 
a personalistic scheme. What is the relation of the finite selves 
and the Supreme Self to this system that includes them all? In 
reply the personalist would deny that a social system may be 
called impersonal. For social means a society of persons, and in 
. ----~ 
(. 
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such a society all relations would naturally be personal. Consider-
able of the recurrent difficulty here is in regarding relations in a 
more or less material or substantial way. A relation is not sub-
stantial, nor so far as we know possible of subsistence wholly apart 
from any mind. Royce's absolutism implies that the only way you can 
bind a system together is by putting an Absolute rim around it like 
the iron band around a wheel. Systems may be bound from within and 
if one insists upon physical illustrations let us refer to the solar 
system. It is the centripetal dravling pov1er of the will of the 
solar Personality which unites our social system. In immaterial 
concepts the system is related not by relations, but by the relating 
power of the Relator. Royce's use of the Interpreter which holds 
the universal community together is a good characterization of this 
Personality. 
In this way it is possible to reach the spiritual unity 
of one system which Royce desired. But it is not reached by embrac-
ing the Absolute. For the Absolute in turn embraces all reality in 
a singular completed experience that :d'lokes growth and distinctive 
functions of individuals. Spiritual unity is more successfully 
attained by respecting the plurality of a community and the reality 
of its member selves. If one of these member selves be given a 
central ,or solar position in the system then unity clusters 
irresistibly about that Personality. It is not, however, the 
unity of structural rigidity, but a more truly organic unity cap-
able of grmvth, creative emergence, causal sequence and other gen-
etic factors. Even the Supreme Personality, while eternal in his 
synoptic view of time may participate in this cosmic growth_. The 
God of this theism is limited by selves external to himself, but 
•• ·- . 
207. 
if that power is freely granted by God it is then a form of self-
limitation. In fact relation to external reality is a condition 
(42) 
of selfhood granted even by Absolutists. So limitations are 
essential to any intelligent being, and may not the limitations 
of selfhood perhaps be more desirable than the limitation of an 
impersonal Absolute without relations? 
So it. appears that whatever way we turn concessions will 
have to be made. We have questioned the wisdom of Royce's concess-
ions to Absolute unity. It has been suggested that by making 
other concessions Royce might more successfully save the values-. 
he sought. These values we have found to be logical, personal 
and social. As each of themmet eventual denial on the absolute 
path we have offered an alternative view. By this view it appears 
that the social values may be conserved in a universal community 
that is a social system composed of member selves. It further 
appears that the personal values may be conserved in a system that 
is maintained by, for and of Personality. Finally it appears that 
logical values may be conserved for the empirical facts are by 
this view organized into a coherent and reasonable system. Sing-
ularism is too tight a unity to respect either the facts or values 
as we find them. A social system composed of member selves is 
our alternative suggestion. 
PART FOUR 
CONCLUSION 
~I do not want to make mere disciples; 
but I hope that I have helped some fellow-
students toward a clearer knowledge of God 
and of themselves. Such knowledge, however, 
they can never get by merely accepting my 
views. They must use their ovm labor.~ 
WI, vol.ii, Preface, p.xvi. 
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PART IV CONCLUSION 
A. Statement of Conclusions. 
The conclusions of this investigation consist of seven 
internal inconsistencies observed in Royce's position and one con-
structive suggestion. 
1. Josiah Royce differs from other absolutists in his 
experimental aim. He succeeds in laying a broad empirical faun-
dation for philosophy of religion, but overlooks some experiences 
and in the end permits speculative considerations to over-rule 
experience. 
2. The voluntary nature of religion as well as of individ-
uality, truth and reality is fruitfully developed. But his volun-
tarism leads to an oversimplification that calls into question the 
adequacy of his ethical principle. 
3. Royce makes a commendable effort to construct a social 
philosophy of religion, but the implications of his All-inclusive 
Self deny him the logical possibility of a bona fide society com-
posed of many selves. 
4. The problem of values is clarified by Royce at many 
points, but his own criterion of value is elusive. Unification 
seems the most plausible Roycean criterion, but this denies all 
values but one, by substituting so~ial solidarity for every other 
value. 
5. The Roycean quest for unity is a worthy undel"'taking in 
the direction of systematic and coherent organization. But its 
neglect of genetic factors for mathematical order, results in a 
rigid structure that denies the very organic unity sought. 
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6. Royce contributes to theistic discussion bold and orig-
inal arguments. But his insistence that God shall be inclusive of 
all reality, while mitigated by emphasis upon internal transcendence 
('-! and the personality of God, still seems unable to escape many 
'" pantheistic difficulties. 
7. Royce believes th~t his principle of individuality saves 
the integrity of the finite self. But any philosophy that makes 
finite selves parts of an Absolute Self endangers either the fin-
ite or the Absolute selfhood. He prese1•ves the unity of the Absol-
ute Self by fusion of finite selves there-in, which amounts to con-
fessing that the identity and distinctness of finite individuals 
is not ultimately real. 
8. All of these internal inconsistencies arise in striving 
after an absolute unity that makes all things and selves parts of 
the one real Self. Our suggestion is to take the community not as 
a Self but as a social system composed of member selves. If this 
social system consists of a Supreme Self and all created selves 
united by purpose, the universe will then be a met a:rhysical commun-
ity which satisfies the demands of logical, personal md social 
values. 
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B. Summary of Fundamental Pro~sitions. 
The central problem of Josiah Royce's philosophy is 
finite experience of Reality. His investigation of this problem 
leads him through a dialectic of experience such as the finite 
present, doubt, moral activity, mystical surrender and membership 
in a community. Membership in a community opens a human possibil-
i ty of transcending self-isolation and conflict. With a socialized 
knowledge (interpretation), a socialized ethic (loyalty), and a 
socialized religion (love) Royce then approaches the more-than-
human world. Postulating the cosmos as a universal community and 
the community as a Self, Royce develops his metaphysics of the 
community. With the characteristic formula, ~ Self composed of 
member selves, all problems such as finite limitations, ignorance, 
error, evil, moral conflict, moral goal, the one and the many, 
and the union of man and God find solution. 
In his experimental method, his social philosophy of 
religion, his voluntaristic treatment of religion and his new 
arguments for God Royce makes a distinct contribution to relig-
ious thought. But his disregard of genetic factors, his inadequate 
ethical principle, his lacl{ of a criterion for religious values, 
and his problematic view of the self involve his philosophy in 
difficulties. vVhile for the most part successful in his experl-
mental aim, he nevertheless does overlook certain experiences of 
importance and permit experience in other cases to be crowded 
~ and contradicted by his speculative interpretations. 
J 
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There can be no question but that Royce intends the unity 
of his system to be final. His success in this unity is sufficient 
to warrant a monism or absolutism with consequent values and dis-
values. The Roycean Absolute may be called theistic, for it is a 
Personality repudiating deism on the one hand and impersonal pan-
theism on the other. This absolute theism maintains a kind of 
internal trmnecendence but the margin is so narrow tha£tis unable 
to escape certain pantheistic dilemmas. The vulnerable point of 
Royce's philosophy is his view of the finite self as a part of the 
Absolute Self. This violates the meaning of selfhood and event-
ually involves the entire system in contradiction. From this it 
appears that Royce's concessions to absolute unity are unw~rranted, 
both by reason of the facts and of the values violated. Less con-
cern for unity and more direct approach to the values sought 
through unity might lead to more satisfactory results. 
The motive underlying Royce's persistent quest for 
unity seems to have been his desire to conserve logical, personal 
and social values in this way. But Royce's method of embracing 
absolute unity after all defeats these values he thought to con-
serve. The difficulty grows out of his attempt to make the 
community a real self, and finite beings members of the Universal 
Self. Therefore we offer as an alternative suggestion, that the 
community be accepted as empirical evidence reasonably warrants 
a 
and called a social system rather than self. Then let this 
conception of the community be applied metaphysically as Royce does 
his to the universe. The cosmos may thus be conceived as a uni-
versal cow~unity, which is to sqy, a social system composed of 
member selves. 
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This view of reality would permit two forms of theism: 
finitism or creationistic personalism. Finitism makes speculative 
~\ assumptions without offering constructive metaphysical theory, and 
is therefore unsatisfactory. Creationistic personalism gives 
metaphysic a1 ground for accepting a Supreme Personality who is not 
;~. 
identical with but the Relator of the universal community. This 
alternative view conserves the social, personal and logical values 
which Royce sought to realize in his philosophy of religion. The 
unity of this view is, however, not absolute but organic, that is, 
giving due place to genetic and individual factors. The universal 
con~unity is not a personality but is the home of personality 
human and divine. 
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c. Key to Abbreviations for Titles of Royce Volumes. 
LA - Primer of Logical Analysis. 
San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co., 1881. 
RAP- The Religious Aspects of Philosophy. 
-- Boston: Houghton,Mifflin•. Co., 1885, 7th ed.l887. 
SMP- The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. . 
Boston: Houghton, Miff'lJ.n Co., 1892; ibid, 1897. 
CG - The Conception of God. Together with comments thereon 
--oy S. E. Meze8; ~LeConte, and G. H. Howison. 
New York: and London: Macmillan, 1897. 
SGE- Studies of Good and Evil: A Series of Essays upon 
Problems or-Eire-and Philosophy. --
New York: Appleton, 1898. 
WI- The World and the Individual. ( 2 vols.) 
New York and London: Macmillan, 1900-1902;ibid, 1904. 
CI - The Conception of Immortality. 
Boston andNew York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1900. 
OP - Outlines of Psychology. 
New York and London: Macmillan, 1903; ibid, 1906; 
ibid, 1908. 
HS - Herbert Spencer, an Estimate and a Review. 
New Ygrk: Foi7 Duffield & Co7, 1904. 
PL - The Philosophy of Loyalty. 
- New Yorki Macmillan, 1908. 
RQ - Race Questions, Provincialism, and Ohher American Problems. 
-- New York and London: Macmillan, 1908. 
WJ - William James and other Essays ~ the Philosophy of Life. 
New York: Macmillan, 1911. 
SRI- The Sources of Reli~ious Insight. 
Ne~ York: Scri ner•s, 1912. 
PC -The Problem of Christianity. (2 vols.) 
New York: Macmillan, 1913. 
LEP- 11 Principles of Logic 11 in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical 
Sciences. Vol. I. 
London: Macmillan, 1913. 
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B. Key to Abbreviations for Titles of Royce Volumes (cont.) 
WAR - War and Insurance. 
---New York: Macmillan, 1914. 
LM - Unpublished Lectures on Metaphysics. 
Cambridge: Harvara-co1lege, 1915-16. 
PHR- Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce. Edited by J. E. 
CreightOn, --
Lancaster, Pa.: The Philosophical Review, 1916. 
HGC - The Hope of the Great Community. 
--- New York: Macmillan, 1916. 
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Calkins, M. W., PHR, pp. 54-65. Cf. also her discussion of 
personalistic absolutism which she acknowledges as influenced 
chiefly by Josiah Royce,in Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 
Nev1 York: Macmillan. 
Royce's characterization of himself. PHR. p. 281. 
Op. Cit. See note (6). 
San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft, 1881. 
PHR, pp. 287-94. 
RQ, p. 148. .. . 
Richard C. Cabot 11 Josiuh Royce as a Teacher", in PHR, pp. 242-3. 
J. Loewenberg calls attention to this in his "Editor's Intro-
duction" to FE, p. 4; Cf. alsop. 67. 
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WI, vol. ii, p. 255. 
SMP, Preface, p. viii. 
See Loewenberg's development of this in his "Editor's Intro-
duction" to FE, pp. 10-30. 
WAR, Preface, pp. iv-v. 
LM, January 11, 1916. 
RAP, p. 333. 
RAP, Preface, p. i. 
PC, vol.i., p. 10. 
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D. Notes and References (cont.) 
Introducti~ (cont.) 
{36) PHR, p. 282. (37) Cf. J. Loewenberg's agreement with this decision, FE, 
"Editor's Introduction", pp. 36-7. 
Chapter I. The Fi~ite Present. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
nn 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
( 15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
{19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(2'7) 
(28) 
( 29) 
"It would seem that our religious philosophy must begin with 
the problem of all theoretical philosophy: Vfuat can be our 
knowledge of this world, and whereon can this knowledge be 
founded?" RAP, p. 231. 
Ibid, p. 231. Note the opening chapter of the constructive argument in 
Roycd's Gifford Lectures in "The Recognition of Facts". 
WI, vol. ii, pp. 1~42. · 
CG, pp. 257,277; VII, vol.i., pp. 17-8, 55-59. 
WI, vol.ii, p.30. ( 6 ) WI, vol.ii, p.ll. WI, vol.i,pp.402~5. 
CG, p.l6. 
WI, vol.ii, p.l2. 
OP, p.21. 
Ibid, p. 123, also FE, p.349. 
OP, p.l29. 
Ibid, Chs. VI,VII. 
CG, pp.l87ff. 
Royce, J. "Ho\'l Beliefs are Made", FE, p.349. 
OP, p.89. Or more specifically stated: "Plainly the con-
scious state of any moment involves two characteristic 
features, the so-called Unity of Consciousness, as it is 
exemplified at that precise moment, and the equally obvious 
presence of a Variety of mental states which have to one 
another relations of similarity and difference." Ibid,pp.85-6. 
WI, vol.ii, pp.46-7. 
Civilization and Ethics, (2 Vols.) 1925) 
WI, vol.ii, p.45. 
Ibid, p.41. 
SGE, p.l51. "The Implications of Self-Consciousness" by 
Josiah Royce (1892). 
WI, vol.ii, p.l9. 
Ibid, Ib.l8. 
Royce, J. 11 'l'ests of Right and Wrong", (1880) FE, p.203. 
Ibid, p. 206. 
Royce, J. "Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness and 
Nature" (1895), SGE, p.210. 
WI, vol.ii, p.23. 
Ibid, p. 59. 
Ibid, p.34. 
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D. References {cont.) 
Chapter I. The Finite Present (cont.) 
( 30) Ibid, p. 57 • 
(31) "Whatever our business or our doctrine, we all endlessly war 
against the essential narrowness of our conscious field. We 
live looking for the whole of our meaning'! Ibid, p. 56. 
(32) SRI, pp.30-31. 
(33) Ibid, p. 50. 
(34) Ibid, p. 52. 
(35) Ibid, p. 32. 
(36) Ibid, pp. 51-2. 
(37) Ibid, p. 30. 
(38) Ibid, p. 43. 
{39) cr. Royce's reference to 11 the most essential argument regard-
ing the true relations between our finite ideas and the ul-
timate nature of things". WI, vol.i, Preface, p.viii. 
Or again, note his reference to "this book ••• an inquiry re-
fiarding just this realm of experience". (Ibid, p.x) and 
'our issue as precisely this relation between Ideas and 
Reality". (Ibid, p. 42. 
The fundamental place of this problem for Royce's system 
was noted above in Section #4, of the Introduction. 
Royce confesses this problem in part at least to have been 
inherited from Kant. 11 The problem bequeathed by Kant to his 
successors was ••• the problem of the relation of the empirical 
self of each moment to the total or universal self." It be-
comes likewise the problem of Hegel and Schopenhauer. 
- SMP .f). 259. 
Chapter II. Doubt. 
RAP, p. 14. 
Ibid, p. 11. 
Ibid, p. 13. 
Ibid, p • 133 • 
Cf. this with a statement from 11 The Practical Significance of 
Pessimism", FE, p. 140. "There is no other way of studying 
the worth of life than by examining the very root and sub-
stance of conscious life." 
Ibid, p. 142. 
Ibid, p. 144. 
This line of reasoning is of course indebted to Schopenhauer 
as Royce acknowledges, S.MP, p. 454 and FE, p.l39. 
SMP, p. 262. 
Ibid, p. 264. 
Ibid, p.437. 
Ibid, p.447. 
Ibid, p.465. 
Ibid, p. 469. 
Cf. Royce's opening sentence in 11 The Practical Significance of 
Pessimism" {1879) FE, p.l33, "Experience is too narrow to fur-
nish us answers to all the great problems of life." 
-
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D. References (cont.) 
Chapter II. Doubt (cont.) 
(16) Ibid, p. 133. 
(17) Ibid, p. 133. 
(18) Ibid, p.l34. 
219. 
(19} This harks back to Kant's famous dictum that thought without 
experience is empty, experience without thought is blind. It 
may be noted here that Royce acknowledges more allegiance to 
Kant than to any other thinker. See RAP, Preface, p.ix. 
(20) RAP, p.297. 
(21) Ibid, p. 298. 
(22) Ibid, p. 299. 
(23) Ibid, p. 171. 
(24) SRI, p. 85. 
(25) Ibid, p. 91. 
(26)"'rhus, then, our estimate of the worth of any large fragment 
of human life is founded, not so much on an estimate of the 
mathematical sum of its separate experiences, as an a total 
impression of the worth or significance of the entire series, 
when viewed from some other moment of time." "Pessimism and 
Modern Thought." (1881) FE, p.l59. 
(27) Ibid, p. 176. 
(28) Ibid, pp. 160-1. 
(29) Royce, J., "The Sciences of the Ideal", Congress of Arts and 
Science, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1903. The quotation con-
tinues, "You cannot see the unity of knowledge; you cannot 
describe it as phenomenon. It is for us now an ideal. And 
precisely so the meanings of things, the relation of knowledge 
of life, the significance of our ideals, their bearing upon 
one another, these are never for us men phenomenally present 
data." p. 155. 
(30} "No experience is of importance unless it is organized ••• 
chaotic or irrationally ordered experience is useless, and 
may be worse than useless." OP, p. 351. 
(31) Ibid, p. 350. 
(39) "Never in the :Jresent life do we find the self as a given and 
realized fact. It is for us an ideal." WI, vol.ii, p.290. 
See also "Tests of Right and Wrong", FE, p.217. 
(35) In PC, vol.ii, p. 43, Royce says, 11 the individual self is no 
mere present datum, or collection of data, but is based upon 
an interpretation of the sense, of the tendency, of the co-
herence, and of the value of life." 
(33) WI, vol.i, p. 287. 
(34) "We can't begin our study of the world of essences with the 
essence of the self for that is highly indirect knowledge." 
LM, p. 221, March 7, 1916. 
(36) "Considering simply this passing moment of my life, I am 
hardly a self at all." Ibid, p. 41. 
11 The present self, the fleeting individual of today, is a 
mere gesticulation of a self. The genuine person lives in 
the far off past and future as well as the presenb.." Ibid,p.67. 
"However a man may come by his idea of himself, the self is 
no mere datum, but is in its essence a life which is interpre-
ted and which interprets itself, and which apart from some 
sort of ideal interpretation is a mere flight of ideas, or a 
meaningless flow of feelings, or a vision that sees nothing, 
or else a barren abstract conception." Ibid, p. 61. 
D. References (cont.) 
Chapter II. Doubt (cont.) 
(37) LM, p. 275, March 18, 1916. 
(38) Ibid, p. 30. 
(39) CG, p. 291. 
(40) Ibid, p. 288. 
220. 
(41) "He has an ideal because only in so far as he has an ideal 
is he a person· at all." Ibid, p. 273. 
(42) RAP, p. 331. 
Chapter III. Moral Activity. 
(1) Cf. Royce, J., "Doubting and·Working", (1881) FE, p. 323-44. 
(2) RAP, p. 108. 
(3) Ibid, ~. 110. 
(4) Ibid, p. 130. 
(5) Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
(6) SRI, pp. 174-5. 
('7) RAP, p. 453. 
(8) Ibid, loc. cit. 
(9) RAP, p. 459. 
(10) SMP, p. 211. 
(11) Ibid, p. 116. 
(12) Ibid, p. 117. 
(13) SRI, p. 184. 
(14) SMP, p. 142. 
(15) SRI, p. 184. 
(16) Ibid, p. 185~ 
(1'7) Ibid, p. 186. 
(18) Cf. RAP, Ch. V.,pp. 107-130, entitled, "Ethical Skepticism and 
Ethical Pessimism." 
(19) SRI, p. 171. 
(20) Ibid, p. 1'73. 
{21) Ibid, p.31. 
(22) Ibid, p. 180. 
(23) Ibid, p. 1'76. 
(24) Ibid, p. 1'76. 
(25) Ibid, pp. 18'7-8. 
Chapter IV. Mystical Surrender .• 
(1) As Royce sugGests, WI, vol.i, p.81. 
(2) Ibid, lo. cit. 
( 3 ) SMP, p • 50 • 
(4) "Mysticism consists in asserting that to be means simply and 
wholly to be immediate". WI vol.i, p.80. 
(5) Ibid, p. 285; also p. -81, "I~deed I should maintain that the 
mystics are the only thoroughgoing empiricists in the his-
tory of philosophy." 
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Chapter IV. Myatical Surrender. 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
( 15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
Ibid, p. 83. 
Chapter II above. 
WI, vol.i,.p. 82. 
Ibid, p. 160. 
cr. Ibid, p. 144, "For the mystic ••• to be real means to be in 
such wise Immediate that, in the presence of this immediacy, 
all thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched, 
so that the finite search ceases, and the Other is no longer 
another, but is absolutely found." 
cr. Ibid, p. 147, "A fact not satisfying is not a pure fact. 
For •• a fact not wholly immediate - by reason of the very 
dissatisfaction mingled with it - sends you elsewhere for a 
presentation that you do not possess and thus declares itself 
not yet real." 
Ibid, p. 167. 
Chapters II and III. 
In his Lectures on Metaphysics (Harvard College, 1915-16) 
Royce includes Marcus Aurelius, Spinoza, Spencer and Bertrand 
Russell among the mystics because of this submissive attitude 
toward reality - "the attitude of not undertaking to change 
the detail of the world, but taking the attitude toward it 
that finds it everywhere the expression of the Divine Will. 11 
LM, p. 263, March 16, 1916. 
Ibid, pp. 169-70. 
IJ~, p. 292, March 25, 1916. 
WI, vol.i, p. 167. • 
Royce summarizes the progression of the mystics reasoning in 
WI, vol.i, p. 178. 
Ibid, p. 168. Royce bases this observation upon a study of 
the Hindu Updnishads. 
Ibid, p. 191. 
Ibid, p. 186. 
Ibid, p. 188:. 
Ibid, p. 186. 
This is a "principle of alternation11 (W. E. Hocking's term) 
which Royce does not explicitly state, but it is necessary 
to understand his contradictory descriptions of the mystic 
as both critical and unconscious. It is implicit in the 
following quotation: "With ideas the mystic wars against all 
mere ideas. With the abstract weapons of Realism he refutes 
Realism. At last he believes himself to have won the right, 
by virtue of the very breadth of his vision of finitude, to 
condemn ••• the whole of finitude." Ibid, p .177. 
Ibid, p. 192. 
Ibid, p. 193~ See also pp, 194-5. 
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(D) References (cont.) 
Chapter V. Membership in a Community. 
{1) 
{2) 
{3) 
~4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
( '7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(1'7) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
{21) 
PC, vol.ii, p. 246. 
Cf. Ibid, p. 12. where Royce says, "we human beings are 
never possessed either of pure perception or pure concep-
tion ••• But we mortals live the intelligent part of our 
lives through some sort of more or less imperfect union 
or synthesis of conception and perception." 
Royce adds that Kant's use of the Urtheilskraft is the 
nearest to a third type of cog~itive process, but is not 
consistently so maintained. Ibid, p. 120. 
Ibid, p. 132. 
Ibid, p. 142. 
i \.;, . .) •.. ) ••. _ _ ..:. Cf. J. B. Watson, "The behaviorist ad-
vances the view that what the psychologists have hitherto 
called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves." 
Behaviorism {1924) p. 183. See also his Psychology from 
the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, Chapter IX and p. 1~ 
11 thinking' by which we mean subvocal talking. 11 
PC, vol.ii, p. 114. 
Ibid, ppp. 185-6. 
Ibid, pp. 148-9. 
"The Will to Interpret undertakes to make these three 
selves a community. In every case of ideally serious 
and loyal effort to interpret this is the simplest, but 
in its deepest motives, the most purely spirit~al of 
possible communities." Ibid, p. 208. Royce also calls 
the Will to Interpret the will to be self possessed, i.e., 
"One who compares his ovm ideas, views them as from above. 
Hamms to pass from blind, 1 leadings' to coherent insight 
and to r.esolute self-guidance." Ibid, p. 193. 
Ibid, p. 207. 
Ibid, pp. 264-5. 
"Left to myself alone, I can never find out what my will 
is." PL, p. 28. See Royce's further statement of this 
paradox. Ibid, p. 31. 
Ibid, p. 3'7. 
Ibid, p. 42. 
Ibid, p. 42. 
"Loyalty shall mean ••• The willing and practical thor-
oughgoing devotion of a person to a cause. 11 Ibid, p. 16. 
Of the loyal in this connection Royce says, "Their cause 
has forbidden them to doubt, it has said, 'You are mine, 
you cannot do otherwise.' And they have said: 'I am, 
even of my own will thine. I have no will except thy 
will. Take me, use me, control me, and even thereby 
fulfil me and exalt me.'" Ibid, p. 45. 
For this discussion see Ibid, p. 52. 
Royce declares of the loyal man that 
practical one. He does something. 
serves his cause. Loyalty is never 
Ibid, Preface, p. vii. 
"his devotion is a 
This something 
mere emotion. Ibid,p.l8. 
D. References (cont.) 
Chapter V. Membership in a Community. (cont.) 
(22) Ibid, p. 15. 
(23) Ibid, p. 116. 
(24) Ibid, p. 125. 
(25) Ibid, p. 126. 
(26} Ibid, p. 130. 
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(27} Ibid, p. 132. Cf. this passage with Royce's solution of 
ethical skepticism in·the will to hold these variant ele-
ments in conscious harmony. RAP, p. 134. 
( 28} PL, p. 133. 
(29) SRI, p. 205. 
(30) PC, vol.i, pp. 89-91. 
(31) Ibid, p. 94. 
(32) Ibid, p. 98. 
(33) Ibid, p. 103. 
(34) Ibid, p. 182. 
(35) Ibid, p. 184. 
( 36) PL, p. 356. 
(37) Ibid, p. 357. 
(38) Cf. PC, vol.ii, pp. 91-2, "then indeed love furnished that 
basis for the consciousness of the community which intell-
igence, without love, in a highly complex realm, can no 
longer furnish." · 
Chapter VI •. ~n~on with God. 
(1) SRI, p. 75. 
(2) LM, Harvard College, 1915-16. 
(3) Ibid, p. 18, October, 1915. 
(4) PC, vol.ii, p. 280. 
(5) Ibid, p. 281~ 
(6) Ibid, p. 296. 
(7) Ibid, p. 11. 
(8) Ibid, p. 16. 
(9) Toward the close of this volume he points out the foDowing 
lan~narks in his discussion. "Time, Interpretation, and 
the Community and finally the World as a Community, -
these have been the central ideas of the rretaphysical 
portion of our course. We have ever~vhere pointed out 
as v1e went, the connection between these ideas and the 
ethical and religious interests which we have also ex-
pounded and defended." PC, vol.ii, p. 422. 
(10) Ibid, pp. 264-5. 
(11) In Chapter I and II above. 
(12) PC, vol.ii, p. 87. 
{13) Ibid, pp. 68-9. 
(14) "The so-called individual is in certain respects a social 
group. He consists of various selves. Anybody is more or 
less a multiple personality. This belongs to the normal 
plasticity and fectuldity of social life." LM, p. 24. 
11 I call the self a social group for excellent reasons. 
These three selves, {past, present and future) are constant-
ly communicatine with each other. The present self re-
membern the past self. The future self is expected by the 
present self, and the expectation of itx affects the pres-
ent self. 11 Ibid, p. 27. 
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D. References (cont.) 
Chapter VI. Union with God (cont.) 
(15) PHR, p. 67. See Chapter VIII below for further discussion 
of this view. 
(16) cr. the quotations at the beginning of this section where 
Royce identifies these terms. 
(17) WI, vol.ii, p. 59 • 
(18) Or "logical analysis which produces synthesis", "Editor's 
Introduction11 , FE,pp. 27,30. Royce insists that in meta-
physics there may be no such thing as an analytical method 
carried on in distinction from a synthetic method. Cf. LM, 
Feb. 15, 1916. 
(19) Cf. Chapter IV. 
(20) WI, vol.ii, p. 55. 
(21) Ibid, p. 57. 
(22) Ibid, p. 102. 
(23) Ibid, p. 107. 
(24) Ibid, p. 102. 
(25) Ibid, p. 105. 
(26) Ibid, p. 107. 
(27) Ibid, p. 130. 
(28) Ibid, p. 139. 
(29) Ibid, p. 417. 
(30) In CG, p. 19, Royce points out that "our ignorance of real-
ity cannot mean an ignorance of some object that we conceive 
as existing apart from any possible experience or knowledge 
of what is. What you and I lack, when we lament our human 
ignorance is amply a certain desirable and logically poss-
ible state of mind, or type of experience.n 
(31) Ibid, p. 21. 
(32) Ibid, p. 33. 
(33) "Apart from our social consciousness, I myself should hold 
that we men, growing up as we do, can come to have no clear 
conception of truth, nor any definite power clearly to think 
at all. 11 Ibid, p. 33. 
(34) Ibid, p. 36. 
(35) Ibid, p. 44. 
(36) RAP, p. 393. 
(37) Ibid, p. 396. 
(38) Ibid, p. 405. 
(39) Ibid, p. 410. 
(40) Ibid, p. 425. 
(41) Ibid, p. 428. 
(42) Ibid, p. 430. 
(43) Ibid, p. 431. 
(44) CG, pp.45-6. 
(45) RAP, p. 144 • 
)46) Cf. RAP, Chapter Vi "Moral Insight" with PL, Chapter III, 
"Loyalty to Loyalty". 
(47) RAP, p. 194. 
(48) Ibid, p. 211. 
(49) Note the term co~munity appearing in RAP p. 211 as early 
as 1885. 
(50) Ibid, p. 195. 
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D. References (cont.) 
Chapter VI. Union with God. (cont.) 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
(56} 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
(64) 
(65) 
(66} 
( 67) 
(68) 
(69} 
(70) 
{71) 
(72) 
(73} 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80} 
Note Royce's definition of reality, "To be means to fulfil 
a purpose". WI, vol~ii, p. 335. 
See Chapter I above. 
Cf. WI, vol.ii, pp.30-42. Professor Hocking calls the 
Ought Royce's "prying-off place" for the other categories. 
11 I declare that this same temporal world is, when re-
garded in its wholeness, an Eternal order". WI,vol.ii,p.l38. 
Ibid, pp. 347-8. 
Ibid, p • 384. 
Cf. Ibid, pp. 384-5, also 389,391,393,405. 
PC, vol.i, pp. 215-267. 
Ibid, p. xiii. 
WI, vol.ii, p. 393. 
Ibid, p. 389. 
Ibid, p. 407 •. 
Ibid, p. 385. 
Ibid, p. 409. 
Ibid, p. 408. 
Ibid, 1 be. cit. 
Ibid, p. 390. 
Ibid, p. 408. 
Ibid, p. 386. 
Ibid, p. 398. 
SGE, p. 28. 
WI, vol.ii, p. 396. 
Ibid, p. 409. 
PC, vol.i, pp.l0-11. 
Ibid,. p. 16. 
Ibid, pp. 362-64. 
Ibid, pp. 366-7. 
SRI, p. 75; also p.l5. 
Cf. PC, vol.ii, p. 379. 
In "What is Vital to Christianity", Royce concludes, 
"What is vital to Christianity includes an acceptance of 
the two cardinal doctrines of the incarnation and the 
atonement. For only in case these doctrines are accepted 
is it possible to interpret life in the essentially 
Christian way, and to live out this interpretation." 
WJ, p. 135. 
(81) The self 11 is not related to these other selves merely 
through the common relation to God; on the contrary, it 
is just as truly !'elated to God by means of its relation 
to them. Its life with them is an eternally fulfilled 
social life, and the completion of this eternal order 
also means the self-conscious expression of God, the 
Individual of Individuals, who dwells in all, as they 
in him." WI, pol.ii, pp. 446-7. 
(82) Ibid, p. 429. 
( 83) Ibid, p. 418, Cf. "tian, too, in our view is a Person". 
Ibid, p. 425. 
(84) Ibid, p. 286. See alsop. 427. 
( 85) Ibid,- ·p. -445. 
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Chapter VI. Union with God. (cont.) 
(86) CG, pp. 217-326. 
(87) WI, vol.i, pp. 473-588. 
(88) CI, pp. 1-80. 
{89) WI, vol.ii, pp. 431-2. 
(90} CI, p. 30. 
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tency in the same way when he takes finite ignorance up 
into the Absolute. For as E. S. Brightman points out, 
(Introduction to Philosophy, p.244) genuine ignorance and 
perfect knowfeuge can hardly dwell together in the same mind. 
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G. Autobiography. 
I was born at Niantic, Connecticut, February 19,1898, 
of Martha Cadwallader and John Edward Johnson. In 1900 we moved 
to Waterloo, Iowa, where I attended the public schools, being grad-
uated from the West High School of that city in 1916. 
My liberal arts course was pursued at Cornell College, 
Mount Vernon, Iowa, where I majored in Sociology and minored in 
English, receiving the A. B. degree in 1920. From there I went 
to the University of Chicago for one year and three summers, lead-
ing to the A. M. degree, granted by the School of Education in· 
the Fall of 1921. My thesis was a curricularand text book anal-
ysis of "Religious· Instruction in American Colleges. 11 
In September, 1920, I entered Boston University School 
of Theology and received the S. T. B. degree in June 1923. The 
year following I served as Graduate Eellow in Philosophy at Bos-
ton University while continuing my studies in the Graduate School. 
During the year 1924-25, I was Assistant in the Department of 
Philosophy at Brown University, participating in seminars there· 
and prAparing for the oral examination at Boston University. In 
that year and the current one I have also engaged in research 
studies at Harvard University. 
The year 1925-26 was spent in travel and study of the 
Chinese language at the Yenching School of Chinese Studies, Pe-
king and the Union Language School, Chengtu. In Chengtu I taught 
Ethics in West China Union University and Philosophy of Life in 
the Chengtu National Normal College, and was appointed principal 
to the Methodist Middle School there. 
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the College and Extension Courses, and Sociology in the College 
of Practical Arts and Letters of Boston University. 
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